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 What explains the resilience of authoritarian regimes in the face of regular 
competitive elections that ostensibly should promote democratic transitions?  This 
dissertation examines both why and how parliamentary elections in Jordan and Morocco 
have served to reinforce these two Arab monarchies. In doing so, it develops a framework 
in which the degree of cohesion among incumbent and opposition elites shape electoral 
system design and, in turn, particular electoral rules structure mass political attitudes and 
elite configurations.  The main argument is that lower electoral thresholds generate 
unique electoral environments in which patronage politics thrive and opposition-based 
politics falter, thus producing a decidedly uneven playing field.  In the end, this study 
examines four additional case studies from the Arab world in order to construct a 
typological theory about the conditions under which elections reinforce or undermine 
regime stability and then discusses the policy implications for democracy assistance 
programs.  This project is grounded within the classic and contemporary literature on the 
role of elites in democratic transitions, the design and functioning of electoral systems 
and the relationship between elections and authoritarianism. The research design is based 
on a comparison of “most similar” cases and utilizes a “mixed method” approach that 
draws from qualitative and quantitative data.  The empirical analysis, which focuses on 
the 2007 parliamentary elections in Jordan and Morocco, is derived from intensive 
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WHY AND HOW ARAB REGIMES  
CONSISTENTLY WIN ELECTIONS 
  
 
 The past decade has presented a decidedly mixed record on elections in the Arab 
world.  At the dawn of the new millennium, initial signs pointed towards a continuation 
of competitive elections as part of a gradual liberalization in the region.  While the 
liberation of Iraq in 2003 failed to unleash a democratic “tsunami” and even gave fodder 
to some anti-democratic sentiments, a “new reform ferment” had taken hold in the region 
(Hawthorne 2005).  During the first half of 2005, elections in Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon 
provided further impetus for political change.  Buoyed by scenes of purple ink-stained 
fingers in Baghdad and popular protests in the streets of Cairo and Beirut, some media 
commentators and democracy enthusiasts quickly labeled this period as the “Arab 
Spring” that would mark the downfall of authoritarian regimes across the region.1  
 Just few years later, however, a number of countervailing forces seemed to augur 
the return of a long, cold winter under authoritarianism.  Elections in Iraq hardened 
sectarian divisions as politicians struggled with the practicalities of sharing political 
power during escalating violence.  Subsequent elections in Lebanon and Kuwait yielded 
political stalemates that neutralized prior democratic impulses.  Egypt imposed a 
                                                
1 Interestingly, this catch phrase also became part of the political debate over the Bush administration’s  




crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular opposition fell into disarray.  
Islamist parties in Morocco and Jordan were dealt serious setbacks after parliamentary 
elections in the fall of 2007.  By this time, the early euphoria for democratic 
transformation in the Middle East was displaced by the harsh reality of deeply entrenched 
authoritarian regimes.2   
 
Puzzle: Do Authoritarian Elections Matter? 
 Although the “Arab Spring” was short lived and quickly forgotten, the resurgence 
of authoritarianism and its durability presents an intriguing puzzle in the face of 
traditional assumptions about elections and political change.  Political scientists 
traditionally have afforded great importance to elections and, for better and worse, have 
put these events at the center stage of their theoretical propositions and empirical testing 
grounds.  Some overreach in claiming elections represent “moments of great drama” for 
democratic transitions (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 62) and emphasize the role of 
elections in facilitating the breakdown of authoritarian regimes (Linz 2000).  In the 
context of the Middle East, Marsha Pripstein Posusney (2002: 34) argues that recent Arab 
parliamentary elections “create the basis for democratic activists to gradually chip away 
at persistent authoritarian rule.”  
 This line of thinking is certainly in tune with theories that claim “liberalization is 
inherently unstable” (Przeworski 1991: 58) and liberalized authoritarianism is a “halfway 
house” that does not stand (Huntington 1991: 137).  Przeworski’s (1991) famous “thaw” 
principle, for example, refers to liberalization as “a melting of the iceberg of civil society 
                                                




that overflows the dams of the authoritarian regime.” We should therefore expect that a 
general trend of political liberalization across the Arab world over the past two decades 
would have released democratic floodwaters.  Alas, this has not been the case.  Elections 
may expose small cracks in Arab authoritarian dams but they more often buttress them. 
 Although it has become fashionable to credit elections with the resuscitation of 
dormant civil societies in the “third wave” era, this study presents a less sanguine view of 
these so-called democratic impulses and expressions of “people power.”  Indeed, my aim 
here is to illuminate the unseen realm of electoral engineering that reinforces traditional 
forms of control and insulates the regime from electoral accountability.  The literature is 
replete with works that discuss elections in the context of political liberalization and 
democratization in the Arab world.3  But less is known about how these elections have 
become instruments of authoritarian maintenance more than catalysts for political 
change.4  This study examines the conditions under which elections reinforced regimes in 
the Middle East, with a particular focus on recent parliamentary elections in Jordan and 
Morocco.  Was the lackluster performance of influential Islamist parties and success of 
pro-regime forces attributable to particular electoral arrangements?  If so, can we identify 
specific mechanisms that reinforce authoritarianism and forestall democratization?   
 According to the conventional wisdom, these are not difficult questions because 
they assume a priori that these elections were significant.  Put starkly, the “Arab Spring” 
never materialized because these elections were orchestrated events and their outcome 
was never really in doubt.  Adherents to the “electoralist fallacy” school of thought 
                                                
3 Among the most well known works are the two edited volumes by Korany, Brynen and Noble (1999). 
 
4 Wiktorowicz(2000) makes a similar argument with regards to the concept of civil society in the Middle 




dismiss elections and conveniently relegate them as “window dressing.”5  It is difficult to 
pinpoint exactly where this myopic viewpoint originates but much of our thinking about 
authoritarian elections, and particularly in the Arab world, has probably been colored by 
normative assessments of the region and its compatibility with democracy.6  From single-
party elections under communism to a closed-choice referendum on a dictator’s rule, 
skeptics can easily point to harsh repression and overt manipulation that renders 
authoritarian elections downright farcical.7  If some form of competition actually did 
occur, the underlying sources of authority were “walled off” within the political system.  
Popular analyses have lent some credence to these arguments by labeling them “façade 
elections” and arguing that, even in the case of established democracies, elections more 
often epitomize a parlor game among governing elites.   
 Although this perspective has powerful appeal from those viewing elections 
through a prism of democratic ideals, it has recently come under much needed scrutiny 
and criticism.8  In the paragraphs below, I highlight a number of political realities in the 
Arab world that challenge the dominant understanding of elections and pose a series of 
research questions based on an emerging scholarship that force us to rethink both why 
                                                
5 The “electoralism” argument was first conceived by Karl and Schmitter (1991) with regards to Latin 
America but since has been applied frequently to the Arab world.  Sadiki (2009) devotes an entire book to 
what he calls “electoral fetishism” in the region. 
 
6 British historian Elie Kedourie argued in his oft-cited book (1992) that there is “nothing in the political 
traditions of the Arab world…which might make familiar, or indeed intelligible, the organizing ideas of 
constitutional and representative government.” Stepan and Robertson (2003) also present cross-regional 
evidence that the Arab world suffers from a severe “democracy gap” that is unique.  
 
7 Among the more egregious examples, Saddam Hussein received a near unanimous vote of approval in 
2003 only months before the U.S. invasion. Five years later, Myanmar’s ruling junta somehow won a 
referendum just days after failing to provide aid to its own population in the wake of a devastating cyclone.   
8 Lust-Okar (2006, 2008, 2009), most notably, has offered various critiques of this view and highlighted 




and how such elections are held.  I contend that if we want to understand incumbent 
electoral dominance in the Arab world, we must shift our focus away from crude forms of 
coercion and fraud, and instead examine the institutional mechanisms that tilt the 
electoral playing field decidedly towards ruling parties and elites. 
 
Questions: Why Parliamentary Elections? 
 A number of empirical realities problematize conventional wisdom about 
elections in the Middle East.  First of all, we cannot ignore that Arab regimes have 
devoted substantial resources to organizing ostensibly “free and fair” elections.  Besides 
the financial costs associated with administering elections, a number of Arab 
governments facilitated relatively open debates and tolerated some criticism, initiated 
efforts to improve voter registration procedures and invited election monitors to certify 
the tabulation of results.  In terms of this study’s focus, incumbent rulers have also 
established electoral systems that promote political pluralism.  Why would kings bent on 
monopolizing power allow rules that effectively disperse it among competing forces?  
And yet why have resulting partisan legislatures strengthened the regime?9 
 The second reason our understanding is flawed is because Arab parliamentary 
elections actually are contested and do feature vigorous competition across the political 
spectrum, including legalized Islamist parties with militant offshoots that reject the 
legitimacy of the regime in power.  Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile the notion that 
Arab elections are meaningless when they are in fact extremely meaningful for insiders.  
In this case, the critical questions are framed around the motivation and participation of 
                                                




elite actors.  Why do opposition leaders agree to participate in elections they know are 
unfair?  And yet why do Islamists often succeed?  Along this vein, a popular assumption 
holds that Islamist parties would sweep elections and be catapulted into power under 
democratic conditions.  But Muslim voters are still routinely swayed by clientelistic 
appeals and freely choose to re-elect local patrons.  Why do the potent mobilization 
capacity and social networks of political Islam still fall short?10 
 Finally, many preconceptions about the influence of political economy do not 
hold in the region.  For example, we should expect that poverty and unemployment, 
which is endemic to many Arab countries and is particularly acute in Morocco in Jordan, 
would create fertile ground for opposition groups to unite behind a common platform 
based on systemic inequality and disaffection.  Yet Arab socialism has lost much of its 
electoral appeal and coordination among opposition parties produces few tangible gains.  
On the other side of the coin, the Arab world is not immune from the pressures of “rising 
expectations” created by globalization (Henry and Springborg 2001).  Rulers that have 
spearheaded neoliberalist policies should also expose rifts between a rising class of 
entrepreneurs and an “old guard” of conservative forces.  What then explains the 
persistence of incumbent regimes in the face of elite ruptures and opposition coalitions?   
       
Arguments: Authoritarian Elections as “Windows,” not “Window Dressing” 
 My core argument is that we must examine the so-called “rules of the game” to 
understand more fully why Arab regimes consistently win elections.  Consequently, this 
study focuses on the role of electoral systems in structuring electoral behavior and elite 
                                                




configurations in Morocco and Jordan.  To begin, I reject facile arguments that elections 
in these two cases are merely “window dressing” with the sole purpose of manufacturing 
legitimacy for the monarchy.  Rather, I contend that various electoral arrangements 
actually provide a window into the levels of elite cohesion within these two regimes.   
 Tracing the logic of electoral system design in Morocco and Jordan, I develop an 
explanatory framework in which the degree of cohesion among incumbent and opposition 
elites shapes electoral system design and defines the parameters of electoral 
manipulation.  In a comparative historical analysis of the two main case studies, I argue 
that cohesion among ruling elites and disunity within the opposition have provided the 
regime ample leeway to engineer electoral outcomes in its favor.  I also contend that in 
the absence of these conditions, most notably when splits occur in the ruling coalition, the 
capacity for electoral manipulation is eroded and regimes more likely face zero-sum 
choices in electoral strategies.  I later demonstrate that this model holds not only for 
Morocco and Jordan but also for a series of secondary cases in the Arab world.  The 
choice of electoral rules thereby reveals the inner clockwork of the regime. 
 Although insights into electoral system design may present a window into 
authoritarian regimes, they only provide a partial explanation for their durability.  
Therefore, my study also explores the consequences of electoral rules for two distinct sets 
of political actors in order to shed light on the micro-foundations of political behavior.  
Based on a “within case” analysis of parliamentary elections in 2007, I posit that the 
electoral setbacks of the main Islamist party in Morocco and the electoral successes of 
pro-regime elites in Jordan can be partially explained by recent changes to electoral rules. 




environments in which patronage politics thrive and opposition-based politics falter, thus 
producing a decidedly uneven playing field.  Lower electoral thresholds in these 
environments thus produce a different incentive structure for voters, candidates, parties 
and parliamentarians. 
 An electoral threshold is loosely defined as the minimum number of votes 
required to win an elected office.  Thresholds can occur “naturally” in the sense that they 
are a product of other variables in the system or they can be imposed “artificially” by 
establishing a percentage of votes required to win a seat.  I am interested in natural 
effective thresholds as the intentional result or unintentional byproduct of changes to 
electoral rules.   Higher or lower electoral thresholds structure the arenas in which 
political actors compete, the choices available to voters and the methods in which votes 
are translated into seats.   
 This allows a number of propositions to emerge.  My first working hypothesis 
stipulates that lower electoral thresholds create environments conducive to clientelistic 
politics.  My second working hypothesis relates to the influence of these factors on 
regime preferences for electoral arrangements.  The third and fourth hypotheses relate to 
the consequences of lower electoral thresholds on the ability of voters to coordinate and 
the constraints on parliamentarians.  Each of the four working hypotheses listed below 
are unpacked and tested in a corresponding chapter (in parentheses) of the empirical 
analysis that follows. 
 
H1: Opposition elites, ruling elites and voters respond to lower electoral thresholds 





H2: Regimes undergoing liberalization processes often opt for electoral rules that 
lower thresholds in order to reinforce clientelism. (Chapter 2) 
 
H3: Lower electoral thresholds negatively impact the opportunities for mass 
mobilization and the parameters in which coordination can occur. (Chapter 3) 
 
H4: Lower electoral thresholds negatively impact the ability of parliamentarians to 
challenge patronage networks controlled by the regime. (Chapter 4) 
 
Approach: “Structured Contingency” 
 In making these arguments, I am sensitive to debates between structure and 
agency and recognize that an attempt to explain political behavior and electoral outcomes 
based on institutional arrangements is susceptible to an excessive functionalism in which 
electoral rules must serve the regime in some way.  While there is no electoral archetype 
in the region and key actors do not have perfect information in designing electoral 
systems, I contend that ruling elites increasingly understand how particular electoral rules 
function and how they can be used to reinforce traditional forms of control.  Similarly, 
opposition elites also weigh the costs and benefits of electoral participation and 
sometimes do not fully compete so as not to provoke an adverse reaction from the 
regime.11  They may scale back their platforms and run limited candidates or party slates 
in order to protect their own preexisting patronage networks.  My study thus operates 
under the assumption that rational political actors make strategic decisions within the 
context of elections, even if it leads to seemingly irrational behavior and paradoxical 
outcomes at the ballot box. 
                                                
11 Many analyses of electoral participation in the Middle East do not assume that Islamist parties are vote-
maximizers in the traditional sense.  Instead, some suggest that Islamists practice self-limiting behavior and 
envisage elections as a transitory stage while their ultimate ambitions and democratic commitments remain 




  Although I attempt to remain agnostic in meta-theoretical debates, my analysis is 
clearly situated within the actor-centric church of contingent choice.  I acknowledge that 
this approach is imbued with a considerable degree of voluntarism and that many 
contingency models neglect deeper underlying conditions.  As Colomer (2000: 5) also 
points out, “much of its work focuses on a contingency of the outcomes which seemed to 
be attained almost by chance, rather than the rationality of the actors involved in such 
circumstances.”  To overcome potential ontological and epistemological dilemmas, my 
approach seeks to balance the explanatory weight of elite configurations in assessing the 
decision-making processes of key political actors (namely the king).   
 Consequently, I adopt the “structured contingency” approach developed by 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997) in which political behavior is not just the consequence 
of structural precedent but also an independent social force and analytic factor in its own 
right.  But instead of explaining regime transitions (as Bratton and van de Walle do for 
Africa), I seek to develop a novel and theoretically enriching explanation of regime 
stability in the Middle East based on a neo-institutional framework that examines the 
extent to which formal electoral rules reinforce informal politics of patronage.  While 
ideational factors, cultural legacies and historical tides offer compelling explanations for 
authoritarianism, they also should not be used to impose a static view of the Arab world.  
Following the influential work of others,12 I contend that authoritarianism has changed 
qualitatively in recent years as part of a calculated strategy by key political actors.  If we 
are to understand political change and continuity in the Middle East, we must therefore 
                                                




examine the decisions of these actors, their context and the incentive structure that 
motivated them.  
 This explanation enables me to transcend well-worn cultural arguments about the 
compatibility of Islam with democracy and overly deterministic arguments about rentier 
economies.  Instead, it seeks to uncover one of the underlying mechanisms of control—
how certain Arab regimes successfully manage internal relationships among key political 
actors by manipulating the “rules of the game.”13  I contend that electoral rules are not 
only engineered for regime interests to “win” and the opposition to “lose” but go much 
further in terms of structuring elite configurations and the type of opposition in the 
political system.  Unified ruling coalitions and divided oppositions have a positive effect 
on regime stability whereas elite defections and opposition coalitions produce instability.  
My explanation for authoritarian resilience in the Middle East thus centers on the 
relationships and bonds among elites.  The concept of “elite cohesion” will receive more 
sustained discussion later.  
 This introductory chapter has so far described the central puzzle of this study, 
spelled out the main research questions and highlighted my arguments and approach.  
Having sketched out the broad contours of my study, I proceed by specifying the scope 
conditions and describing the main variables of the model that drives it.  It is important to 
note that the following section is abbreviated by design.  Subsequent chapters will 
elucidate my explanatory framework in greater detail and describe the methods used to 
evaluate various arguments and test specific hypotheses. 
                                                
13 I recognize that Islamist movements are collective actors that key targets for electoral manipulation. But 




Key Terms: Authoritarianism, Elites, Explanatory and Outcome Variables 
 The central aim of this dissertation is to investigate how electoral institutions 
benefit authoritarian regimes.  More specifically, I am interested in a regime subtype 
which Howard and Roessler (2006) have called “competitive authoritarianism” because it 
recognizes, among other characteristics, that elections allow for a minimal level of 
genuine competition.14  This conceptualization presents an appropriate scope condition 
for my study because it does not allude to particular regional or cultural dimensions that 
could relegate any potential subset of cases as idiosyncratic.15  For purposes of 
convenience, I use “competitive authoritarian” and the more generic term “authoritarian” 
interchangeably throughout this study. 
 To recap, one of my main arguments is that varying degrees of elite cohesion 
shape the design of electoral systems which, in turn, help to reinforce regimes by 
structuring configurations among elites.  Following Burton et al. (1992: 10), I use the 
term elites as analytical shorthand for “persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic 
positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and 
importantly.”  This definition helps to differentiate different types of elites within society 
and their role with collective actors such as political parties.  While the role of economic 
elites is vitally important to the study of regime stability in the Middle East and has been 
                                                
14 See the authors’ tree diagram (Figure 1) for a helpful illustration of various electoral dimensions.  
 
15 Other conceptualizations such as “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler 2006) and “monarchical 




addressed elsewhere,16 I focus on political elites because they are the primary agents 
associated with the origins and consequences of electoral rules.  
 At this point, it is important to underscore that I do not claim that some arcane set 
of electoral laws explains Arab authoritarianism.  But, at the same time, neither I do fall 
back on historical legacies, abstract socio-cultural frames or nebulous social structures so 
as to “explain away” the democracy deficit in the region.17  Rather, I seek to illuminate 
the interaction of particular electoral rules and forms of clientelism within distinct venues 
of electoral campaigns and elected legislatures.  Before describing how this framework 
unfolds, I first conceptualize several key terms and operationalize some of them.    
 The explanatory variable is electoral rules.  Since so many studies of electoral 
rules have focused on their supposed “effects,” the first step involves moving beyond this 
terminology.  Effects imply causes, which are often elusive and difficult to prove in 
social science.  As such, this study focuses on the general consequences of electoral 
rules.18  The definition is relatively straightforward as electoral rules constitute the 
legislative framework governing elections that are codified into law but open to 
amendment by the political process (Norris 2004: 7).  Following Rae (1971), I 
operationalize this variable based on three critical components of electoral rules: ballot 
structure, district magnitude and the electoral formula.  The ballot structure refers to how 
voters indicate their preference: whether one votes for a single candidate, a slate of 
                                                
16 The following works have addressed the role of business elites in Arab politics: Crystal (1990) and 
Chaudhry (1997) on merchants in the Arabian peninsula; Vitalis (1997) on capitalists in interwar Egypt, 
and Bellin (2002) on state-sponsored development in Tunisia. 
 
17 This marks a fundamental departure from other prominent studies of authoritarianism in Morocco and 
Jordan.  See the literature review in Chapter 2 for examples. 
 




candidates or a party; the number of votes allowed; and the ability to rank-order votes by 
preference.  District magnitude refers to the number of seats filled at an election in an 
electoral district and is commonly described as single-member districts or multi-member 
districts.  The electoral formula is the method in which votes are translated into seats and 
is classified into two major families: majoritarian and proportional.  In short, 
majoritarian formulae allocate seats to those who win a plurality or absolute majority of 
votes whereas the latter allocate seats according to the proportion of votes cast for each 
party or candidate.19  
 Clientelism is another key term.  It has often been used loosely to serve as a 
“catch-all” concept and various forms of clientelism have been described in a variety of 
contexts under a range of disciplines.  Therefore, it is important for the purposes of this 
study to be more precise and provide a definition of clientelism that applies directly to 
electoral behavior and outcomes.  At the same time, a definition should not be so narrow 
and limited that it lacks general applicability.  With this in mind, I am interested in 
electoral clientelism within the context of contemporary authoritarianism.   
 In Elections without Choice, Rouquié (1978: 23) neatly summarizes this form of 
clientelism as an asymmetrical relationship between two parties that involves an unequal 
exchange of goods.  In this case, individuals of higher socioeconomic status (patrons) 
provide benefits to a people of lower status (clients) who reciprocate by offering specific 
forms of support.  Under these conditions, competition for political office features 
patrons who provide access routes to material resources and patronage that can be 
distributed to supporters who have helped elect members of the party or preferred 
                                                




candidates.  The ability of candidates or incumbent elites to deliver patronage thus 
depends on their acquiescence to the “rules of the game.”  Even when voters prefer an 
alternative to clientelistic policies they vote according to their patron’s preference in fear 
of being shut out from the perks of clientelism.20   
 The empirical chapters examine vote shares for candidates and parties across 
electoral districts to infer the extent to which voters were affected by clientelist logic.  
Assessing the role of clientelism without individual-level data is admittedly an imperfect 
approach but cross-comparison of districts that feature different characteristics and levels 
of competition does yield some interesting results.  They show that votes were largely 
dispersed across the ideological spectrum and range of candidates, thus showing the lack 
of strategic coordination that occurred in recent elections. 
 The third key term relates to the outcomes of elections in terms of regime 
stability.  Many studies about Middle East elections disproportionately focus on the 
participation and performance of Islamist actors at the expense of ruling parties, 
incumbent elites and other pro-regime forces.  While this analytical lacuna is mostly 
attributable to the infatuation with political Islam among many Western scholars and 
policymakers, there are also a number of methodological dilemmas in defining regime 
stability and then comparing it across different cases.  One of the first tasks therefore 
involves finding appropriate indicators to assess the density of authoritarian rule rather 
than simply measuring the absence of democracy.21  For this reason, I prefer the term 
                                                
20 See Lust (2009) for a more current discussion of clientelism in competitive elections in the Middle East. 
 
21 I am referring here to scores assigned by Freedom House, Polity and the World Bank that all tend to 
measure authoritarian regimes in terms of their non-democratic qualities. See Howard and Roessler (2006) 




regime stability because it provides some conceptual flexibility while narrowing the 
scope of inquiry.   
 Although many analyses of authoritarianism privilege the coercive apparatus of 
the state and other regime power structures (Bellin 2002, Cook 2007), I favor a definition 
based on the cohesion of elites and opposition actors.  This conceptualization allows me 
to operationalize regime stability as a function of unified or divided configurations of 
elites as originally developed by Higley and Burton (1988).  This binary categorization is 
admittedly crude but my purpose here is not to provide a precise calibration of internal 
political dynamics.  Rather, I seek to develop a general explanatory framework for 
regime stability that underscores shifting power equilibriums across cases during distinct 
temporal periods.  This framework constitutes the crux of my research design, to which I 
now turn.  
 
Research Design: Plan of the Dissertation 
 To recap, my basic model theorizes that the degree of cohesion among elites and 
opposition actors shapes electoral system design and, in turn, affects configurations of 
these key political actors.  It follows that unified elites and divided oppositions help 
explain regime stability through electoral dominance whereas elite ruptures and 
opposition coalitions commonly lead to regime instability through electoral miscues.  
Although both formal electoral rules and informal patron-client relationships produce 
incentives and constraints for political actors, my study is primarily concerned with 




in this model represent both the independent and dependent variable and suggest a 
recursive relationship between elections and authoritarian governance (see Figure A). 
 







 The research design has two distinct parts related to the origins and effects of 
electoral rules even though they are intimately related.  The first part examines the 
conditions under which two Arab monarchies established their electoral systems and 
what motivated the regimes to changes the “rules of the game” when they did.  Chapter 1 
develops an explanatory framework for understanding electoral system design and 
changes based on elites perceptions of power in an explicit and parsimonious manner. 
Chapter 2 then provides a background of parliamentary elections in the primary case 
studies and applies the framework based on comparative historical analysis of secondary 
resources.  The empirical puzzle that animates this chapter is why these “most similar” 
cases employed different electoral systems at the onset of liberalization and then both 
enacted fundamental electoral reforms under new kings.  It develops an explanation in 
which changes to the electoral system occurred during periodic shifts in relative power 
among elites and the opposition.  In doing so, I argue that political actors made strategic 








reform (Schedler 2006).22  These rules are thus mechanisms not only for the purpose of 
engineering outcomes and providing material payoffs in the short term but also for 
structuring partisan politics within the broader system.   
  The second part of the research design focuses on the consequences of particular 
electoral rules.   Besides presenting a model for institutional design, Chapter 1 also 
develops an explanatory framework for understanding the effects of electoral rules and 
assessing their explanatory weight within prevailing clientelist structures.  My basic 
premise is that electoral rules under competitive authoritarianism encompass two 
fundamental purposes: 1) to manage arenas of competition among different groups; and 
2) to maintain political control over rival groups.  In order to gauge the influence of 
electoral rules along these two dimensions, I adopt the model conceptualized by Pippa 
Norris (2004:14) in which “formal electoral rules (the independent variable) impact the 
behavior of rational politicians (the intermediate variable) which then exert direct and 
indirect effects on the electorate (the dependent variable).”  My model theorizes that 
changes to the electoral rules shape the political behavior of political actors which, in 
turn, affects the cohesion of elites and opposition actors.  Figure B presents a basic causal 





                                                
22 As Schedler (2006: 109-110) states, “...neither incumbents nor opponents will perceive manipulated 
elections as an ‘equilibrium’ solution that corresponds to their long-term interests. Rather they will accept 
the rules of the electoral game as a temporary compromise, a provisional truce continent on current 











 In Chapters 3 and 4, I apply this framework to a “within-case” analysis of 
parliamentary elections in Morocco and Jordan that occurred only several months apart in 
the latter half of 2007.  In both cases, Islamist opposition parties were dealt serious 
electoral setbacks and a number of pro-regime forces scored surprising victories.  These 
chapters explore the extent to which electoral rules shaped the incentive structure for 
candidates, voters, parties and parliamentarians.  I argue the failure of voters to coalesce 
around Morocco’s main Islamist party and the successful incorporation of Jordan’s “new 
capitalists” in parliament can be partially explained by changes to electoral rules that 
lowered thresholds. 
 The empirical analysis is based on original research derived from intensive 
fieldwork in both countries.  The primary methods for data collection included direct 
observation of Morocco’s parliamentary elections in September 2007 and key informant 
interviews conducted with newly elected parliamentarians in Jordan in July 2009.23  In 
                                                
23 In Morocco, I was invited to be an international election observer for the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI).  The observer mission included briefings with Moroccan officials and representatives several days 
before the elections.  I was dispatched with a small team of observers to the town of Midelt and personally 
observed voting and tabulation processes on election day. In Jordan, I spent one month in Amman as a 















both cases, I utilized qualitative individual-level information and cross-national 
quantitative data as a methodological form of “triangulation”.  The lack of reliable 
district-level data and inconsistencies with available resources largely prevented a 
structured comparison between the two cases.24  
 The empirical analysis will address two related questions.  First, under what 
conditions did these two monarchies seek to change electoral rules?  Second, to what 
extent do these rules enable the monarchies to manage elites?  Morocco and Jordan are 
ideal cases to examine the origins and effect of institutional choice because the two 
monarchies share many characteristics, with exception of their electoral systems, and 
both regimes arguably have become more entrenched through recent elections.  On the 
other hand, Morocco and Jordan are somewhat idiosyncratic cases in that their durability 
can be explained by the nature of the monarchy itself and the pervasiveness of clientelism 
coupled with the symbolic power of the palace.  With this limitation in mind, Chapter 5 
extends the empirical analysis to a theoretical model for understanding institutional 
change and regime continuity in the Middle East.  Four secondary cases help to assess the 
external validity of my model by identifying electoral mechanisms that were not effective 
in dividing the opposition and unifying supporters. 
  
Case Selection: Why Morocco and Jordan? 
 The kingdoms of Morocco and Jordan share many characteristics yet they also 
                                                                                                                                            
stay, I personally conducted over twenty key informant interviews, including many with newly elected 
members of parliament.  Most of the people interviewed in both countries were contacted through local 
contacts and the actual interview was often facilitated by a translator.    
 




exhibit variation in electoral system design and reform trajectories.  In order to define the 
parameters of the historical background and benchmarks for assessing changes to 
electoral rules, I focus on factors related to their parliamentary history, liberalization 
processes, as well as the participation and performance of Islamist parties in elections.  
Table A summarizes the main similarities, which are subsequently explained with other 
works cited that provide further details. 
 
 Table A: Summary of Main Similarities between Case Studies 
 
 Morocco Jordan 
Parliamentary 
History 
- Assertive parliament:  
1963-1965 and 1993-1997 
- Parliament dissolved:  
1966-1969 and 1972-1976 
- Assertive parliament:  
1956-1957 and 1989-1993 
- Parliament dissolved:  
1963-1967 and 1974-1978 
Onset of  
Liberalization 
- SAPs lead to unrest during 
early 1990s  
- Founding elections in 1993 
- SAPs lead to unrest during 
late 1980s  
- Founding elections in 1989 
Course of 
Liberalization 
- New king in 1999  
- Economic liberalization and 
political de-liberalization 
(2000-present) 
- New king in 1999  
 - Economic liberalization and 
political de-liberalization 
(2000-present) 
Freedom House (FH) 
“Political Rights”  
- Average score: 5 (2000-2008) - Average score: 5 (2000-2008) 
Islamist Parties - Moderate party (PJD) 
- First participation (1997) and 
high-water mark (2002) 
- Moderate party (IAF) 
- First participation and high-
water mark (1989) 
2007 Elections - Widespread disaffection   
- Electoral setback for PJD: 
Vote percentage (11%), seat 
share (14%) 
- Widespread disaffection 
- Electoral setback for IAF: 




Explanation of Similarities 
 
Parliamentary History: Although the parliaments of Morocco and Jordan have 
different origins, their histories have many parallels.25  Both parliaments experienced 
                                                
25 See Baaklini et al. (1999) for a more thorough survey of legislative development in the two cases among 




brief periods of assertiveness after independence and during the early 1950s that 
coincided with pan-Arabism and indigenous nationalist movements.  The parliaments 
then crossed certain “red lines” during the 1960s and 1970s, which led to their 
suspension and dissolution.  The parliaments eventually reasserted themselves 
following brief political openings and experiments with multipartyism in the 1980s. 
 
Onset of political liberalization:  Economic crises acted as catalysts for political 
liberalization in Jordan and Morocco even though the two monarchies dealt with them 
differently.26  During the late 1980s and early 1990s, both monarchies were forced to 
accept austere Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that alienated loyalists and 
emboldened some opposition actors.  Later, when social, political and economic 
pressures mounted, a series of elite bargains were struck that led to the initiation of a 
government-opposition dialogue, enactment of a national charter and a revival of 
parliament.  It is important to note that in both cases, the onset of liberalization that 
was deliberately initiated by the regime and coincided with so-called “founding 
elections” under new rules in Jordan (1989) and Morocco (1993).   
 
Course of political liberalization: Morocco and Jordan are generally regarded as 
“success stories” in political liberalization during the 1990s because they allowed a 
degree of social pluralism while also maintaining political stability.  According to 
Brynen (1999: 276), both monarchies acted simultaneously as both interested players 
and far-from-impartial umpires in the political reform process.  When aging monarchs 
passed away in both countries in 1999, many expected the young kings that ascended 
to the throne to accelerate political reforms.  Although the western-minded kings have 
pushed forward with economic liberalization, they have slowed down political 
liberalization and have even undertaken de-liberalization in some regards.   
 
Freedom House (FH) “Political Rights” Score: Morocco and Jordan generally share 
the same degree of political rights according to Freedom House.  The FH ratings 
process is based on a checklist of questions related to electoral processes, political 
pluralism and participation.27  “Political Rights” scores are measured on a 1 to 7 scale 
with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest.  Table B 
compares the “Political Rights” scores between the two cases across time periods.  
The results show very little variation 1990 to 2008 in both cases with the exception of 
the year 1992 when Jordan decreased to 3 and Morocco increased to 6.28  
 
 
                                                
26 See the book by Lust-Okar (2005) for an extensive analysis of the different responses. 
 
27 See  http://www.freedomhouse.org for the time-series data and discussion of the methodology. The 
“Political Rights” section also contains two additional discretionary questions for traditional monarchies 
such as Jordan and Morocco. 
 
28 As Stepan and Robertson (2003: 32) note, Arab-Mulsim majority countries received a political rights 




Table B: FH “Political Rights” Scores (Averages in Time Periods) 
  
 1990-1991 1992 1993-2000 2000-2008 
Jordan 5 3 4 5 
Morocco 5 6 5 5 
 
Islamist party: Morocco and Jordan have both allowed moderate Islamist parties to 
compete in the electoral arena, achieve representation in the parliament, and even 
wield some influence in select ministries.  One could also argue that the participation 
of the PJD and IAF has allowed the regime to control them while staving off 
democratic pressures.29  Indeed, the Islamists initially fared very well in 
parliamentary elections, which gave the regime an opportunity to recalibrate various 
laws and regulations for subsequent elections.  As a result, Islamist parties in 
Morocco and Jordan appear to have achieved their respective high-water marks in 
terms of voting percentages and seat shares.  
 
2007 elections: The most recent parliamentary elections in Morocco and Jordan were 
marred by widespread disaffection and apathy.  In Morocco, voter turnout plunged to 
a historic low of 37% while allegations of fraud and the general malaise among the 
public resulted in a dismal turnout as well.  Despite this electoral context, the political 
opposition failed to register any significant gains at the ballot box.  Most notably, the 
Islamist parties in both cases suffered stunning setbacks in failing to meet 
expectations regarding seats in the next parliament.  This so-called “electoral 
disaster”30 for Islamists has led some to speculate that the two parties have become 
internally divided.  On the other hand, both electoral outcomes also include surprising 
success for pro-regime forces and well-connected elites. 
 
 
 While the research design is based on an analysis of “most similar” cases, close 
inspection of their differences is also helpful to evaluate alternative explanations for 
electoral system design such as historical factors, demographic and economic 
characteristics, regime coalitions and opposition forces.  Table C below summarizes these 




                                                
29 See Brumberg (2002) for this argument applied in general to the Arab world. 
 
30 The November 17 edition of The Economist labeled these elections as an “electoral disaster” for Islamists 




Table C: Summary of Main Differences between Case Studies 
 
 Morocco Jordan 
Historical Factors - French colonization 
- Struggle for independence 
- British colonization 
- Negotiated independence 
Demographic characteristics - Population of 35 million 
- 56% urban population  
- Berber minority (20%) 
- Population of 6.2 million 
- 78% urban population  
- Circassian minority (2%) 
Economic characteristics - Larger economy 
- Agricultural sector 
- High urban unemployment 
- Modest oil production 
- Smaller economy 
- Service sector 
- General unemployment 
- No oil production 
World Bank (WB)  
“Stability” Score  
- Slightly less stable - Slightly more stable 




Explanation of Main Differences 
 
Historical factors: Morocco and Jordan have different colonial legacies.31  Morocco 
was colonized by the French and remained a protectorate for several decades before 
gaining independence in 1956. Morocco’s first king, Mohamed V, was an integral 
part of the struggle for independence even though it spawned a nationalist movement 
that would eventually challenge the monarch’s legitimacy.  In contrast, Jordan’s 
Hashemite monarchy initially ruled under the British Mandate and King Abdallah 
remained closely tied to his British allies up until Jordan received formal 
independence in 1949.  
 
Demographic characteristics: One of the largest disparities between the two cases is 
population. According to 2009 estimates32, Morocco has almost 35 million 
inhabitants whereas Jordan only has approximately 6.3 million.  Despite having 
several large urban centers, Morocco also has a much smaller urban population (56%) 
than Jordan (78%). Morocco and Jordan are predominantly Arab-Islamic countries 
but have significant minority populations.  Morocco’s Berber population 
(approximately 20%) is significantly more than Jordan’s Circassian/Armenian 
minority (2%).  Jordan’s substantial Palestinian population should also be noted 
considering that the traditional East Bank Hashemites may actually be a minority in 
their own country.   
                                                
31 Lust-Okar and Jamal (2002: 348) dispute whether this factor affected electoral system design based on 
the fact that Morocco used single-member districts and plurality rules until it switched to a proportional 
system in 2002.  
 
32 See The World Factbook from the CIA. Available online at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-





Economic characteristics:33 Although Morocco boasts a larger economy, its per 
capita GDP ($4,500) is less than Jordan ($5,200).  Morocco’s labor force is also 
almost ten times that of Jordan, almost half of which is in agriculture (45%).  While 
unemployment levels are slightly higher in Jordan (12%), Morocco faces nearly 20% 
unemployment in urban areas.  Jordan produces no oil while Morocco produces a 
modest amount.  In sum, most of these differences are negligible but they do indicate 
that Morocco may face more acute economic pressures.  Indeed, Moroccan 
authorities understand that reducing poverty and unemployment is key to domestic 
security and regime stability.  
 
World Bank (WB) “Stability” Score:34 According to Figure C, Morocco is slightly 
less stable than Jordan (with the exception of the year 2006).  The WB Score is a 
subjective governance indicator aggregated from a variety of sources and measuring 
perceptions of the likelihood of destabilization (ethnic tensions, armed conflict, social 
unrest, terrorist threat, internal conflict, fractionalization of the political spectrum, 
constitutional changes, military coups).  Estimates range between -2.5 and 2.5; higher 
is better.  This difference could be a reflection of prevailing demographic and 
economic conditions as described above.  It should be noted that Morocco and Jordan 




















                                                
33 These figures are also taken from The World Factbook. 
 
34 This scale seems to be sensitive to terrorism and external events in the region so it is difficult to assess 
whether the regimes themselves are actually more or less stable. For comparison, see the website of UNDP-
POGAR at http://www.arabstats.org/indicator.asp?ind=12 for a compilation of the World Bank data for the 









Polity “Autocracy” Score:35 According to Figure D below, Jordan has experienced 
greater fluctuations in autocracy than Morocco.  The trend lines show a steep drop in 
Jordan’s “Autocracy” score at the beginning of the 1990s whereas Morocco only 
experienced a gradual decline over the decade.  It is interesting to note that Jordan 
then became more autocratic during the mid-1990s.  The Polity composite variable is 
constructed additively from several other variables related to political participation 
and competitiveness.  The eleven-point scale ranges from 0 to 10 with the latter 
representing a full autocracy.  Jordan’s average score during the 1990s was 4.5 while 










                                                
35 The Polity IV Project covers 161 countries and includes historical data from 1800 to 2007 concerning 
regime stability, authority characteristics and transitions. The Polity IVd dataset features a new format in 
which the "polity-case" (rather than the "country-year") is the unit of analysis. That is, each observation 
(case) gives information for a polity over a discreet time period during which the scores on all of the 
component variables remain unchanged. See the Dataset Users’ Manual (Marshall and Jaggers 2009) for 
more information about the methodology. When “Autocracy” is subtracted from the “Democracy” score, 










Implications of the Study 
 The central thesis of this dissertation is that electoral rules are an important but 
overlooked mechanism that accounts for authoritarian resilience.  Electoral rules provide 
a window into the regime because they indicate perceptions of relative power among 
incumbent and opposition elites.  The manipulation of electoral rules often shapes the 
behavior of political actors (as an intermediate variable) as it relates to participation and 
competition in the electoral arena.  In turn, the “rules of the game” also influence mass 
political attitudes toward political actors and the electoral process itself.  The principal 
implication of this study is that it contributes to emerging scholarship on authoritarian 




workings of regimes.  This line of inquiry is important for both academics and 
policymakers for at least two important reasons. 
 For one, my study heeds the calls, both past and present, for scholars to 
investigate the micro-level dynamics of authoritarian elections and the systematic 
differences between them in order to distinguish elections that promote democratization 
from those that simply reinforce the existing regime (Linz and Stepan 1978; Lust-Okar 
and Gandhi 2009).  In addition to the obvious theoretical interest to scholars of 
democratization and authoritarianism, this line of inquiry can help policymakers both to 
understand why autocrats invite international election monitors and to identify the 
underlying “rules of the game” that often render ostensibly democratic elections as 
fundamentally “un-free and unfair.”  The concluding chapter discusses the policy 
implications of this study on election observation and legislative strengthening programs.  
 Second, my study engages the emergent literature on authoritarian elections and 
challenges some of the orthodoxy regarding electoral rules by explaining variation in two 
“most similar” cases and developing contingent generalizations based on other cases in 
the Middle East.  My study avoids the abstractness of cultural explanations and seeks to 
demystify the phenomenon of Arab authoritarianism by assessing the relationship 
between elections and authoritarianism.  As such, my study illuminates the “black box” 
of electoral engineering and uncovers one of the underlying mechanisms of regime 




















 By examining the resilience of two Arab monarchies through an institutional lens, 
comparativists gain a better understanding of why authoritarian regimes choose particular 
electoral arrangements and how they reinforce traditional forms of control.  Yet their 
metaphorical camera cannot capture the big picture if specific objects are obscured.  As I 
mentioned in the introduction, my “structured contingency” approach attempts to bridge 
an intellectual divide between structure and agency by focusing on the decisions made by 
key political actors (with the approval of the king) about electoral arrangements but 
recognizes that relationships among elites and clientelist interests structure these choices.  
 According to my model, electoral rules under competitive authoritarianism are 
designed to manage arenas of competition among different groups and to maintain 
political control over rival groups.  A number of key propositions follow from this basic 
premise.  They are: 
 
1. Political actors make strategic choices regarding electoral rules that are embedded 
within the larger game of political reform. 
2. Changes to the electoral system occur during periodic shifts in relative power 
among elites and the opposition.  
3. The combination of particular electoral rules and general forms clientelism shape 
political behavior which, in turn, produces certain configurations of elites. 
4. Unified ruling elites and divided opposition elites help explain regime stability 
through electoral dominance whereas elite ruptures and opposition coalitions 




 These propositions enable me to derive concrete hypotheses regarding the 
circumstances under which Morocco and Jordan changed electoral rules and how they 
impact regime stability.  But first I explain how this model is needed to address a 
theoretical bias within the existing literature.   
  
1. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
In the following section, I briefly survey the literature on authoritarianism and 
authoritarian elections while highlighting the influence of neoinstitutional approaches on 
these research programs.36  Although their ascendancy is important for guiding 
subsequent scholarship, I show how many important works privilege either formal or 
informal institutions and explain why a synergy between them is needed.  I also discuss 
relevant theories on electoral systems and clientelism separately. 
 
Literature Review: Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Elections   
 Explanations for the contemporary phenomenon of authoritarianism are at the 
forefront of a longstanding debate on regime types and subtypes, democratic transitions 
and non-transitions, and regime breakdowns around the world.  Some of the early 
literature on political modernization during the 1950s and 1960s provides a conceptual 
starting point for the question of authoritarian resilience in the Arab world.   
                                                
36 The literature on various thematic components of authoritarianism is exhaustive.  The purpose of this 
brief literature review, therefore, is not to provide a full account of all the relevant resources or merely to 
summarize the most salient ones.  Rather, the aim is to frame the central question regarding the relationship 




 After an initial wave of modernization theory failed to account for variation 
within the developing world, social scientists began to re-examine the salience of 
structural arguments and the validity of linear trajectories.  Scholars from a range of 
disciplines developed new approaches.  Some abandoned the study of formal legal 
institutions (i.e. laws) and moved toward particular aspects of political culture (e.g. 
Almond 1960) to explain slow-moving processes of political change.  Others loosened 
the definition of institutions to include class configurations and ideologies that chart 
historical pathways toward democracy or dictatorship (Moore 1966).  Relatively few 
sought to recast the role of institutions in explaining why some countries experience 
political development whereas others experience political decay.  Huntington (1965), 
most notably, argued that the existence of political institutions capable of giving 
substance to public interests distinguishes politically developed societies from 
undeveloped ones.  He later asserted that aspects of the so-called “modernization 
process” actually led to a deepening pattern of statist authoritarianism (1968).   
 During the 1970s, this line of thinking heavily influenced the study of political 
underdevelopment in particular regions.  In the case of Latin America, for example, 
social and economic modernization in the context of delayed development led to a form 
of “bureaucratic authoritarianism” rather than democracy (O’Donnell 1979). Although 
this concept captured many empirical realities, “bureaucratic authoritarianism” did not 
apply particularly well to the Middle East or serve as a tool for comparative analysis.37  
Instead, studies of Middle East politics increasingly focused on the exceptionalities and 
                                                
37 O’Donnell (1979) originally argued that social and economic modernization in the context of delayed 
development is more likely to lead to authoritarianism than democracy with special attention to the cases of 




features unique to the region.  The dominant narrative was that many Arab states 
emerged from political turbulence to a period of relative stability but still suffer from a 
“legitimacy shortage.”38  As a result, the introduction of multiparty elections in the region 
was linked reflexively with efforts to enhance legitimacy. Returning to the body of 
influential work by Huntington, he also postulated the well-known “king’s dilemma” in 
traditional monarchies such as Morocco where the demands of social mobilization clash 
with ineffective bureaucratic performance and governance, thus leading to political decay 
and the demise of such regimes.  Other prominent scholars also forecast a similar fate for 
cases of neotraditionalism such as Morocco (Linz 1975).  Yet over four decades later, 
monarchies have withstood the test of time and Huntington’s dire prediction that their 
future would be “bleak.”   
 The survival of Arab monarchies and neopatrimonial regimes in the Middle East 
has garnered significant interest from area scholars.  While this body of work initially 
focused on cases of regime change, recent studies have contributed to our knowledge of 
authoritarian resilience.39  Other studies have contributed to our understanding the 
politics of Gulf monarchies by examining political institutions (e.g. Herb 1999) but they 
are somewhat limited in that these institutions only encompassed the self-evident role of 
ruling families.40  Consequently, there is a growing recognition that the persistence of 
Arab monarchies is unique and that it should be integrated into comparative studies of 
                                                
38 This narrative is commonly associated with the seminal book on Arab politics by Hudson (1977). 
 
39 Kostiner’s edited volume (2000), for example, attempts to explain why some Middle East monarchies 
persist while others fail.  Brownlee (2002) examines Iraq, Syria, Libya and Tunisia to explain why some 
neopatrimonial regimes survive the kinds of intense domestic crises that topple similar systems.  
 
40 Lucas’ forthcoming book on Middle East monarchies promises to focus on the regimes’ institutional 




authoritarianism (Lucas 2004).  But instead of cluttering the conceptual landscape with 
new terms for “monarchical authoritarianism,” comparativists need to begin specifying 
particular mechanisms that operate across different cases. 
 More recently, a new generation of scholars within this research program has 
made the case for examining informal institutions associated with monarchical rule.  
Building on work that emphasizes the cultural frames of authoritarianism in Morocco 
(Hammoudi 1997), two recent doctoral dissertations argue that the monarchy’s use of 
“symbolic political manipulation” (Mednicoff  2007) and “rituals of power” (Daadaoui 
2008) limit the ability of Islamist and non-Islamist opposition groups to mobilize.  These 
studies do contribute to our understanding of the monarchy’s supremacy and continued 
political domination but they also carry the risk of resuscitating “exceptionalist” 
arguments with regards to this variant of authoritarianism.  My study avoids the 
abstractness of cultural explanations and seeks to demystify the phenomenon of 
authoritarianism by assessing the relationship between elections and authoritarianism, the 
subject of the literature to which I now turn. 
 As I previously alluded to in the introduction, one of the principal arguments in 
the debate about elections under authoritarianism is whether such events destabilize or 
reinforce the regime.  On one hand, some scholars point to a slippery slope that exists for 
authoritarian regimes trying to navigate between liberalization and democratization (i.e. 
O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).  Under these accounts, elections pose particular dangers 
to autocrats because of their inherent degree of uncertainty.  Thus, “liberalization is 
inherently unstable” (Przeworski 1991: 58) and liberalized authoritarianism is a “halfway 




views elections as instruments of autocratic control that reinforce and even prolong 
authoritarian rule (Linz 2000).  With regards to the Middle East, many scholars 
increasingly argue that liberalized autocracies manage to stave of democratic pressures 
by allowing tightly controlled elections (Brumberg 2002).  How does one reconcile these 
contrasting claims?   
 Rather than focusing on the polemics of why elections matter, this dissertation 
offers a potential solution in focusing on how elections matter.  In other words, the task at 
hand is to determine the conditions under which elections become competitive or 
uncompetitive.  Such an analysis should begin with a clear conceptual distinction of 
various types of authoritarian regimes. 
 With increased scrutiny of the “third wave” and skepticism of the accompanying 
“transition paradigm”, many scholars within the field of comparative politics have 
developed new analytical frameworks and typologies for classifying non-democratic 
regimes.  In fact, subtypes of authoritarianism have proliferated almost as rapidly as their 
earlier “democracy with adjectives” counterparts (Collier and Levitsky 1997).41  The 
common thread from this emerging research program is the use of intermediate categories 
to describe the “neither here nor there” qualities of various regimes (Diamond 2002) and 
the emphasis on the indeterminacy of transition processes (Carothers 2002).  In devising 
methods of observation and measurement, standard questions used to classify regimes 
(who rules?), study elections (who wins?) and resource allocation (who gets what?) have 
become less relevant.  Instead, they have given way to questions that seek to uncover how 
                                                
41 Some of the noteworthy conceptualizations include “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 




authoritarian rule functions, how authoritarian elections differ systematically from each 
other and how political actors under authoritarianism deliver patronage.  Without 
examining these questions, as Snyder (2006: 221) argues, we cannot understand 
variations in the dynamics and consequences of elections in the context of autocracy.  
Until these questions are more fully explored, political scientists and policy makers will 
be unable to distinguish elections that create momentum toward democratization from 
those which reinforce the existing regime (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).  My study heeds 
this call by examining both why and how authoritarian regimes have proven to be so 
resilient within the context of political liberalization, especially in the face of ostensibly 
“free and fair” elections that produce multiparty legislatures.  In doing so, it focuses on 
the interaction between formal electoral rules and informal politics and investigates how 
these types of institutions actually reinforce each other. 
 With this paradigmatic shift in the thinking surrounding democracy and 
authoritarian elections, scholars have now begun to explore the various roles that 
authoritarian elections fulfill and what both the regime and opposition hope to achieve 
from them.42  While this line of inquiry has yielded some conceptual clarity for 
understanding the logic of electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006), it still tends to reify 
the widespread assumption that the outcomes of authoritarian elections are determined 
solely through overt forms of electoral engineering and blatant coercion.43  For example, 
                                                
42 See Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) for a concise summary of this emerging scholarship. Brown 
(forthcoming) also provides a cogent synopsis of the literature specific to the Middle East.  
 
43 The controversial outcome of Iran’s presidential elections in June 2009 clearly demonstrates that 
authoritarian regimes still resort to fraudulent practices to secure favorable electoral outcomes and use 
coercion to enforce them. This case underscores the pitfalls of rigging elections and represents an exception 




studies that spell out the “menu of manipulation” (Schedler 2002a) and assess the 
“manipulative skills” of rulers (Case 2006) have generally focused on fraud, 
gerrymandering and vote tampering rather than explaining how the underlying 
institutional mechanisms skew electoral competition and shape elite behavior. 
 These issues also reflect a broader problem within the literature in that 
authoritarian elections are accorded importance only after they became competitive and 
the opposition has proved moderately successful (Levitsky and Way 2002: 54).  As 
Brownlee (2004: 42) comments incisively, “the mechanisms driving such outcomes 
remain obscured since no explanation is given for why competition emerges from a 
process that previously reinforced the status quo.”  A recent study on liberalizing 
electoral outcomes under competitive authoritarian regimes (Howard and Roessler 2006), 
for example, falls short in fully explaining the institutional mechanisms that affect the 
choices of opposition elites to form strategic coalitions.44  Unfortunately, it also reflects a 
tendency within the recent literature on authoritarian elections to focus on opposition 
movements rather than configurations among elites, and relationships between various 
factions within the regime’s ruling coalition.   
 These studies overlook or discount the classic work by Higley and Burton (1989) 
that examines the relationship between types of national elites and political stability.45  
My study uses their tripartite typology of elite configurations to examine how recent 
                                                
44 In their cross-national statistical analysis, the authors merely test the effect of political institutions by 
creating a dichotomous variable for presidential or parliamentary systems (374).  
 
45 Higley and Burton (1989) develop a tripartite typology of elite configurations: ideologically unified, 
consensually unified and disunified, which they claim is the most common type throughout history.  
According to their theory, the transformation from elite disunity to consensual unity is an essential 
precondition for political stability and that one of the routes for this transformation is when a consensually 




elections in Jordan were instrumental in incorporating a new elite of young economic 
entrepreneurs, thereby casting doubt on the argument that (at least in the case of Jordan) 
“change within Arab elites does not come through elections” (Perthes 2008: 26). 
 In sum, my study injects new evidence into the debate on authoritarian elections 
that these events are significant and meaningful to those who participate.  While I agree 
that elections alone do not make or break regimes, they do have the capacity to either 
buttress or undermine them.  The empirical analysis shows that elections have become a 
central arena for negotiations, relationships and competition among key political actors.  
In this sense, the combination of electoral rules and informal patron-client relationships 
do not determine so much who “wins” or “loses” in limited elections but rather structure 
configurations within the domestic political system.  Thus, as Schedler (2006: 6) asserts, 
“the same way authoritarian governance engenders authoritarian elections, authoritarian 
elections feed authoritarian governance.”  
 This literature review has summarized some of the seminal works on political 
development and touched upon some of the recent work on elections under 
authoritarianism.  My purpose is twofold.  First, I wish to highlight the shift away from 
traditional theories based on modernization and democratic transitions.  Although the 
history of elections before, during and after the “third wave” is replete with examples of 
elections that provided some impetus for liberalization, I am interested in cases that have 
been caught up in the autocratic undertow.   
 Second, I wish to introduce the broader theoretical debate between analyses of 
formal and informal institutions with regards to the study of authoritarianism.  When 




institutions have proven decisive in deflecting, defusing and undermining these 
challenges.  At the same time, however, formal electoral rules have also created an 
incentive structure that reinforces clientelism.  Consequently, I attempt to explicate the 
interaction between formal electoral politics and the informal politics of clientelism. 
 
Electoral Rules 
 Giovanni Sartori once famously described electoral systems as “the most specific 
manipulative institution of politics.”  Since then, there have been numerous studies that 
have explained the logic of electoral manipulation in different contexts.46  Yet this 
research has rarely been integrated into a broader understanding of electoral malpractice 
that involves the elements of strategic design.   
 Arendt Lijphart, one of the preeminent scholars in comparative politics, opined 
that “the study of electoral systems is one of the most underdeveloped in the field of 
political science (1985: 3).”  Lijphart further urged those working within the field “to 
discover the consequences of the different aspects of election rules (7).”  This came in 
spite of the fact that such studies were already well established (Rae 1971, Lijphart and 
Grofman 1984) and continued to flourish throughout the decade (Grofman and Lijphart 
1986, Taagepera and Shugart 1989) and beyond.  
 Although Lijphart’s survey is now considered among many to be a relic of the 
past, it does provide the basis for examining the scope of the field.  One consistent theme, 
for example, has been the relatively parochial focus on established democracies (e.g. 
Lijphart 1994).  While some recent studies have explored electoral systems in emerging 
                                                




democracies (Luoung 2002, Reynolds 2005, Lindberg 2005, Diamond and Plattner 2006), 
considerably less scholarship exists on electoral systems in non-democracies, particularly 
in the Middle East.   
 The limited literature on electoral systems in the Middle East suffers from several 
deficiencies.  For one, it is confined to structural arguments based on regime type and 
largely overlooks the strategic choices of key actors.  This study moves beyond the 
binary categorization of liberalizing one-party states and monarchies (Lust-Okar and 
Jamal 2002) 47 and instead focuses on how divisions within the ruling elite or opposition 
affect the outcomes of bargaining over electoral systems.  The second shortcoming 
relates to a normative bias against majoritarian systems that pervades studies of Arab 
regimes with strong ruling parties.  One such study argues that most Arab ruling parties 
undergoing pluralization prefer “winner-takes-all” electoral system to produce desired 
outcomes and forestall democratic reform (Posusney 2002).  I argue that incumbent 
dominance and authoritarian resilience is unrelated to the dichotomy between 
majoritarian and proportional systems.  Instead, I point to a number of electoral 
mechanisms that shape political behavior and, in particular, reinforce traditional forms of 
control through patron-client relationships. 
 It is only within the past several years that scholars have studied the effects of 
particular electoral arrangements in Arab countries.  Among these, Jordan’s electoral 
laws have attracted particular attention.  Lucas (2005: 83), for one, explains how changes 
                                                
47 To summarize this important article, Lust-Okar and Jamal (2002) examine seven cases of managed 
liberalization in the Arab world, two of which are Jordan and Morocco.  They find that liberalizing one-
party states are likely to develop electoral rules that favor dominant political parties, whereas liberalizing 
monarchies support electoral rules that balance political power among competing forces (338). As 
evidence, they present a series of bivariate tables and case histories in which monarchies are characterized 




to the election law in the 1990s were designed to “reduce the voice of the opposition in 
Parliament so that questions about potentially unpopular policies could not be as easily 
raised.”  Lust-Okar (2006) also examines the role of Jordan’s peculiar “one vote” system 
in recent parliamentary elections.  She insightfully points out that voting behavior differs 
when elections are over patronage, not policymaking.   
 
“When granted multiple votes, individuals often cast some votes for candidates they 
expected could supply them with resources and other votes for those representing their 
ideologies. When restricted to one vote, however, they cast their ballot for their personal 
interests.” (465) 
 
 Moroccan elections have also attracted some interest but less so in terms of 
strategic design.  Comparing parliamentary elections across North Africa, Dillman (2000) 
posits that Morocco’s majoritarian system during the 1990s benefited the major leftist 
and royalist parties at the expense of smaller parties.  Posusney (2005: 107) suggests that 
this electoral strategy was “risky” because the opposition would have an advantage over 
competing loyalist candidates if it could unify.  Her analysis stops short of explaining 
Morocco’s change in 2002 to a proportional system and very few have analyzed the 
implications of Morocco’s new electoral framework.48   
 The following chapter provides much more discussion of electoral rules in the 
case studies and why they were adopted and sustained.  For now, I turn to the study of 
informal institutions associated with clientelism and their significance for the two case 
studies. 
                                                
48 Attempts to explain the 2002 electoral reform and its implications mostly surfaced in Morocco’s local 
press but have not received much scholarly attention in English.  Other analyses primarily have been from 
democracy assistance organizations and are intended for a limited audience. See IFES (2005), DRI (2007) 





 To begin, clientelism is a term that has often been used loosely to serve as a “catch-
all” for various social structures and forms of patron-client relationships.  It is important 
for the purposes of this study to be more precise and provide a definition of clientelism 
that applies directly to electoral behavior and outcomes.  At the same time, this particular 
conception should not be so narrow and limited that it lacks general applicability.  
 In one of the first projects to address clientelism in the context of non-democratic 
elections, Rouquié (1978: 23) describes clientelism as an asymmetrical relationship 
between two parties that involves an unequal exchange of goods based upon 
particularistic criteria.  In this relationship and exchange, patrons use their influence 
and/or resources to provide protection and/or benefits to clients who in turn offer support 
and assistance; votes, in this case.  Indeed, popular elections can be seen as a 
reestablishment of the redistributive mechanism of the traditional setting (Scott 1977).   It 
is also important to note that in many hierarchical societies, particularly under 
authoritarian regimes, these processes of exchange are not based on equality and 
reciprocity.  Rather, traditional forms of coercion and domination tend to determine 
political outcomes so that election results register not the political attitudes and choices of 
voters, but the reality of social relationships (Hermet 1978: 25).  
 This study does not rule out entirely the possibility that citizens vote in 
authoritarian elections according to ideological or policy preferences but also assumes 
that they expect to receive some sort of material benefit for their vote.  While this 
assumption is based on conventional wisdom to some degree, it is firmly rooted in 




Egypt that it accounts for illiterates being twice as likely to vote as those who can read 
because they are more susceptible to targeted appeals and sanctions (Blaydes 2005). 
Evidence from Africa also confirms that the credibility of clientelist appeals and 
accessibility of clientelist goods greatly influence voting behavior (Wantchekon 2003).  
 Analyses that dwell too much on patronage tend to encounter some problems with 
Islamic movements, however, because their political party offshoots still “lose” in the 
electoral arena despite being deeply embedded within social networks and engaged in 
extensive welfare activities based on horizontal ties.  Indeed, vertical patron-client 
relationships within Islamic social institutions are often weak (Clark 2004).  On the other 
hand, some point out that the success of Islamists at the ballot box is precisely because 
they are not expected to dispense patronage.  These analyses stress that Islamist parties 
largely represent the marginalized, educated middle class, not the disenfranchised poor.  
Massoud’s (2008) study of the electoral performance of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in 
Egypt concurs that its candidates cultivate middle class constituencies that do not need to 
vote for narrow, short-term, material considerations.  Pellicer (2007) also came to the 
same conclusion in the case of Islamist support in Morocco’s recent elections.  
 A growing literature examines the patronage that authoritarian regimes can supply 
and distribute through elections.  In the case of Jordan, Lust-Okar (2006) has argued 
convincingly that voters cast their ballots for those who can, and will, deliver goods over 
the course of time.  She uses the Arabic term wasta, which translates literally as 
“mediation” to describe the logic of voter calculus.  According to Kilani and Sakijha 
(2002: 21), wasta is a “social tool with deep historical precedence in which loyalty to 




interests.”  In contemporary usage, however, Benstead (2008: 71) notes that wasta 
generally refers to the use of an individual’s position within a state bureaucracy and the 
resources of the state’s power to gain power and influence to solve a problem or gain 
preferential treatment.  Wasta thus has a dual meaning as both the individual who acts as 
an intermediary and the act of providing the favor itself.  Although wasta constitutes a 
primary form of clientelism across the Arab world, I choose to emphasize a different 
aspect of clientelism in the context of Morocco.   
 Waterbury’s highly acclaimed book (1971) offers perhaps one of the best portrayals 
of clientelism within a distinctly Moroccan context.  His anthropological explanation for 
the behavior among the country’s political elite also provides a striking contrast to 
traditional explanations within comparative politics.  In short, he argues that the failure of 
Morocco’s nationalist opposition to dislodge the monarchy is deeply rooted in the 
country’s political culture and social structure.  Waterbury’s work has become a 
touchstone for a number of other sociological analyses of Moroccan politics. The 
common theme among all these works has been their emphasis on the inordinate role 
played by the palace, which is commonly referred to as the makhzen in Morocco.  The 
word “makhzen” literally means “warehouse,” but in the Moroccan political context, it 
denotes government as a network of power brokers.  The makhzen has traditionally 
included palace retainers, regional and provincial administrators, and military officers, all 
persons in the service of the monarchy and connected to it by entrenched patronage 
networks.  As such, the makhzen merges the political and bureaucratic spheres, which 
creates the basis for the domination of traditional forms of power over rational-legal ones 




symbols used in socio-political discourse that permeate formal institutions and condition 
citizen behavior.   
 In sum, the makhzen as an informal institution has been essential for maintaining 
the stability of Morocco’s monarchy while overseeing a gradual and limited liberalization 
of the economic and political spheres.  To ensure continual dominance and control, 
various kings have balanced competing groups and individuals against each other by 
handing out favors and punishments.  Willis (2002:14) also stresses the importance of 
Morocco’s patron-client relationships during competitions for political office in which 
parties and their leaders provide access routes to material resources and patronage that 
can be distributed to supporters who have helped elect members of the party.  Numerous 
other works also underscore the distinct nature of clientelism in Morocco and all 
emphasize the role of the makhzen within Morocco’s political culture.  
 The challenge for institutional analysis is to integrate formal electoral rules and 
informal clientelism in order to arrive at a fuller understanding of the durability of Arab 
monarchies and authoritarianism in general.  In this light, I highlight a recent article by 
Helmke and Levitsky (2004) that seeks to develop a framework for integrating formal 
and informal institutional analysis.  Although their argument is an important contribution 
to the field of comparative politics, I point out a number of shortcomings of their 
framework within the context of other influential studies.  I use these criticisms as a 







A New Framework for Institutional Analysis? 
 Although institutional analysis has become a highly regarded approach in 
comparative politics and the study of electoral systems has gained considerable currency 
within the field, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) argue persuasively that “many ‘rules of the 
game’ that structure political life are actually informal—created, communicated and 
enforced outside officially sanctioned channels (725).”  This definition implies that 
informal institutions are more than behavioral regularities or unintentional byproducts of 
formal institutions.  As such, they offer a compelling case for incorporating informal 
institutions into mainstream political analysis.  
 Their article also proposes a new framework for examining how formal and 
informal institutions interact.  They develop a typology in which this relationship can be 
conceptualized along two dimensions: first, the degree to which formal and informal 
institutions converge; and secondly, the effectiveness of formal institutions based on 
compliance and enforcement.  Although this conceptual model is helpful for heuristic 
purposes, it falls short in three respects.  
 First, the model unduly privileges informal institutions as the principal causal force 
of political behavior.  When the article finally considers change of formal institutions as a 
source of informal institutional change, the authors suggest that its impact is limited.  For 
example, they argue that changes in the design in formal rules may only indirectly affect 




expected and rules are enforced and complied with in practice.49  As such, the model 
implies that adherence to the informal rules of the game generally, though not always, 
subverts the intentions of formal institutional arrangements.  One recent study about 
Egyptian parliamentary elections (Koehler 2008) adopts this line of reasoning and 
privileges informal institutions to an even greater extent.50   
 Second, Helmke and Levitsky apply a different set of standards to informal 
institutions in their model even though they note that good institutional analysis requires 
rigorous attention to both formal and informal rules (726).51  The authors argue 
appropriately that informal institutions should not be classified in simple dichotomous 
(functional versus dysfunctional) terms but they proceed to relegate formal institutions as 
either effective or ineffective in their typology.  Informal institutions can also be either 
weakly or strongly influential, and effectively or ineffectively enforced.  Many studies of 
formal institutions overstate perceptions of their ineffectiveness instead of exploring their 
functionality and relationships with informal institutions.  Lust-Okar (2008: 78-79), for 
example, cites a 2006 democracy poll to buttress her claim that the Jordanian parliament 
is an ineffective policymaking institution unable to influence areas of importance.52  
                                                
49 The only example cited by the authors as a change in formal rules affecting an informal institution is the 
1974 Bill of Rights of Subcommittees in the U.S. House of Representatives (732). Electoral rules are 
conspicuously absent from their discussion. 
 
50 According to Koehler (2008: 978), “the prevalence of the informal institutions associated with 
neopatrimonialism influences actors’ cost-benefit calculations in a way that makes it more promising to act 
according to the informal, rather than the formal, rules of the game.” 
 
51 Instead, the authors appear more interested in justifying the study of informal institutions and describing 
their research challenges. Indeed, the authors devote an entire section of the article to identifying, 
measuring and comparing informal institutions without any mention of formal institutions (733-734). 
 
52 In fairness, Lust-Okar (2008: 77) does call for a need to understand how authoritarianism “works” with 




 Third, the authors neglect to mention the growing influence of “new” 
institutionalism53 within the field of political science and how an emergent scholarship 
has effectively combined formal and informal institutions.  Analyses of regime transitions 
in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997), for example, attribute change to the heritage 
of neopatrimonial rule in which “the customs and patterns of patrimonalism co-exist 
with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions” (61).  While emphasizing structural 
characteristics of neopatrimonialism, they also assert that strategic choices made by 
neopatrimonial rulers have widely influential effects on the course and outcomes of 
transitions.  Likewise, Lust-Okar (2006) demonstrates how Jordanian elections provide 
an arena for significant competition over access to state resources and how incumbents 
can manage that competition through institutions. 
 While my study is admittedly interested in the impact of formal electoral rules in 
spite of prevailing sociological and historical factors, it recognizes that informal 
institutions are essential to understanding electoral behavior in authoritarian contexts. 
Nevertheless, the nature of the political system and clientelism should not become 
convenient fallbacks to “explain away” recent electoral outcomes.  Seemingly small 
differences in institutional details can often have macro-political effects. The “rules of the 
game” matter and electoral rules are no exception. 
 The task at hand, therefore, appears not be whether formal or informal institutions 
should be afforded analytical primacy, but rather, how they interact.  To examine this 
                                                                                                                                            
of the Jordanian parliament is less concerned with how the institution serves the interests of the regime than 
how it represents the electorate. 
 
53 See Hall and Taylor (1996) for a discussion of  “new institutionalism” and Thelen (1999) for an 
introduction to “historical institutionalism.” It is important to note that not all of the recent institutional 




interaction, I adopt Groffman’s (1999) terminology of “embedded institutions” to study 
the interaction of particular institutional choices and the wider political arena and 
political culture can be better understood.  One of the methodological steps in this 
approach involves comparing similar institutions and then generalizing about them to 
more precisely specify mechanisms through which effects are realized (xii).  Thus, when 
we consider the incentive structure of parties, candidates and voters under various 
electoral systems, we might take that electoral system as a given, but we should also look 
at how actors decide among electoral system.  I turn to this task in the next section. 
 
2. Theoretical Model 
 
Electoral System Design 
 To recap, my explanatory framework stipulates that elections serve two 
fundamental objectives from the standpoint of the regime: 1) managing arenas of 
competition among elites (a “horizontal” dimension); and 2) maintaining political control 
over rival opposition groups (a “vertical” dimension).  Figure 1.1 (see below) depicts a 
matrix along these two dimensions with degrees of elite cohesion.  It is helpful to think of 
elite cohesion as lying along a continuum with ideal types of “strong” and “weak.”  One 
extreme is marked by loose collections of local notables and significant infighting within 
the ruling coalition or opposition movements (“weak” cohesion) whereas the other 
extreme is identifiable by highly disciplined and organized elites with institutionalized 

















 The four quadrants describe the broad contours of the electoral system as well as 
the type of configuration it produces among opposition actors.54  I use Posusney’s (2002) 
ideal typical terms of “winner-takes-all” and “divide-and-rule” to describe electoral 
systems.  The former typically feature majoritarian systems with single-member districts 
and candidate ballots whereas the latter refer to proportional systems with multi-member 
ballots and party ballots.  When cohesion among ruling elites is “strong,” incumbents 
have more leeway to design electoral rules that can limit representation, reward certain 
factions or foster divisions.  Consequently, elections can structure the opposition as 
“fragmented” or “loyal” in the political system.  In contrast, splits within the ruling 
coalition erode the maneuverability of the regime and typically force zero-sum choices 
                                                
54 While other studies have focused on the composition of Middle East elites and the patterns of change 
within them (see Zartman 1980, Perthes 2008),54 I am interested in the relationships among elites in the 
context of political reform. 


























between electoral accommodation and intervention.  If the degree of cohesion among the 
opposition is “weak,” the regime may seek electoral rules to include certain opposition 
groups.  If these groups become too powerful and opposition coalitions begin to form, 
however, the regime may seek to exclude the opposition through blatant electoral 
engineering or even annulling elections such as the case of Algeria in 1991.  With this 
framework briefly illuminated, a number of propositions emerge. 
 For one, I argue that the degree of opposition cohesion, broadly defined, 
determines the nature of the electoral system.  Strong opposition movements often force 
regimes to accommodate them with inclusive rules that are candidate-oriented with the 
aim of producing a loyal opposition in the legislature.  In contrast, weak oppositions 
allow regimes to co-opt elites through rules that exacerbate divisions in the opposition 
and prevent defections within the ruling coalition.  In the following chapter, I assess the 
validity of these propositions through a comparative historical analysis of Morocco and 
Jordan over five distinct time periods. 
 Second, I contend that liberalizing autocracies are increasingly opting for “divide-
and-rule” electoral systems rather than more risky strategies based on “winner-takes-all.”  
This hypothesis follows from Przeworski’s game theories of democratic transitions 
(1991), which postulate that architects of electoral systems tend to be risk-averse and opt 
for the “safe” choice of electoral rules when uncertainty is high.  In separate chapters that 
focus on recent parliamentary elections in both Morocco and Jordan, I show that both 
incumbent and opposition elites have chosen electoral rules as a way to hedge within the 




reform between “winner-takes-all” and “divide-and-rule” strategies is premised on shifts 
in relative power among opposition elites.   
 Finally, I believe these central cases provide insights that can be applied 
elsewhere.  As such, I test the external validity of these arguments by broadening the 
analysis to four secondary cases studies of Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt and Palestine—of 
which the latter two provide greater variation in regime type as presidential systems.  All 
four experienced electoral miscues around the time of the “Arab Spring” in 2005 and 
2006.  I briefly survey the experience of these secondary cases in order to arrive at an 
explanation for the variation in electoral outcomes.  
 
Consequences of Electoral Rules 
 In order to gauge the influence of electoral rules on political actors, I adopt the 
model conceptualized by Pippa Norris (2004:14) in which “formal electoral rules (the 
independent variable) impact the behavior of rational politicians (the intermediate 
variable) which then exert direct and indirect effects on the electorate (the dependent 
variable).”  In my case, the dependent variable is the degree of cohesion among both 
incumbent and opposition elites through the behavior of political actors (recall Figure B).  
I begin by describing the independent variables. 
 My basic model theorizes that particular electoral arrangements help stabilize 
regimes by discouraging defections from ruling elites and sowing divisions within the 
opposition.  It emphasizes that electoral system design is not limited to a dichotomous 
choice between majoritarian or proportional systems but also includes critical aspects 




shape the strategies political actors (i.e. candidates) pursue to garner votes.  I summarize 




H1.1: Majoritarian systems encourage political actors to seek a broad-based 
 coalition of votes and support (i.e. “bridging strategy”) because they must win 
 an outright majority or plurality of votes. 
H1.2: Proportional systems encourage political actors to target their campaign 
 appeals to a narrow base of homogenous votes (i.e. “bonding strategy”) 




H1.3: Candidate ballots provide a strong incentive for political actors to offer 
 particularistic benefits (i.e. “pork”) to strengthen their support in local 
 communities. 
H1.4: Preference ballots provide a moderate incentive for political actors to offer 
 particularistic benefits in order to stand out from rivals within their own party. 
H1.5: Party ballots encourage political actors to offer programmatic benefits that 
 are focused on the collective record of their party. 
 
  
 Other scholars have also emphasized the importance of district magnitude as a 
“decisive factor” in shaping political behavior and party systems (Taagepera and Shugart 
1989).  I posit that district magnitude is very important for structuring the level of 
competition and degree of personalism within particular electoral districts.  I summarize 




H1.6: High district magnitudes provide an incentive for more actors to compete for 
 available seats.  Lower electoral hurdles in each district encourage actors to 
 cultivate a personal vote.  
H1.7: Low district magnitudes discourage actors from competing for fewer available 
 seats.  Higher electoral hurdles in each district discourage personal vote 
 strategies. 




 Recall my first working hypothesis (H1) that changes to district magnitude, ballot 
structure and electoral formula shape the behavior of opposition elites, ruling elites and 
voters through electoral thresholds.  Electoral thresholds are the key mechanism in the 
causal chain because they structure the incentives and constraints for political actors 
during the course of electoral campaigns.  My core argument is that lower electoral 
thresholds foster electoral environments in which patronage politics thrive. 
 To illustrate the incentives and constraints, Table 1.1 presents a number of 
electoral rules and their hypothesized effects on select groups of political actors.  The 
first column includes the two major families of electoral systems with district magnitudes 
and types of ballots.  These categories do not come close to capturing the breadth of 
electoral system design and the variation within particular electoral arrangements but 
they do serve to identify distinct electoral arrangements from the primary and secondary 
case studies.  The first row lists opposition and ruling elites as the key political actors.  
Voters are also included because the electorate constitutes the decisive actor in electoral 
processes and often reflect cohesion or division among elites.  I explain some the 
behavioral consequences of the electoral arrangements in the corresponding boxes.  
 
Table 1.1: Hypothesized Effects of Electoral Rules on Political Actors 
 
 Opposition Elites Ruling Elites Voters 
Majoritarian 
(H1.1) 
High entry costs; Bridging 
strategy; Exclusive 
 
High entry costs; Bridging 
strategy; Exclusive; 









Low entry costs; High incentives 
for defection; High degree of 
factionalism; Bonding strategy; 
Inclusive 
Low entry costs; High 
incentives for defection; High 
degree of factionalism; 





Proportional Medium entry costs; Low 
incentives for defection; 















Low entry costs; Low incentives 
for defection; Personal 
reputation; More accountability 
with electorate; Discourages 
party mobilization 
Low entry costs; Low 
incentives for defection; 
Personal reputation; 









Low entry costs; Low incentives 
for defection; Bridging strategy; 
Personal reputation; More 
accountability with electorate  
Low entry costs; Low 
incentives for defection; 
Bridging strategy; Personal 










High entry costs; High 
incentives for defection; High 
degree of factionalism; Bonding 
strategy; Party reputation; Less 
accountability with electorate; 
 
 
High entry costs; High 
incentives for defection; High 
degree of factionalism; 
Bonding strategy; Party 
reputation;  








 To reiterate, my model links electoral rules to the cohesion of ruling and 
opposition elites through the behavior of rational politicians.  I define these behaviors, 
herein referred to as “variables of interest,” in terms of incentives and constraints related 
to participation and competition in the electoral process.  The nine variables of interest 
are: 1) costs of entry into the electoral arena; 2) incentives to defect to competing groups; 
3) corresponding degrees of factionalism; 4) type of campaign strategies pursued; 5) type 
of reputation cultivated; 6) levels of party mobilization; 7) incidence of vote buying; 8) 
prevalence of sincere voting; and 9) extent of voter accountability.  I now describe each 
intermediate variable and how electoral rules can determine different values. 
 
1.   Entry Costs: Political actors often make informed decisions about whether to seek 
elected office or participate in the electoral process based on perceived costs and 
expected rewards.  Entry costs may determine how easy it is for candidates to run, 
either as independents or at the helm of new parties.  The actual costs could refer 
to something straightforward such as registration fees or be subsumed under 
electoral rules that alter the incentive structure for incumbent and opposition 




costs for candidates to compete because the threshold required for victory is less.  
Conversely, majoritarian systems that feature single member districts or low 
magnitudes present “high” entry costs to smaller parties and weaker candidates.  
Open list or nomination processes for parties typically produce “low” entry costs 
whereas closed systems result in “high” entry costs.  A mixture of majoritarian or 
proportional elements with varying district magnitudes, ballot structures and legal 
thresholds may produce “medium” entry costs for political actors. 
 
2.   Defection: Candidates are very aware of technical details that affect their electoral 
fortunes and will act accordingly.  Changes to the ballot structure may determine 
whether they defect to another electoral camp.  For example, proportional systems 
with closed party lists increase competition among candidates vying for a high 
ranking, particularly in multi-member districts with low magnitudes, thus creating 
“high” incentives for defection. In contrast, open lists or electoral procedures that 
allow preferential voting result in “low” incentives for defection.  Candidate-
ballots and multi-member districts similarly produce “low” incentives for 
defection because electoral competition is less structured and there are more seats 
available.  Different contexts relating to party ideology and individual 
characteristics may create “medium” incentives to defect.     
 
3.  Factionalism: The participation of political actors in the electoral arena generates 
varying degrees of factionalism, both within ruling parties and among competing 
parties or political groupings.  A degree of factionalism is a desirable outcome for 
autocrats because they can play various sides off one another.  Factionalism may 
also erode the cohesiveness of opposition parties or blocks in parliament. As a 
result, regimes may manipulate electoral rules and institutional structures to 
encourage factionalism.  A “high” degree of factionalism is typically associated 
with a weak party system or a degenerate ruling party.  Conversely, a “low” 
degree of factionalism can exist within a disciplined ruling party or a starkly 
different situation in which a coherent opposition presents a unified front against 
an incumbent regime.  A “medium” degree of factionalism presents a muddled 
picture of political dynamics within the regime and opposition. 
 
4.  Campaign Strategies: In many electoral contexts, political actors are “vote-
maximizers” and seek to obtain a broad base of support. Their campaign 
strategies thereby attempt to “bridge” gaps between segments of the electorate, 
stitch together a diverse coalition and aggregate heterogeneous interests. Elements 
of majoritarian systems such as single-member districts and first-past-the-post 
formulas tend to encourage so-called “bridging strategies.” In other contexts, 
political actors are less likely to invest the time and resources to garner votes from 
a wide segment across the political spectrum. Instead, they pursue “bonding 
strategies” that target a narrow base of socially homogenous supporters and 
segmented sectors of the electorate. Electoral rules that lower effective thresholds 
through multiple-member districts and proportional formula typically reward this 





5.  Reputation: In virtually all kinds of systems, political actors rely on reputation to 
advance their political careers. Electoral formulas may be arrayed on a continuum 
regarding the degree to which they encourage candidates for legislative office to 
cultivate either a “party” reputation or a “personal” reputation.55 A formula that 
emphasizes party reputation typically fosters a political environment in which 
parties are responsive to the collective interests of the public. In contrast, a 
formula that generates incentives to cultivate a personal reputation usually 
produces an environment in which candidates cater to needs of individuals. 
Whether voters select candidates or parties on a ballot obviously determines the 
type of reputation political actors cultivate but variations within ballot structure 
also shape behavior. For example, personal reputations are normally at a premium 
in open list systems unless electoral rules produce incentives for candidates to 
distinguish themselves within closed list systems.     
 
6.  Party Mobilization: Arab regimes generally seek to dampen party mobilization to 
limit the popular appeal of opposition movements.  Regimes sometimes may also 
enlist party loyalists to mobilize segments of the population to boost the 
legitimacy of the elections.  Majoritarian systems typically encourage “high” 
levels of party-based mobilization because they require a greater number of votes 
to win.  In contrast, proportional systems (especially those with higher district 
magnitudes) encourage smaller groups like tribes or ethnic communities to seek 
votes at the expense of national or ideological-based parties.  Likewise, electoral 
formulas that allocate seats based on quotas or an “electoral average” also result 
in “low” levels of mobilization.  Widespread political disaffection also poses 
significant challenges for party mobilization.  Abstention and a range of other 
attitudinal factors often complicate party efforts but do not necessarily impede it, 
thus resulting in a “medium” level of mobilization.  
 
7.  Sincere Voting: As previously explained, the calculus of voting is not just based 
on preferences for parties, candidates or political issues but also on the likelihood 
that a preferred candidate or party has a chance at winning. Voter preferences may 
be altered based on an assessment of electoral prospects, thus resulting in strategic 
voting. In contrast, sincere voting occurs when voters stick to their preferences 
without regard to the expected outcome. Electoral rules that structure voter 
choices may have a profound effect on the prevalence of sincere voting. For 
example, some ballots allow multiple votes or for voters to rank order their 
preference. In these cases, the prevalence of sincere voting is “low” because 
voters have more choice and can dole out their votes based on ideology, personal 
connection or some other factor. A “high” prevalence of sincere voting is likely 
                                                
55 See Carey and Shugart (1995) for a rank ordering of electoral rules in terms of incentives for political 
actors to cultivate a personal vote. They assign scores to systems based on whether (a) party leaders control 
access to and rank on ballots, (b) votes for the candidate of a party are pooled across the party as a whole, 
contributing to the party’s share of seats, and (c) voters cast ballots for a single party, for multiple 




when voters have fewer choices due to small district magnitudes or closed party 
list systems.  
 
8.  Vote Buying: The extent of vote buying is an approximate indicator in which 
elections contain clientelist forms of exchange.  Regimes that rely on traditional 
forms of control are therefore willing to tolerate or even encourage vote buying. 
This practice can be a way for pro-regime elites to win election or to boost turnout 
for added legitimacy.  Although there is no single root cause of vote buying, 
electoral rules can influence the incentives of political actors to purchase electoral 
support.  Bonding strategies and personal reputation obviously offer strong 
incentives for vote buying. But certain electoral systems that foster intra-party 
competition can also be significant since co-partisans have strong incentives to 
make targeted appeals to voters. Among those most likely to encourage a “high” 
incidence of vote buying include SNTV and open list PR. Variations within these 
rules that increase the saliency of candidate positions on closed-list lists may 
contribute to the incidence of vote buying.  Developing countries that feature 
typical forms of clientelism irrespective of electoral systems probably indicate a 
“medium” incidence of vote buying.   
 
9.  Voter Accountability: Corruption is deeply engrained to many political systems 
and its many permutations present an almost insurmountable obstacle for 
operationalization.  As such, this study does not claim that electoral rules have an 
observable effect on corruption overall but rather seeks to investigate whether 
they can impose constraints on corrupt politicians through voter accountability. 
Put plainly, do elections allow voters to “throw the rascals out” or do they insulate 
them from accountability?  The most straightforward institutional variable is 
whether the ballot allows choice among parties or candidates.  Studies have 
shown that larger shares of candidates elected from party lists are associated with 
more corruption and less accountability (Persson 2003).  Indeed, a party list 
system is typically characterized by indirect linkages between the candidate and 
voter, which thereby result in “less” accountability. In contrast, candidate ballots 
in plurality-rule elections tend to produce “more” voter accountability. 
 
 
 Many of the hypothesized effects appear to follow conventional wisdom about the 
incentives and constraints of particular electoral rules.  Yet I propose a theory of how 
political actors behave when formal electoral rules interact with informal modes of 
patronage.  Existing theories typically focus on the mechanical effects of electoral 
systems on party systems based on “Duverger’s Law” and assume that political actors 




Following Lust-Okar (2006), I argue that the calculus of political actors is different when 
patronage, not policymaking, is at stake.  As such, the effects of electoral rules, both 
mechanical and psychological, are magnified under competitive authoritarianism.  Since 
authoritarian elections are primarily about the distribution of political patronage through 
elites and access to clientelistic networks, I theorize that political actors respond strongly 
to electoral incentives that feature low electoral thresholds because they increase the 
saliency of “retail politics” with individual voters.   
 Thus, my empirical analysis is primarily concerned with the consequences of 
fundamental electoral reforms in Morocco in Jordan over recent years.  Morocco 
switched from a majoritarian system to a List PR system in 2002 whereas Jordan adopted 
the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system in 1993.  Even though both cases have 
held a number of elections since then and political actors have adapted to the new rules to 
some extent, the most recent parliamentary elections in 2007 still reinforced traditional 
forms of electoral clientelism that were beneficial to the incumbent regime.  As such, 
subsequent chapters will assess the extent to which particular electoral rules affected the 
ability of voters to coalesce around the main Islamist opposition in Morocco and the 
degree to which it helped elect a group of “new capitalist” candidates in Jordan.  
Incorporating these “variables of interest” associated with clientelism produce observable 
electoral outcomes and explain variation within and across similar cases. 
 My project also seeks to develop contingent generalizations beyond the 
experiences of Morocco and Jordan.  In addition to the primary case studies, I also 
explore the conditions under which opposition parties fared well in other Arab 




commonly lead to regime instability through electoral miscues.  These chapters 
collectively examine the core argument that lower electoral thresholds generate unique 
electoral environments in which patronage politics thrive and ideological-based 
movements falter.   
 Although my study is primarily concerned with the effects of electoral rules, it 
also treats electoral rules themselves as outcome variables to address the so-called 
“endogeneity problem”56 so as to increase the level of confidence in the research findings 
(King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 198).  Therefore, the following chapter traces the 
evolution of electoral systems in the two primary case studies in order to develop an 























                                                
56 Generally defined, the “endogeneity problem” in theoretical analysis is the reversal of the causal 










HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:  




 This chapter provides a historical background of Morocco and Jordan (the two 
primary case studies) with a particular focus on parliamentary elections and the evolution 
of their respective electoral systems.  In doing so, I seek to advance the argument that 
variation in electoral system design is attributable to the degree of cohesion among key 
political actors, most notably incumbent and opposition elites.  I show that electoral 
reform typically occurred during shifts in power equilibriums within both regimes.  In 
particular, I trace how elite ruptures or opposition coalitions often produced zero-sum 
choices between electoral manipulation and accommodation whereas strong regime 
coalitions and divided oppositions enabled more maneuverability in electoral 
arrangements designed to co-opt some factions but contain others.  This argument goes 
beyond the binary regime type dichotomy previously used to explain electoral law 
formation in the Middle East (Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002).  
 The comparative historical analysis of Morocco and Jordan that follows is broken 
down into five distinct time periods that encompass: 1) colonial and post-independence 
elections (1920s-1960s); 2) elections of regime consolidation (1960s-1970s); 3) elections 
under regime duress (1980s); 4) elections under new rules (1990s); and 5) elections under 




purposes of comparison and should be considered flexible.  Nonetheless, the time periods 
do serve to demarcate a number of defining elections across the two cases.  They are 
organized based on a series of synchronic “snapshots” of electoral reform and thus 
provide the basis for transforming descriptive explanations into analytic explanations.57 
 Before delving into the annals of history, I must address the potential claim of 
selection bias by which particular historical evidence is presented in order to construct 
artificial narratives about the evolution of electoral systems.  Without attempting to 
provide a lengthy justification for examining certain aspects of history over others, the 
purpose of this chapter is to examine the origins of electoral institutions and the context 
in which key actors (namely incumbent elites with the king’s acquiescence) established 
new institutions on top of them.58  This structural context defines the relative power of 
actors and the range of options available to them.  Therefore, the historical evidence 
presented herein seeks to illuminate elite configurations across temporal settings and how 
changes in elite cohesion impacted electoral reform over time.   
 With this in mind, this chapter examines whether united or divided elites help to 
explain regime preferences for particular electoral rules.  Since there is little variation in 
the type of electoral system used in both cases throughout their history, I highlight three 
“variables of interest” introduced in Chapter 1 in order to derive concrete hypotheses 
about the relationship between elite configurations and electoral rules.  They are: 
 
                                                
57 See George and Bennett (2004: 92-94) for more discussion about this methodological task. It was 
difficult to demarcate parallel periods and to avoid roaming among them.  Accordingly, they should not be 
considered as fixed analytical units but rather as historical scaffolding for an evolving narrative. 
 
58 Historical Institutionalism refers to “layering” to describe a polity as an interlocking set of institutions 




1) Entry Costs: Political actors often make informed decisions about whether to seek 
elected office or participate in the electoral process based on perceived costs and 
expected rewards.  Entry costs may determine how easy it is for candidates to run, 
either as independents or at the helm of new parties.  The actual costs could refer to 
something straightforward such as registration fees or be subsumed under electoral 
rules that alter the incentive structure for incumbent and opposition elites.  
 
H2.1:  Regimes with divided elites prefer electoral rules that lower entry costs to 
reward supporters, co-opt potential defectors and divide the opposition.  
  
H2.2: Regimes with unified elites prefer electoral rules that raise entry costs to 
promote favored candidates, discourage defectors and exclude the opposition.   
 
2) Personal Vote Strategies: In many electoral contexts, political actors are “vote-
maximizers” and seek to obtain a broad base of support. Their campaign strategies 
thereby attempt to “bridge” gaps between segments of the electorate, stitch together a 
diverse coalition and aggregate heterogeneous interests. Elements of majoritarian 
systems such as single-member districts and first-past-the-post formulas tend to 
encourage this type of campaign strategy. In other contexts, political actors are less 
likely to invest the time and resources to garner votes from a wide segment across the 
political spectrum. Instead, they pursue “bonding strategies” that target a narrow base 
of socially homogenous supporters and segmented sectors of the electorate. 
 
 H2.3: Regimes with a strong ruling coalition or a divided opposition prefer  
 electoral arrangements that feature multi-member districts, candidate ballots and 
 proportional formulas in order to reinforce clientelism. 
 
 H2.4: Regimes that face a united opposition prefer electoral arrangements that 
 feature single-member districts and majoritarian formulas to reward loyalists and 
 exclude opponents.    
 
3) Strategic Voting: The calculus of voting is not just based on preferences for 
parties, candidates or political issues but also on the likelihood that a preferred 
candidate or party has a chance at winning. Voter preferences may be altered based 
on an assessment of electoral prospects, thus resulting in strategic voting. In contrast, 
sincere voting occurs when voters stick to their preferences without regard to the 
expected outcome.  
 
 H2.5: Regimes with divided elites prefer electoral systems that disperse votes
 across the political spectrum and reduce the likelihood of strategic voting in 
 order to protect established patronage networks. 
 
    H2.6: Regimes with strong ruling coalitions prefer electoral systems that 
 concentrate votes in key contests in order to reward pro-regime candidates and 




 In sum, this chapter presents both a complex set of empirical puzzles and a 
theoretical challenge in explaining the evolution of electoral systems in Morocco and 
Jordan.  What explains the rationale for different electoral systems in these two similar 
cases?  Were electoral outcomes a direct product of electoral reforms?  If so, can we 
identify particular electoral mechanisms that served to reinforce these regimes?  These 
are the questions that frame this chapter, guide the subsequent empirical analysis and 
used later to develop a typological theory. 
 
1) Colonial and Post-Independence Elections (1920s-1960s) 
 
The colonial period in Jordan and Morocco reveals a number of similarities and 
differences in levels of elite cohesion as British and French administrators established 
political institutions that were closely tied to the monarchy.  While nascent legislatures 
were far from being popularly elected or representative, they did serve as arenas for 
managing elites and channeling nationalist sentiment through political structures.  The 
shifting power equilibriums in both cases led to distinct regime survival strategies and 
help to explain the origins of their respective electoral systems.  
 
Elite Mobilization under Colonial Administrations 
 Jordan’s experience with parliamentary politics dates back to its establishment as a 
British colony in the 1920s.  The king of what was then known as Transjordan hoped that 
the establishment of a legislature would bolster his power, weakening British influence 




Assembly (LA), codified in the 1928 Organic Law, were designed to subordinate the LA 
to the palace by ensuring it was packed with loyalists.59  Despite these rules, the first 
legislature elected in April 1929 turned out to be quite assertive and critical of the 
colonial administration (ibid).  A series of national conferences that convened in 
subsequent years brought together a number of notables and tribal representatives that 
were opposed to the electoral law and the LA’s lack of power (Abu Jaber 1973: 94-95).  
They also demanded that the British leave and end its support to the monarch.   
 Facing a direct threat to his rule, the king quickly reasserted control over the 
parliament in the 1930s and continued utilizing electoral rules that excluded opponents 
from political representation.  After the disastrous defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, 
however, two internal challenges confronted the monarchy were the influx of Palestinian 
refugees and mounting discontent within the traditional Hashemite elite.  The sudden 
emergence of a unified opposition in a highly charged political climate led to an abrupt 
switch to a new electoral law for parliamentary elections in 1950 that granted equal 
representation to Palestinians from the West Bank.60 In the following years, a series of 
events including the assassination of the king and the replacement of his successor further 
underscored the fragility of the regime.  When the 17-year-old King Abdallah ascended 
to the throne in 1953, few expected Jordan’s nascent monarchy to survive the turbulent 
era.  
                                                
59 Among other mechanisms, Baaklini et al. (1999: 135) note that “through a system of quotas, the electoral 
law ensured that the Christian and Circassian minorities, which were seen as natural allies of the palace, 
would be overrepresented in the LA.” 
 
60 Baaklini et al. (1999: 167) also point out that the East Bank’s smaller population elected the same 
number of deputies and that its constituencies were designed to the advantage of native Transjordanians 




 The case of Morocco differs from Jordan in that the French colonial administration 
did not establish a parliament but rather created centralized institutions without popular 
representation.  It also worked to establish a modern administrative and bureaucratic 
system of government alongside the traditional authority of the palace.  Indeed, reforms 
beginning in the 1920s allowed the monarchy to “gradually merge the traditional 
authority of makhzen with modern European-style institutions” (Ayubi 1995: 121).   
 There were unintended consequences of colonial-led centralization, most notably in 
1930 when the French resident-general attempted to co-opt the Berber population and 
“pacify” the countryside through blatant manipulation and coercion.61  According to 
Ashford (1961: 61), “this divide and rule strategy effectively jump-started and unified the 
disparate strands of Morocco’s movement opposed to French rule.”  Pro-independence 
groups eventually coalesced under the banner of the Istiqlal and, when the party was 
officially formed in 1944, it attracted widespread support among elites and the masses 
(Waterbury 1970: 50).  This mass mobilization proved essential to the success of the 
rebellion and eventual return of the exiled king, who had allied himself with the Istiqlal 
and had become the symbol of the independence movement.   
 When the French effectively ended colonial rule in 1955 and Morocco achieved 
formal independence the following year, many governmental structures were preserved 
under the monarchy and newly created ones were powerless.62  Ruling elites remained in 
                                                
61 In 1930 the French administration issued a decree (commonly referred to dahir) that took mountainous 
Berber regions out of the administration of central Islamic courts and put them into French ones. This 
infamous dahir backfired, causing both Arabs and Berbers to form a common front against the French.  See 
Hoisington (1995) for more about Lyautey and this turbulent period of Morocco’s history. 
62 Waterbury (1970) argues that the 1955 declaration of “Celle-Saint-Cloud” assured the continuity of the 
governmental structures as reformed by the French.  Other institutions created after the 1958 Royal Charter 




positions of authority and the popular new king quickly sought to monopolize them.  As 
the post-independence struggle for power between the king and main political parties 
intensified, the Istiqlal suffered from internal splits between radicals and conservatives as 
well as a dwindling support base (Storm 2007: 14-15).  A number of opposition elites 
defected to form a new party in 1959 called the Mouvement Populaire (MP), which 
appealed to the disaffected Berber population.  Aware of the rift and hoping to weaken 
the principal opposition party, the king appointed one of the faction leaders as prime 
minister, which led to an irrevocable split within the Istiqlal (Waterbury 1970: 218).   
 
Analytical Explanation 
  To sum up, this section has shown how shifting power equilibriums in both cases 
led to distinct regime survival strategies based on institutional design.  Before Jordan’s 
independence, the king maintained control over the Legislative Assembly through a 
“winner-takes-all” system designed to include prominent families and elites.  The decline 
of British colonial patronage in the 1940s and devastating Arab-Israeli War in 1949 led to 
the mobilization of opposition elites, however.  As a result, the monarchy had to resort to 
a more inclusive electoral system that expanded representation to Palestinians in the West 
Bank.  In Morocco, elites unified in opposition to the French colonial administration 
during the 1930s, thus spawning a powerful nationalist political party that earned a share 
of political power after independence in 1956.  Towards the end of the decade, however, 
splits within the Istiqlal eroded its bargaining position vis-à-vis the monarchy and 
negotiations over subsequent elections.  At the same time, the popular new king 




 Figure 2.1 presents my explanatory framework for electoral system design with 
shifts in relative power during this time period.  The diagram depicts the two case studies 
and the main changes to electoral institutions as a consequence of weakened opposition 
movements.  Jordan’s King Abdallah kept a majoritarian system but doubled the size of 
the lower chamber in 1950 to allow more Palestinian representation in the recently 
annexed West Bank.63  Although Morocco did not have a legislature or electoral system 
during this period, the monarchy did move from a broad power sharing arrangement with 
the political parties after independence to one based on political factions in the early 
1950s.  Since Jordan’s electoral system remained majoritarian with single-member 
districts, my hypotheses about campaign strategies (H2.3 and H2.4) have limited 
plausibility.  There is inconclusive evidence regarding entry costs and voting behavior. 
 












                                                
63 Baaklini (1999: 167) notes that the East Bank was still favored under the system and districts were 
delineated in such a way to give clear advantage to native Transjordanians over Palestinians (note 2). 
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2) Elections of Regime Consolidation (1950s-1970s) 
 
The next period of history in the two case studies can be described as a period of regime 
consolidation during which time the monarchies reasserted control over the political 
system.64  During the 1950s and 1960s, Jordan and Morocco had experimented with 
parliaments and political pluralism but the regional and domestic climate was simply too 
combustible for any sustained process of liberalization.  After a series of political crises 
that challenged the legitimacy of the two monarchies, the kings ordered harsh 
crackdowns on political opponents.  In the years that followed, parliaments were eclipsed 
by elections that featured heavy-handed forms of intervention and manipulation to ensure 
regime domination.  Both monarchies gradually released their grip during the 1970s 
when they felt their position was secure.  Therefore, elections at the beginning and end of 
this period represent critical junctures for analysis.  
 
Elections Expose Elite Ruptures  
 In Jordan, a number of political undercurrents directly threatened the Hashemite 
monarchy during the early 1950s.  For one, a young and politicized intelligentsia 
flourished in the East Bank under the banner of the National Socialist Party (NSP) and 
became highly critical of Jordan’s pro-Western orientation.  Other leftist parties also 
organized protests and riots and opposition even spread through the army (Lust-Okar 
                                                
64 Baaklini et al. (1999: 142) define the period of regime consolidation in Jordan encompassing 1957 to 
1978.  Even though the authors refer to the same approximate period in Morocco as “Experiments with 
Parliamentary Politics” (112), they too can be more accurately conceptualized as period in which the 




2005: 52).65  After the 1956 parliamentary elections, in which NSP candidates won 
twelve out of the forty seats, the opposition party emerged as the principal parliamentary 
block and main threat to the palace.66  King Hussein, who had only assumed the throne 
several years prior, tried to co-opt this increasingly powerful movement by appointing its 
party leader—Suleiman Nabulsi—as prime minister.  This tenuous arrangement quickly 
unraveled, however, as both sides lurched toward a showdown in the ensuing year.67  
Finally, on April 25, 1957, King Hussein launched a massive crackdown, which included 
a declaration of martial law and a ban on all political parties. 
 Although the parliament was allowed to complete its term that year, a total of 
fifteen deputies were either expelled or forced to resign and were replaced by “friendlier” 
members (Abu Jaber 1972: 108).  According to Baaklini et al. (1999: 142), the Nablusi 
interlude contained important lessons, namely that a properly functioning legislature 
requires the existence of a “loyal opposition.”  Moreover, the episode demonstrated that 
the monarchy needed to manage more carefully the composition of the parliament.  As a 
result, the regime quickly increased the number of seats in the elected Chamber of 
Deputies and appointed Chamber of Notables to ensure that future parliaments would 
include a bigger bulwark of supporters.68  
 In the case of Morocco, the regime also faced a growing chorus from political 
                                                
65 King Hussein attempted to co-opt many military officers with nationalist sympathies by negotiating with 
them over positions of power (see Lust-Okar ibid).  
 
66 Baaklini et al. (2002: 141) notes that “progressive” and Arab nationalist elements controlled a total of 20 
seats, or one-half of the lower chamber. Dann (1989: 39), however, stresses that there was a lack of 
cohesion among the rest of the opposition. 
 
67 See Dann (1989) for a fuller account of the Nabulsi interlude and ensuing crises. 
 
68 Abu Jaber (1972: 109) asks rhetorically whether the increase in membership would result in a larger 




opposition parties that wanted to transform the monarchy into a purely symbolic role.  
The new king adopted a dual strategy based on active intervention in politics while deftly 
assigning blame on subversive political forces for the lack of democracy.  In May 1960, 
the palace propagated the accusation that “preparations had been made not for a general 
election or for establishing true democracy, but for a nihilist revolution.”69  Months 
before Morocco’s first parliamentary elections in 1963, King Hassan orchestrated the 
creation of the Front Pour la Defense des Institutions Constitutionelles (FDIC) with a 
staunch ally at the party’s helm.  At the same time, the government narrowly managed to 
institute a majoritarian electoral system that allowed the FDIC and other palace parties to 
capitalize on their proximity to the monarchy’s patronage networks.70  Consequently, the 
FDIC managed to win as many seats as the two opposition parties combined despite 
receiving thirteen percent less of the total vote.  Although the monarchy clearly benefited 
from a disproportional outcome, others point to the failure of the Istiqlal and its main 
rival, the UNFP, to form an electoral alliance.71  
 Despite the blatant interference of the regime in Morocco’s inaugural national 
elections, the Chamber of Representatives elected in 1963 contained many vocal 
opposition deputies who wanted to curtail the power of the king and transform Morocco 
into a parliamentary system.  In July, state security forces arrested nearly one hundred 
                                                
69 This accusation was actually made by the son of King Mohammed, Hassan II, in his 1978 memoirs.  See 
Storm (2006: 18) for the full citation. 
 
70 Without a doubt, the most authoritative resource on this election is by Leveau (1985), who was directly 
involved in the design of Morocco’s electoral districts in the late 1950s. In it, he singles out a key actor 
who switched his position in favor of a system of electoral lists that would have favored party organizations 
to one of single-member districts. 
 
71 Zartman (1970: 260-261) claims that “the barriers to [an alliance between the UNFP and Istiqlal in 1963] 
proved insurmountable” but they did agree not to run rival candidates in districts in which one or other 




members of the UNFP on trumped up charges of plotting to overthrow the government.72  
These arrests and an economic crisis that engulfed Morocco over the next year led to riots 
in March 1965 that rocked the country.  The overall deterioration in the political climate 
provided the pretext for the monarchy to declare a state of emergency and suspend 
parliament for five years between 1965 and 1970.  These events ushered in a dark period 
in Morocco’s history known as the “years of lead” (années de plomb in French) during 
which time hundreds of palace opponents “disappeared” and thousands were imprisoned 
and sometimes tortured.   
 To sum up at this point, “winner-takes-all” electoral strategies were again 
instrumental in maintaining regime stability.  This time, however, the majoritarian rules 
served to induce smaller parties to compete in areas which they enjoyed popular support 
and to prevent coordination with the more powerful nationalist parties.  How did these 
majoritarian systems come into being?  I argue that divided elites were instrumental to 
both regimes’ strategies. 
 Morocco’s king succeeded in getting “buy in” from opposition elites and nationalist 
parties to an electoral system that that catered to prominent local figures, that is, the new 
rural notability.  As for Jordan’s monarchy, it also favored a strategy based on packing 
the elected parliament with supporters but underestimated the extent of their loyalty.  The 
cases thus differ in that King Hussein’s room for maneuver after independence was 
considerably less than his counterpart in Morocco because of changes in opposition 
cohesion.  Although Jordan’s opposition was not unified, the regime did suffer from an 
                                                
72 Waterbury (1970: 293) suggests that the arrests were timed to halt the UNFP momentum in advance of 




erosion of elite support among East Bank intellectuals who formed the core of the NSP.  
Moreover, Jordan’s opposition was emboldened by the rise of Nasserism and the highly 
charged conflict in neighboring Palestine whereas Morocco’s opposition was relatively 
isolated and in a general state of decline during the 1960s.  
 
Analytic Explanation  
 Figure 2.2 depicts these electoral arrangements based on my explanatory 
framework.  It shows that levels of elite cohesion differed substantially before critical 
parliamentary elections in Jordan (1956) and Morocco (1963).  As a result, Jordan’s 
relatively strong opposition and weak ruling coalition hamstrung the ability of the 
monarchy to manipulate electoral rules.  The regime was forced to use a strict 
majoritarian system with single-member districts and candidate ballots in order to include 
loyalists and exclude the opposition as much as possible.  The hypotheses regarding 
“entry costs” (H2.1/2) and “personal vote” strategies (H2.3/4) are not applicable because 
the regime was resigned to accept the outcome.   
 The case of Morocco, in contrast, reveals that divisions within the opposition 
allowed the king more maneuverability in designing electoral rules that would co-opt 
loyalist and opposition parties.  Morocco’s monarchy was able to entice party leaders by 
encouraging the development of so-called “palace parties” whereas Jordan did not. 
Nonetheless, the inauguration of multiparty elections provided important signals to both 
regimes about the strength of opposition parties.  Although they decided to stick with 
majoritarian systems, Morocco’s strong ruling coalition enabled the regime to redraw 




parties with token seats in parliament and curtail representation from the principal 
opposition (H.2).  Interestingly, however, Morocco opted for a two-round system that 
could encourage opposition coordination, thus casting some doubt on the “strategic 
voting” hypothesis (H2.6). 
 












 While Morocco and Jordan initially allowed a semblance of genuine competition in 
these elections, the two regimes also established “red lines” during this initial experiment 
with parliamentary politics.  When opposition leaders and elected parliamentarians 
questioned the nature of the political system itself, it provided embattled kings the 
justification to intervene.  Through the imposition of martial law and rule by royal decree, 
the two monarchies were able to establish their dominance over the next two decades.  In 

















the paragraphs below, I describe how a series of external events impacted levels of 
cohesion among opposition and ruling elites, which thus produced different electoral 
arrangements in the 1970s. 
 
External Events Impact Elite Cohesion 
 Although Morocco’s opposition suffered from harsh repression, it did find common 
cause in seeking constitutional revisions during the early 1970s.  Nevertheless, a 
sustainable coalition never emerged that was able to put any significant pressure on the 
regime because of two main factors.  For one, the new constitution stipulated that trade 
unions, communal councils and professional chambers would be part of the electoral 
colleges that indirectly elect members of the parliament.  The electoral influence of 
political parties was diluted and the electoral colleges became less ideological in which 
members could be swayed by clientelist appeals.   
 The other factor relates to external events during the 1970s.  In 1974 a territorial 
dispute over the Western Sahara erupted between Morocco and Mauritania.  The ensuing 
political crisis enabled the king to rally hundreds of thousands of Moroccans to embark 
on the “Green March” to stake their claim to the area.  This nationalist tide was the death 
knell for rejectionist forces still hoping to topple the monarchy. When the king called for 
new elections that year, the political environment provided extra leverage over opposition 
parties that returned to the bargaining table.  According to Lust-Okar (2005: 58), 
“political forces that had shown themselves either too strong or intransigent during the 
previous decade would be excluded.”   




reforms for highly anticipated parliamentary elections in 1977.  Although overt forms of 
vote rigging and harassment were much less prevalent, the redrawing of electoral districts 
produced much higher thresholds in opposition strongholds and disproportional vote to 
seat ratios.73  Moreover, the use of a two-round system allowed the regime to correct for 
any imbalances that emerged from the initial ballot.  The Istiqlal and UNFP (which 
became the USFP) only captured a relatively small share of seats because of the new 
system.  This outcome further divided the political opposition and the two main parties 
experienced an irreconcilable split when the Istiqlal agreed to join the new government.  
 Meanwhile, Jordan’s monarchy forced a number of prominent opposition groups to 
operate underground during the decade as it sought to reestablish control over the 
political system.  The catalyst for this newfound resolve was undoubtedly a result of the 
events during “Black September” in 1970 when the state army fought pitched battles with 
Palestinian militias that had become radicalized from the escalating tensions in the 
neighboring West Bank.74  By 1971, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) no 
longer had a presence in Jordan and the monarchy turned its focus to shoring up 
traditional domestic bases of support.  Like Morocco, the monarchy needed an external 
catalyst to gain the upper hand over recalcitrant elements within the political system.  
After the UN adopted a resolution in 1974 declaring the to be the sole representative of 
the Palestinian people, King Hussein again dissolved parliament in part based on the 
rationale that the resolution was at odds with the substantial representation of Palestinians 
in the Jordanian institution (Baaklini 1997: 143).  Instead of setting a new date for 
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74 The precipitating event that led to “Black September” was the hijacking of a commercial airline by a 




parliamentary elections, however, the king decided to rule without a parliament and 
appointed an advisory council to serve as a tenuous bridge to the citizenry.  
 This period forms the critical juncture in Lust-Okar’s (2005) analysis because the 
two monarchies pursued different strategies for consolidating their rule.  Morocco’s king 
manipulated the incentive structures that opposition elites face when deciding whether or 
not to demand political change by admitting some opponents into the formal political 
system while excluding others.  As such, she argues that Morocco’s monarchy effectively 
co-opted the opposition in the 1970s by producing a divided political environment.  In 
contrast, Jordan’s monarchy did not seek to foster a divided political climate but rather 
kept all opposition groups illegal during this period.  Consequently, political opponents 
remained willing to mobilize popular opposition to challenge the government.  As I will 
show in the next section, these structures of contestation would have important 
ramifications on subsequent elections and changes to the electoral system. 
 
Analytic Explanation  
 Relatively stable levels of elite cohesion over the 1960s and 1970s produced 
breathing room for Morocco’s monarchy to initiate greater competition within the 
electoral arena and allow inclusion of some opposition groups within parliament.  Since 
opposition elites were divided, my first hypothesis postulates that Morocco should prefer 
electoral rules that lower entry costs in order to reward supporters, co-opt potential 
defectors and increase factionalism within the opposition (H2.2).  The delimitation of 
electoral districts and significant variation in the number of votes required to win provide 




Hassan to stave off prolonged economic crises and sporadic bouts of political unrest 
during these two decades.   
 In contrast, Jordan had experienced severe fluctuations in elite cohesion among 
traditional allies such as East Bank intellectuals, the army and Palestinian notables.  The 
opposition had also coalesced around populist causes such as the Palestinian conflict and 
the Arab nationalism.  This flux between divided and unified elites should lead to 
electoral rules that raise electoral entry costs in order to promote favored candidates, 
discourage factionalism and exclude the opposition (H2.1), which I also find strong 
evidence.  Given the tense political situation, King Hussein had little leeway to 
manipulate electoral rules with these objectives.  He was forced to accommodate the 
opposition’s demand for parliamentary elections and accept their outcome. 
 
3) Elections under Regime Duress (1980s) 
 
Both monarchies faced serious challenges during the 1980s in large part due to economic 
crises and mounting social unrest.  Yet each adopted different strategies for dealing with 
an emboldened opposition and managing internal tensions.  Many political histories of 
Morocco and Jordan mark this period as the onset of liberalization because dormant 
oppositions began to press their demands in the context of widespread discontent.  The 
two monarchies responded, to some extent, by allowing greater participation and 
competition in elections.  Building on the illuminating work of Lust-Okar (2005), my 
analysis examines how changes in electoral rules altered the relationship between the 




Dissatisfied Elites Prompt Different Electoral Strategies 
 In 1983, six years had passed since the last parliamentary elections in Morocco and 
Jordan’s parliament had been suspended for nearly a decade.  King Hassan had exploited 
divisions between moderates and radicals by successfully incorporating Morocco’s main 
opposition party into government.  King Hussein had created the National Consultative 
Council (NCC), which was comprised of handpicked loyalists, to facilitate contacts 
between the bureaucracy and the Jordanian population.  Although prospects may have 
appeared bleak for political reform, the two kings were sensitive to popular sentiments 
and wanted to inject some legitimacy into their rule.  As a result, both regimes announced 
the resumption of elections while maintaining tight controls over electoral processes and 
the rules that govern them.  At this point, the two cases diverge in the forms of electoral 
manipulation they employed.  
 Morocco held municipal elections in 1983 followed by parliamentary elections in 
1984.  The timing and sequence of these elections were inextricably linked to a palace 
strategy of controlling the electoral process and limiting the opposition’s ability to 
organize.75  Local elections tend to be more prone to manipulation due to their relative 
small number of voters and salience of parochial issues.  In this case, however, the 
monarchy took an active role in engineering the outcomes.  Two explanations for such 
blatant interference from the palace can be singled out.  The first was to help manufacture 
a more pliant parliament.  As García explains (2000: 103-104), Morocco has an indirect 
system for electing members of the upper chamber of parliament, one-third of which 
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would be chosen by councils formed after the 1983 municipal elections.  The second was 
to blunt the likely electoral gains by the Istiqlal by redrawing electoral districts to 
minimize its representation.76  Even though the party was a partner in the governing 
coalition, the regime continually sought to undermine its influence through elections.    
 Despite these overt instances of electoral manipulation, King Hassan reached out to 
opposition parties after the 1984 parliamentary elections and invited them to help form 
the new government.  This time, however, both the USFP and Istiqlal refused to be co-
opted.  While some hoped the two parties would form a united coalition, disagreements 
over positions emerged and personal differences resurfaced, leading to further intra-party 
power struggles.  The elections once again occurred on an uneven electoral playing field.  
 The rest of the 1980s were defined by continued stalemate between the palace and 
opposition despite a combustible political environment.  King Hassan had forced the 
opposition to play by the rules of the game by requiring all candidates to be registered 
members of a political party (Zartman 1988).  This also weakened the influence of 
Morocco’s labor unions, which had successfully mobilized strikes and protests against 
the regime earlier in the decade.  Continued divisions among union leaders and within the 
USFP weakened the opposition’s bargaining position and enabled the king to postpone 
elections for the remainder of the decade (Lust-Okar 2005: 134).     
  In Jordan, the political environment in the early 1980s was more polarized between 
incumbent and opposition elites despite some efforts by the king to play upon divisions 
among different groupings.  Unlike his counterpart in Morocco, King Hussein did not 
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separate opponents into legal and illegal factions in the formal political sphere (Lust-Okar 
2005: 60).  As I have previously explained, Jordan’s regime maintenance strategies 
swung back and forth between intervention and accommodation.  After more than two 
decades during which time all political parties were strictly banned, the palace recognized 
the inherent dangers of maintaining a closed political system indefinitely.  It also realized 
that negotiations with Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) could 
produce a new political reality for Jordan.  Consequently, King Hussien recalled the 
Chamber of Deputies in January 1984 and announced a series of by-elections to fill 
vacancies that had been left in the wake of the parliament’s suspension.  
  At this point, the case of Jordan and Morocco diverge substantially in the degree of 
electoral manipulation employed by the two regimes.  Jordan actually reduced 
government interference in the by-elections and even reserved 11 seats for the Palestinian 
refugee camps in Jordan.  Many considered the conduct of the elections to be fair as 
evidenced by the defeat of notables from prominent families closely connected to the 
palace (Robins 1991).77  Ironically, this initial attempt at electoral liberalization resulted 
in de-liberalization after elites launched a counter-mobilization to protect their influence 
through electoral change (192).  As a result of this pressure, the government enacted an 
electoral law in 1986 to shore up traditional bases of support.  One of the main objectives 
of the new law was to strengthen rural kinship groups in the south through the creation of 
smaller constituencies with a disproportionately greater number of seats (200).  Tribes 
that were loyal to the Hashemite monarchy dominated these sparsely populated regions 
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whereas most urban centers in the north feature a mixture of national origin, ethnic 
identity and political orientation.  These electoral districts were allocated much fewer 
seats in relation to their population.  The manipulation of electoral districts became a key 
component of promoting the interests of elites and structuring competition.   
 Not all elites were satisfied, however, and others became increasingly critical as 
Jordan’s government embarked on a number of controversial foreign and domestic 
policies during the 1980s that exposed fissures within the regime coalition.  For one, the 
king’s decision to enter into negotiations with Israel was fraught with danger because 
Jordan’s policy became linked to the fate of Palestinians in the West Bank.  The political 
situation in Jordan exploded after negotiations broke down during the spring of 1986 and 
a full-scale uprising, or intifada, erupted across the Occupied Territories in 1987.  During 
these tumultuous years, the Islamist and secular opposition put aside ideological and 
factional differences to make political demands based on economic grievances.  Some of 
the initial popular protests originated with university students who were associated with 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Community Party.  Towards the end of the decade, other 
secular parties mobilized around general discontent with the steep decline in per capita 
income.78  The economic situation further deteriorated on July 31, 1988 when King 
Hussein announced that Jordan would sever administrative ties with the West Bank.79 
 In response to the ensuing fiscal crisis, Jordan agreed to an IMF structural 
adjustment program that called for the removal of subsidies on basic commodities.  In 
                                                
78 The Christian Science Monitor from May 1, 1988 cites a number of economic studies that showed a 
decline from $1,800 per capita in 1982 to $900 in 1988. 
 
79 According to Lucas (2005: 26), Jordan’s unilateral disengagement in 1988 precipitated a fiscal crisis that 




April 1989, price increases on fuel and food sparked riots in the southern town of Ma’an, 
a traditional stronghold of Hashemite rule.  Clashes between security forces and citizens 
quickly spread across the country amidst public calls for the government’s resignation.  
With the regime reeling, King Hussein and a coterie of close advisors decided that a 
major political restructuring was necessary.  Mufti (1999) provides an illuminating 
analysis of these internal debates and makes a compelling argument that the key catalyst 
for political reform came from within the regime’s power structure itself.80  Indeed, he 
credits the reinstatement of general elections, initiation of a government-opposition 
dialogue, enactment of a national charter and ultimately, a revival of parliament to a 
series of elite bargains struck in 1989. 
 The first order of business for Jordan’s regime after quelling the riots was revisiting 
electoral reform.  In the 1986 electoral law, it had settled on a Block Vote system that 
granted citizens votes for as many seats as there were in any particular district.  The 
rationale was that forcing voters to cast their ballots for only one candidate might 
provoke infighting among within clans and tribes, undermining patron-client hierarchies 
that serve as useful mechanisms of government control (Mufti 1999: 107).  What the 
regime did not anticipate was the ability of Islamists and other highly organized groups to 
capitalize on the provision allowing multiple votes.  While direct relationships and tribal 
affiliations factored foremost in voters’ minds, the electoral law stipulated that citizens 
could also vote based on ideology and service.  As Baaklini et al. (1999: 150) explains, 
“the law enabled individuals to vote both their interest and their heart.”  
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 Jordan’s 1989 parliamentary elections empowered a number of disparate groups: 
the Islamists who would eventually win a plurality of seats; the secular left that captured 
a dozen seats; the traditional tribal candidates who were the regime’s strongest backers; 
and finally those independent candidates who represented professional and business 
interests that rejected both the Islamists’ and the left’s message (151).  This final group 
became the “swing” vote within parliament when they banded with pro-regime forces to 
form a coalition (Robinson 1998: 392).81  Even though many heralded the 1989 
parliamentary elections as a harbinger of democracy, the delimitation of electoral districts 
still provided a safeguard for the regime.82  
 
Analytic Explanation  
 Figure 2.3 summarizes the elite configurations in Jordan and Morocco during this 
period and the electoral systems they produced.  It represents a stark example of how 
“strong” and “weak” degrees of elite cohesion produced different electoral arrangements.  
Once again, Jordan was in a precarious position not only because of regional tensions but 
also because particular elite configurations placed added pressure on the regime.  
Although the government had enacted a new electoral law in 1986, the critical juncture 
came in April 1989 when domestic unrest exposed divisions within the ruling coalition.  
Consequently, the regime opted to maintain a Block Vote system that allowed opposition 
parties to capitalize on their organization and the ability of citizens to vote strategically 
across personal and ideological lines.  Neither of the hypotheses regarding campaign 
                                                
81 Politicians that came from the private sector were increasingly successful.  This trend has continued in 
subsequent elections and is the focus of the upcoming chapter on Jordan’s 2007 elections. 
82 Lucas (2005: 47), for one, claims that the Muslim Brotherhood could have won a landslide had the seats 




strategies (H2.3 and H2.4) applies since this relatively open electoral system in Jordan 
featured multi-member districts and candidate ballots, but also a majoritarian formula.    
 Morocco, in contrast, devised electoral rules in 1983 under divided elites.  Islamist 
opposition groups had gained some popular support but, unlike in Jordan, they did not 
form a strategic alliance with secularists.  Towards the end of the decade, opposition 
parties did agree on the need for a common platform but lacked unity.  Hopes for the 
return of an opposition bloc, or kutla, quickly faded.  As a result, the regime redrew 
electoral districts and fielded additional pro-palace candidates in single-member districts 
to insulate it from voter discontent.  This electoral arrangement had a mixture of 
incentives to lower entry costs, reinforce personal vote strategies and reduce the 
likelihood of strategic voting, thus neither confirming nor disconfirming the hypotheses.   
 




























4) Elections under New Rules (1990s)  
 
The beginning of the 1990s ushered in a widespread feeling that profound political 
reform was on the horizon.  Revolutions had swept aside totalitarian regimes in Eastern 
Europe and some believed it would only be a matter of time before the “third wave” of 
democracy engulfed the Arab world.  By the end of the decade, however, the two 
anachronistic monarchies of Morocco and Jordan had reinvented themselves by issuing 
an array of new electoral rules.  Electoral reform was a key component to regime 
maintenance strategies under liberalization.  This section explains how shifting elite 
configurations resulted in fundamental reforms. 
 
Ruling Elites Rally 
 In 1990, Morocco was consumed by violent riots, union-led strikes and other forms 
unrest related to the standoff against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.  Yet the regime was still 
in a position of strength vis-à-vis a divided political opposition during debate over 
constitutional revisions.  As such, the monarchy was able to promulgate a new 
constitution and electoral law in 1992 that made marginal improvements to the 
transparency of elections but made no change to the character of parliamentary elections 
themselves.83  Nevertheless, the opposition parties that participated as part of a renewed 
Kutla fared relatively well in the 1993 parliamentary elections, obtaining more one-
quarter of the total valid votes and capturing 41 percent of the seats in the House of 
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and its main provisions. Munson (1998) later criticized the Moroccan government for manipulating the 




Representatives (García 1999: 189).  Again, the key for limiting the opposition’s electoral 
gains was the second round of indirect elections, which disproportionately benefited the 
palace parties in winning a combined seat share of 77 percent in the upper House of 
Counselors (190).84  While the close proximity of municipal and parliamentary elections 
in 1983 and 1984 partially explained the success of pro-regime forces in the previous 
period, the outcome in 1993 may be attributed to the vagaries of electoral colleges and 
the preferences of the independent councilors who composed them.  Nonetheless, the 
elections produced no clear winner and left the opposition parties racked with internal 
divisions over whether or not to join the government.     
 In the case of Jordan, the 1989 parliamentary elections provided an opening for the 
opposition and governing elites to press for further reform.  Indeed, the newly elected 
parliament pushed many initiatives with the Muslim Brotherhood as the driving force.  
While this assertiveness provided some immediate benefits in the form of cabinet 
portfolios and policy concessions, the Islamist block in parliament overreached in 
criticizing foreign policy matters in the Gulf crisis and Arab-Israeli peace process.  As a 
result, the 1989 victory actually made the Islamists accountable for their rhetoric and 
moderated their influence in the business of day-to-day governing (Schwedler 2005).    
 Not to be overlooked, the 1989 elections also enabled the Jordanian monarchy to 
remove itself from the vicissitudes of daily political life.  For example, King Hussein 
granted the prime minister and his cabinet greater responsibilities and autonomy to 
appease international and domestic audiences.  This strategy mirrored the one previously 
                                                





adopted by his Moroccan counterpart in co-opting governing elites and sheltering the 
monarchy from criticism (Baaklini et al.: 1999: 155).  While many heralded this period as 
the onset of democratization in the kingdom, the reality was that the regime’s actions 
constituted a tactical retreat, leading some to label Jordan’s reform process as “defensive 
democratization” (Robinson 1998). 
 The most significant development in incumbent-opposition relations during the 
1990s was Jordan’s National Charter, which was officially adopted in June 1991.  
Although this formal pact effectively normalized relations between the monarchy and 
political parties, it came with a number of costs for the opposition.  For one, the process 
that produced the Charter exposed the deep-seated divisions within the opposition that the 
previous elections had masked.85  Lucas (2005: 47) adds that the process was also tightly 
controlled by the regime and the negotiations allowed the regime to circumvent the 
Islamist-dominated legislature and avoid public debate over sensitive issues.  Perhaps 
most importantly, the Charter established the absolute legitimacy of the monarchy, 
thereby producing an irrevocable split between opposition radicals and moderates.  
According to Hamid (2010: 125), the pact “proved, in reality, an unfortunate bargain for 
the king’s erstwhile adversaries.”  The longstanding goal of King Hussein to divide the 
opposition had been achieved in one fell swoop.   
 In contrast, the regime coalition during the writing of the National Charter was 
generally cohesive and cooperative (Lucas 2005: 48).  The Charter also served to rally 
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loyalist forces and Hashemite allies around the core issue of Jordanian identity.86  In May 
1993, the king appointed a new prime minister whom many considered to be a regime 
hard-liner. At this point, the power equilibrium had shifted enough to enable fundamental 
electoral reform.  Ironically, this reform would come in the form of a subtle change to the 
ballot structure that governed previous elections.  
 In August 1993, Jordan discarded the open list Block Vote system in which citizens 
could cast as many votes as there were slots in multi-member districts.  The new system, 
classified as Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) and known as sawt wahad (“one 
vote”) in Jordan, allowed citizens only one vote in each electoral district no matter its 
magnitude.  The government justifications for the 1993 amendments were well 
documented and buttressed by royal decrees and throne speeches.87  The Muslim 
Brotherhood and opposition parties protested the new law but were unwilling to boycott 
the upcoming elections in fear of provoking a reaction from the regime and jeopardizing 
the tenuous gains made in the National Charter.              
 On November 8, 1993 Jordanians returned to the polls for the first time since the 
landmark elections and were able to choose among a multitude of legalized parties.  The 
“one vote” system exerted significant psychological effects on voting behavior, however.  
Citizens could no longer cast extra votes for Islamists and other ideological parties in 
addition to candidates from their tribe or family who could deliver wasta (or 
“mediation”).  With only one choice, the calculus of voters shifted entirely to identity and 
patronage.  As a result, the IAF and Islamist candidates lost significant ground while 
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where the opposition abandoned claims to a non-Jordanian identity.   
 




centrists and pro-regime independents scored significant gains.  These results did not 
translate into immediate benefits for the regime, however. 
 Following the 1993 elections, members of Jordan’s Lower House organized 
themselves into six parliamentary blocks but they lacked cohesion and rarely voted as 
single units (Baaklini et al. 1999: 159).  Although some lobbed criticisms on the 
government and brought officials before the body for questioning, the body remained 
fractured and could neither regain the electoral mandate nor the numerical capability to 
be effective.  Moreover, external events again dominated the legislative agenda as Jordan 
signed a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel.  King Hussein would later rely on a 
more pliant parliament to ratify the formal treaty.88  
 Meanwhile, domestic pressure continued to mount during the 1990s in Morocco. 
Entering the twilight of his reign, King Hassan relented to some opposition demands 
while also insulating the regime for his eventual successor.  In 1996, the monarchy again 
resorted to constitutional reform to establish a bicameral parliament for the first time.  
The resulting structure attracted considerable scrutiny from detractors of Morocco’s 
reform efforts.89   
 Morocco subsequently held parliamentary elections in 1997 that reaffirmed the 
                                                
88 Lucas (2005: 81-83) actually suggests the 1993 election amendments were part of a deliberate strategy by 
the king to reduce potential opposition in parliament.  
 
89 Ketterer (2001) notes that King Hassan had continually adopted new formulae for ruling, in which the 
precise powers and size of the parliament were adjusted to both meet the demands for greater openness and 
maintain the stability of the state.  He argues that the bicameral parliament was created to address those 
previous experiments that had not succeeded.  More specifically, White (1997) links the creation of a new 
bicameral parliament to the frustration of the opposition following the 1993 elections.  He stresses that the 
amendments were part of a process towards gradual accommodation of the opposition’s demands.  In 
contrast, Deneoux and Maghraoui (1998) contend that the monarchy proposed the bicameral structure in 
order to extricate itself from day-to-day politics and shift blame away from the monarchy.  Howe (2005) 





control of the monarchy.  While the opposition parties increased their vote shares, the 
new system actually penalized them in terms of seats.  Indeed, the Kutla managed to win 
over one-third of votes but captured less seats in the new parliament whereas the pro-
government coalition won more seats with fewer votes.  One of the keys for the success 
of loyalist parties was that they concentrated their resources in smaller districts in which 
the number of votes needed to win a seat was significantly lower than larger 
constituencies (Storm 2005: 80).   
 The inconclusive outcome of Morocco’s 1997 elections frustrated the opposition 
and allowed the king to co-opt it once again.  In March 1998, the king asked the leader of 
the USFP and longtime regime opponent, Abderahmane Youssoufi to form a 
gouvernement d’alternance—a government that, in theory at least, would alternate 
between centrist coalitions of the left and right.  Youssoufi assembled a cabinet of forty 
ministers from seven political parties but they spent much of their tenure squabbling and 
proved to be too unwieldy for an effective government. 
 Meanwhile, the “one man” vote system in Jordan changed the electoral landscape 
so much for the opposition that the IAF took the bold step of boycotting the 1997 
parliamentary elections.  The party’s rationale was based on a variety of factors but the 
Islamists knew they faced an uphill battle under the existing electoral law.  Moreover, 
efforts to replace SNTV with a more proportional system had been stymied in parliament. 
As Lucas (2005: 116) opines boldly: 
Thus, what the regime’s SNTV electoral system began, the opposition boycott 
completed: the near “tribalization” of the Jordanian parliament and the exclusion of the 
opposition from the legislature. The Parliament elected in 1997, aside from a quarrelsome 





 In the end, the decision to abstain from the balloting provided mixed results.  The 
boycott did cast serious doubt on the legitimacy of the elections but Islamists were shut 
out entirely of the parliament and lost considerable visibility and popular support.  The 
1997 elections thus marked the end of the parliament’s brief quest to secure some degree 
of autonomy and institutional centrality within the broader political system..   
   
Analytic Explanation 
 In sum, different forms of institutional manipulation undertaken by Morocco and 
Jordan in the 1990s were effective in containing opposition parties and expanding its 
governing coalition.  Reforms to the parliament and electoral law were strongly backed 
by the monarchy.  After the 1991 National Charter altered the political dynamics in 
Jordan, the regime abruptly switched from a multiple candidate ballot to the “one vote” 
system in advance of the 1993 elections.  Likewise, the continued divisions within 
Morocco’s Kutla enabled King Hassan to institute a bicameral parliament in 1996 to 
offset the influence of opposition parties in the Lower House.  Figure 2.4 summarizes this 























 In the aftermath of the 1997 parliamentary elections, both regimes emerged 
stronger but for different reasons.  In Jordan, the deterioration of opposition cohesion in 
the early 1990s and resurgence of ruling elites motivated the regime to devise an electoral 
arrangement that would lower entry costs (H2.2) and reinforce traditional patron-client 
relationships (H2.4).  As a result, so-called “service representatives” and pro-regime 
independents once again dominated the legislature.   
 As for Morocco, a series of constitutional amendments kept the opposition off 
balance.  The establishment of a bicameral parliament appeared proved to be a bulwark 
for maintaining support in at least one of the chambers.  Later, King Hassan invited the 
secular opposition to form a government of alternance, mindful that the diverse coalition 
would not be able to govern effectively.  Put simply, institutional arrangements enabled 
















both monarchies to structure electoral competition to their advantage.  As we will see, 
this strategy would be tested in following years.  
 
5) Elections Under New Kings (2000s)  
 
Ironically, both King Hassan and King Hussein died within the span of several months in 
1999.  After these two pillars of monarchical rule in the Arab world passed away, the 
challenges confronting their successors were enormous.  Expectations for reform were 
high and early indications appeared promising as two new kings began their reign.  In 
Morocco, King Mohammed released many political prisoners, fired the powerful Interior 
Minister who was loathed by the opposition and even promised to develop a “new 
concept of authority.”90  In Jordan, King Abdallah spearheaded an aggressive 
privatization program, pushed through administrative reform and eased press restrictions.   
 
Kings Regain Control Over Elites 
 In the beginning, the democratic rhetoric of the new kings matched their actions.  
The initial optimism was short lived, however, as the young monarchs soon adopted the 
model of managed top-down liberalization of their fathers.  As Ottaway (2007) notes, 
Mohammed and Abdallah introduced limited change in very specific areas rather than 
stimulate a sustained process of democratic transformation.  They also inherited the 
institution of the palace and the symbolic power and informal rituals associated with it.  
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At the same time, both kings recognized the need for modernization and development.  
Economic liberalization therefore became the dominant mode of reform.  New electoral 
rules were part of a broader effort to consolidate monarchical rule while promoting an 
image of reform to external audience.  
 After King Abdallah assumed power in 1999, Jordan’s monarchy became more 
sensitive to the appearance of parliament merely serving as a “rubber stamp” for the 
regime.  This perception became more acute given the king’s determination to push 
through an economic liberalization agenda.  Indeed, many of the new king’s neoliberal 
initiatives exposed the limitations of a parliament dominated by conservative figures 
(Sawalha 2001: 1).  King Abdallah realized that much of the “old guard” needed to be 
ushered out of power quietly for his plans to move forward.  Consequently, he appointed 
a noted businessman as prime minister in June 2000 and directed him to draft a “modern” 
elections law (Lucas 2005).  
 Enacting a new electoral law largely mirrored the process from 1993; the king 
dissolved parliament to keep the negotiations close to centers of power and to avoid 
unwanted criticism that would undoubtedly accompany a public debate.  Opinions differ 
why the government dispensed with parliament at a time when it was generally 
supportive.  One report (ICG 2003) suggests that the monarchy saw the parliament as a 
liability and a potential brake on economic reforms. It is hard to imagine, however, that 
many deputies would have opposed the king’s resolve for economic liberalization.  Most 
likely, the king recognized that a critical juncture had arrived for many important 
decisions, including electoral reform, and dissolving parliament was a necessary step to 




 When the king announced the new temporary law, it became obvious why the 
government had kept such a tight lid on the process.  According to Sawalha (2001), the 
law was hardly “new” and, in fact, largely dressed up old provisions.91  First of all, it 
allocated 24 additional parliamentary seats but the distribution of those seats reflected the 
same geographic and demographic imbalances of representation.92  Second, the 
temporary law introduced a new national quota to ensure that women would be elected 
but it did not specify the number of seats and stipulated that female candidates would 
compete against each other on a national level.93  Finally, and most importantly, the new 
law preserved the controversial “one vote” system.  Thus, the 2001 electoral law was 
developed in a fashion that reflected traditional forms of elite dominance with a keen 
interest in maintaining pre-existing power structures.  
 In Morocco, the monarchy also recognized that systemic changes needed to be 
made after the 1997 parliamentary elections.  One of the earliest signs of impending 
reform was the resurgence of women’s rights associations at the end of the decade and 
the government’s discussion of proposals to revise the conservative family code 
(mudawanna) and the legal restrictions it placed on women (Sater 2007).  Like Jordan, 
Morocco established a quota for women in parliament with national lists for female 
candidates.  
                                                
91 The exceptions were by-laws that clarified voter registration procedures, rationalized voter identification 
cards and made the administrative process more accountable. 
 
92 See Lust-Okar (2008: 91), Sawalha (2001: 12-14) for more detailed district-by-district analysis. See 
Momani (2004) for more discussion about the quality of the resulting parliament. 
 
93 It is highly debatable whether the modest six-seat quota added in 2003 by governmental decree really 
“empowered” women in Jordan’s parliament. It should also be noted that quotas for other ethnic minorities 




 Most importantly, however, Morocco’s government switched from a first-past-the-
post system to a party list proportional system..  Surprisingly, relatively little has been 
written about Morocco’s electoral overhaul in 2002 and what distinguishes it from other 
instances of electoral reform.  In this case, the Kutla parties and Islamist opposition in 
parliament were involved in the discussions over the new law’s shape and form (Storm 
2007: 87).  The “hidden hand” of the palace obviously was instrumental but it did not 
“pre-cook” the new law, as in the case of Jordan, and then bypass normal legislative 
procedures for enacting it into law.  In fact, the debate over the new law in the spring of 
2002 was marked by relative transparency and civility.  As Storm (2007: 88) concludes 
from several local media sources, “Although it was Prime Minister Youssoufi who 
initiated the reform of the election code, it was the corresponding support for the revision 
by the makhzen that enabled it to come true after demonstrations of accommodating 
behavior from both parties.”  Why did these political forces that had been odds for many 
years suddenly come to an agreement in 2002 over the “rules of game”? 
 The answer may lie in the regime’s recognition that promoting more competitive, 
free and fair elections were in its best interests for the sake of both international and 
domestic legitimacy.  King Mohammed had already traveled extensively around the 
country as part of an extensive publicity campaign to shore up support for his initiatives. 
The monarchy’s commitment to electoral reform was part of a broader effort to reassure 
citizens that the country was moving in a democratic direction.  In a Royal Speech 
commemorating an important date in the country’s struggle for independence, 
Mohammed extolled the significance of the upcoming elections as “a landmark in the 




appropriating the issue for himself, the king prevented the Kutla from controlling the 
debate on any reform proposals.  The monarchy could thus position itself as the 
champion for certain democratic principles while maintaining a tight grip on the process.  
The king also recognized that the political dynamics within Morocco had changed and 
that elite allegiances were more fluid under his nascent rule.   
 Electoral reform also became a process around which various political forces could 
cohere.  Indeed, a wide range of political forces fell in line with popular sentiments as the 
momentum for electoral reform grew in 2001.  Even Driss Basri, the former Interior 
Minister and alleged mastermind of fixed elections in the past, came to the following 
conclusion in mid-2001: “the way of voting in force today contributes to the dispersion of 
the voices in a large number of candidates, disfigures the democratic representation and 
reduces the legitimacy of the representative institution.”94  The PJD agreed to electoral 
reform that featured proportional representation because the party believed it would 
benefit from its strong organization and mobilization capacity relative to other parties.  In 
sum, the process and outcome became commonly regarded as a “win-win” situation for 
all those who were involved.  In short, the details of the new law mattered less than being 
a part of the coalition.   
 In Jordan, regional events quickly overtook any hopes that political reform would 
become King Abdallah’s main preoccupation.  Besides the resumption of the Palestinian 
intifada, the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States put security issues front 
and center.  The buildup to the U.S. invasion of Iraq most directly impacted Jordan, 
                                                
94 See the op-ed by Basri entitled, “Code électoral: Il faut changer de mode de scrutiny,” in L’Economiste 




however.  As a result of the growing unrest and public antipathy towards U.S. policy in 
the region, the palace decided to postpone elections in fear of an impressive opposition 
showing.  King Abdallah probably did not feel secure enough to allow elections to go on 
as planned.   
 The 2003 elections were set against this backdrop of security concerns, growing 
domestic political pressure and regional crises.  As such, there was significant interest in 
assessing the openness of the electoral process, the engagement of political parties and 
the representative nature of the elected parliament.  But again the palace resorted to 
making significant changes to the electoral system outside of a normal legal legislative 
framework.95  The changes included an increase in the number of parliamentary seats—
from 80 to 110—as well as an increase in the number of electoral districts—from 21 to 
45.  These changes not only reflected a deliberate strategy to dilute the strength of the 
political opposition, but also to bring more tribal and pro-government elements into the 
parliamentary fold.96 
 Although IAF candidates registered a total of 17 victories in the 2003 elections, the 
presence of opposition parties in the parliament continued to decline.  Two-thirds of the 
110 seats were won by independent tribal or conservative pro-government candidates. 
One of the main reasons these candidates were successful was because could they focus 
their energies on offering patronage rather than being tied to an ideology and legislative 
program. In turn, voters were likely to reward those candidates who could deliver 
                                                
95 Sawalha (2001:12) provides a detailed account of this critical juncture in Jordan’s electoral law. 
 
96 See Lust-Okar (2006:466) for a cogent analysis of how the new electoral law did not rectify the 
discrepancies in representation between rural and urban districts. For example, the number of additional 




material benefits to them.  Although it is not uncommon for representatives to play this 
role in a variety of political contexts, the presence of “service deputies” became a 
preeminent feature of Jordan’s parliament.  They harbored no illusions about what they 
were supposed to do once elected and their constituents expected it.  
 In 2002, Morocco’s new electoral system divided the country into 91 constituencies 
and the proportional representation (PR) party list system was introduced.  According to 
Willis (2002: 62), “the officially stated reason for these changes was to reduce the 
saliency of vote buying and, more curiously, to help strengthen and rationalize 
Morocco’s traditionally weak and balkanized party political map (emphasis added).”  
Willis does not provide a source for the latter claim but it is highly questionable whether 
the introduction of List PR would lead to these desired changes in the party system.  In 
fact, out of the 25 parties competing in the 2002 elections, ten were formed between the 
beginning of the debate on electoral reform in 2001 and the election date in 2002 
(Szmolka 2009).  Moreover, party representatives have testified that the new system 
further frustrated the electorate by complicating the voting process (IFES 2004).97  The 
plethora of political parties taking part in the elections not only led to confusion and 
disinterest of the electorate but also to the impossibility of any workable majority in the 
new parliament (Howe 2005: 241).  After the 2002 elections, the number of parties 
represented in the new parliament increased from fifteen to twenty-one.   
 Why didn’t electoral reforms have a greater impact on the party system? One lies 
with the motivation of parties themselves.  According to Daadaoui (2008), Moroccan 
                                                
97 According to polling data from Transparency Maroc, a Moroccan civil society organization, 70 percent 
of voters in the 2002 elections did not clearly understand the voting process and 64 percent were unaware 




political parties increasingly seek a “positional strategy” in their contestation of the 
public sphere.  Based on elite interviews, he argues: “[i]n the short term, political parties 
register their presence in the political system, and their commitment to participation and 
political reforms. In the long run, they seek to contest the rules set by the state (282).”  As 
such, electoral reform under King Mohammed, has been part of a two-level game in 
which political parties accepted or rejected certain changes based on their own 
calculations of future electoral performance. Negotiations over a new electoral code in 
2006 were telling as representatives of the main political parties were split on whether a 
final electoral code should revert to its old form, maintain the current version or 
incorporate elements of both.  One group of influential parties—among them the Istiqlal, 
USFP and the PJD—seemed to favor the PR-list system first applied in the 2002 
elections;98 another group including the MP was pushing for a return to the plurality 
formula used before 2002; while the loyalist parties such as the RNI were proposing a 
hybrid of these two systems (Chaoui 2006).  
 While Morocco’s political parties may be positioning themselves for the possibility 
of democratic change in the future, one should recognize that elections are also used to 
gather patronage for their supporters and to mobilize their clients.  As Angrist (2006: 11) 
explains in her study of party building in the Middle East, “the ability to command the 
loyalty of large constituencies gives party leaders more potential for political influence 
than that wielded either by individual actors or by smaller clique-like groups.”  At the 
same time, the public perception of political parties in Morocco and their role in 
                                                
98 According to Willis (2004), the PJD publicly welcomed the switch to List PR in 2002 based on the 
party’s own awareness that the new party-oriented system would favor those that were well organized and 




parliament has deteriorated to the point where they are no longer trusted as intermediaries 
between citizens and government.99  
 In the years following the 2003 elections, Jordan’s reform movement continued to 
struggle.  In 2005, the king appointed a Royal Committee, comprised of a wide spectrum 
of forces in the country, to develop a “National Agenda” for reform, including the 
electoral system.  Marwan Muasher, who was former deputy prime minister and headed 
the committee, wrote a book (2008) with an inside account of the tug of war that erupted 
between conservative political elites (who he calls the “old guard”) and reformists. “All 
hell broke loose,” he penned, when the committee began discussion of the electoral law 
(250).  In the end, however, the committee did compromise on a mixed system, with a 
portion of seats assigned to district candidates and the other to party lists.  Despite this 
tentative agreement, the government chose not to follow the committee’s 
recommendations.  The king’s initiative fostered inclusive dialogue but promises of 
genuine electoral reform were again left unfulfilled because of vested interests among the 
elite in maintaining the status quo.   
 
Analytic Explanation  
 In sum, electoral systems evolved differently under new kings due to a range of 
external and internal factors.  Under King Mohamed, Morocco relied on an inclusive 
strategy of accommodating the interests of various political actors in electoral reform 
whereas Jordan pursued an exclusive strategy in which the palace continued to 
                                                
99 Recent public opinion data has exposed a deep dissatisfaction with parliament as an institution and the 




manipulate electoral reform without broader participation from political actors.  These 
differences are partially attributable to the destabilizing impact of conflicts in Palestine 
and Iraq.  Shifting power dynamics among ruling elites led the regimes to choose 
between the two extremes.  Ultimately, the level of cohesion within the main Islamist 
opposition caused the difference in electoral arrangements.  The ascendancy of the PJD in 
Morocco coupled with renewed influence of the Kutla finally created the political 
conditions necessary for a new electoral arrangement.  On the other hand, the IAF in 
Jordan was internally divided and the split became more polarized from the events in 
neighboring countries.  These arrangements provide strong disconfirming evidence for 
several of my hypotheses regarding entry costs, personal vote strategies and strategic 
voting.  Figure 2.5 depicts these relationships in the current period.  
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Conclusions: Explaining Regime Continuity Through Institutional Change 
  
The kingdoms of Morocco and Jordan are ideal cases to seek an explanation for the logic 
of institutional design because they share many characteristics yet they also exhibit 
variation in electoral system design and reform.  The comparative historical analysis 
elucidated striking similarities and differences in causal configurations, temporal 
structures and historical sequences between the cases.  Table 2.1 (see below) summarizes 
the results of the hypotheses (see page 83) as a subjective assessment of their explanatory 
weight based on available evidence.  The results for many hypotheses were inconclusive 
or not applicable (n/a) to particular time periods.  Although each case (Morocco=M, 
Jordan=J) displayed confirming and disconfirming evidence for certain hypotheses, 
several crucial junctures did show “strong” support for others.  In the next section, I 
rehash the comparative historical analysis through the lens of an analytic narrative in 
order to develop contingent generalization about the relationship between elite cohesion 
and electoral rules.   My theory lends support for an institutional explanation of 
authoritarian resilience in the Middle East. 
 
Table 2.1: Summary of Results 
 
 
 1920s-60s 1960s-70s 1980s 19990s 2000s 
Entry Costs      
H2.1: United=Higher Inconclusive Strong (J) Inconclusive Inconclusive n/a 
H2.2: Divided=Lower  Inconclusive Strong (M) Inconclusive Strong (J) Weak (M) 
Campaign Strategy      
H2.3: Divided=Person Weak n/a n/a Inconclusive n/a 
H2.4: United=  Weak Weak n/a Strong (J) Weak (M) 
Strategic Voting      
H2.5: Divided=Sincere Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive Strong (M) 





 The central premise of my theory regarding electoral law formation in Morocco 
and Jordan is that they are shaped degree by the degree of cohesion among ruling and 
opposition elites.  In short, elite ruptures or opposition coalitions often produced zero-
sum choices for regimes between electoral manipulation and accommodation.  In 
contrast, strong ruling coalitions and divided oppositions provided regimes with more 
maneuverability in designing electoral arrangements to co-opt some factions but contain 
others.  Although the five temporal periods has shown mixed results on the internal 
validity of this theory, examining the electoral laws help to provide a window into the 
health of each regime at various points of their recent history.  
 To begin, both monarchies employed electoral manipulation during the 1950s and 
1960s to gain the upper hand over powerful nationalist movements.  Morocco used the 
following multi-pronged strategy: smaller districts were created to control representation 
more carefully; ballots featured candidates so as to deemphasize party identification; and 
electoral formulas sought to reward pro-palace parties or loyal ethnic minorities.  In 
Jordan, the regime employed a similar strategy but also increased the number of seats in 
the parliament in an attempt to co-opt Palestinian notables in the West Bank and to dilute 
the representation of opposition candidates.  The monarchies hoped that these “winner-
takes-all” arrangements would produce strong pro-regime majorities in parliament and 
placate a nominal “loyal opposition.”   
 This strategy also carried significant risks during initial post-independence 
elections when the victory of opposition candidates at the district level translated into 




Istiqlal in Morocco and the NSP in Jordan to challenge the legitimacy of the monarchies.  
At the same time, competition among loyalist elites for seats in inaugural parliaments 
exposed differences and encouraged some to defect to the opposition.  With cohesion 
weak among ruling elites and growing stronger within the opposition, both regimes were 
forced to resort to coercive strategies with direct intervention in elections.  In the case of 
Jordan, martial law was imposed, opposition parties were banned and elections were 
suspended.  In Morocco, massive repression was instituted and elections were rigged so 
as to exclude the opposition almost entirely.  These heavy-handed forms of electoral 
manipulation afforded both monarchies time to consolidate their rule. 
 The limited openings that occurred in the 1980s were triggered by economic 
crises that produced of varying levels of cohesion among elites and opposition actors.  
The electoral trajectories of the two cases then diverge.  Jordan decided to institute an 
open electoral system for landmark elections in 1989 as a result of a unified opposition 
and splits within the ruling coalition.  Although Muslim Brotherhood held considerable 
sway in the newly elected parliament, the opposition suffered from problems in 
governing and the traditional elite rallied around the monarchy during negotiations over 
the 1991 National Charter.  As a result, King Hussein gained considerable leeway for 
electoral manipulation and successfully switched to the “one vote” system in 1993.  
Morocco also faced mounting political discontent during the 1980s but elites were 
divided and did not link up with opposition demands for reform.  Consequently, King 
Hassan employed a mix of electoral strategies to co-opt the opposition through 
constitutional and administrative reforms in 1991 and again in 1996.  Continued divisions 




electoral gerrymandering and the use of a two-round system.  The coup d’grace was co-
opting the relative success of the Kutla by establishing a system of alternance in 1997.  
This political sleight of hand enabled the monarchy to maintain effective control as the 
political system became nominally competitive during the 1990s.  
 The last decade under new kings in Morocco and Jordan also reveals distinct 
regime maintenance strategies through electoral manipulation.  In Jordan, the monarchy 
relied on a cadre of elite support in parliament to maintain the “one vote” system.  
Meanwhile, the electoral system continued to foster division within the opposition as it 
could not overcome its built in bias towards clientelism and personal vote strategies.  The 
regime was thus free to pursue a mix of “divide-and-rule” and “winner-take-all” 
strategies in adjusting electoral rules in 2001 to appease certain constituencies while 
maintaining overall control.   
 As for Morocco, the monarchy switched to a PR system in 2002 as an apparent 
concession to the opposition.  In reality, however, it was another deft maneuver as new 
system effectively divided the country into electoral cantons with small district 
magnitudes and a closed list system.  While the PJD made noticeable gains in 2002 based 
on its organization prowess, the switch to PR epitomizes a classic “divide-and-rule” 
strategy over the long term to dilute the electoral influence of Islamists while reinforcing 
traditional forms of electoral clientelism.   
  
Contingent Generalization 
 The next steps are to generalize about the underlying sources of institutional 




junctures within distinct time periods.  Indeed, the central question underlying this 
chapter was why Morocco and Jordan—two Arab monarchies that share many 
institutional characteristics—adopted different electoral systems.   
 This chapter has shown that variation in electoral system design is largely 
attributable to the degree of cohesion among key political actors, most notably incumbent 
and opposition elites.  I use the word “largely” as a qualifier because I recognize that 
electoral politics, like all politics, are complex and that the contingent choice of elites 
alone should not suffice for a causal explanation.  As such, I do not wish to discount the 
role of colonial legacies, historical precedents and path dependencies.  However, I 
believe that examining configurations of ruling and opposition elites provides a sort of 
“historical scaffolding” that yields considerable insights into electoral system design in 
semi-authoritarian regimes. 
 Electoral system design and subsequent reform in Jordan and Morocco 
demonstrate that autocrats, ruling parties and opposition leaders are closely attuned to 
elite configurations and the shifting balances of power within them.  By nature, political 
elites are part of the calculus for electoral rules and they often occupy a seat at the table 
(in loose terms) during negotiations over them.  Even though these processes are highly 
“unequal” in the Arab world (Brown forthcoming), the bargaining power of opposition 
elites and leverage incumbent elites are strongly influenced by cohesion within them. 
Electoral reform therefore occurs not only when government-opposition dynamics are in 
a state of flux but also when there are fissures among incumbent or opposition elites.  
 Therefore, the key to explaining variation in electoral system design then involves 




coalition, for example, erode the maneuverability of the regime in designing electoral 
rules and force it to choose between electoral strategies based on accommodation or 
coercion.  These types of electoral rules more commonly reflect majoritarian, or “winner-
takes-all” arrangements because they tend to exclude opposition movements, favor 
dominant parties and, if necessary, manufacture majorities in “rubber stamp” parliaments.  
Of course, this high-reward strategy is also a high-risk strategy, as I will show with the 
secondary case of Palestine in Chapter 5.  In contrast, divided oppositions provide the 
regime more leeway in electoral system design and allow it to choose between strategies 
based on co-option or manipulation.  These types of electoral rules often feature more 
proportional elements not only to “balance competing forces,” as Lust-Okar and Jamal 
(2002) claim, but also to reduce risk and uncertainty.  That way authoritarian regimes can 
rely on traditional forms of control through clientelism.   
 I now test this contingent generalization by reversing the causal direction of my 
main variables.  In other words, how do electoral rules affect levels of cohesion among 
opposition and pro-regime elites?  I isolate the 2007 parliamentary elections in order to 
assess the consequences of particular electoral rules on coordination dilemmas and elite 
circulation from a within-case analysis.  The next two chapters take up these tasks with 
respect to why the PJD failed to win in Morocco and why the “new capitalists” won in 
Jordan.  The final chapter determines whether the scope conditions of these cases can be 
expanded and engages in typological theorizing to identify particular variables that link 















MOROCCO’S 2007 ELECTIONS: 
WHY THE ISLAMIST OPPOSITION FAILED TO WIN 
 
 
 Before Morocco’s 2007 parliamentary elections, many speculated that the Party 
for Justice and Development (PJD) would win a plurality of seats, thus emerging as the 
principal parliamentary powerbroker and potential counterweight to the palace.  The PJD 
had performed well in previous elections and the party leadership had expressed 
confidence that it could capture more than 70 seats in the fractured 325-member Lower 
House.  Yet the PJD only won four additional seats (from 42 to 46) and it was left out of 
the coalition government.  The widely expected victory did not materialize.  
 What accounts for the PJD’s failure to win more seats?  The PJD immediately 
assigned blame to the prevalence of vote buying and the influence of local notables in the 
countryside.  While these claims do have merit, they do not uncover the underlying 
conditions of the elections.  For example, several analyses have pointed to the intrinsic 
divisions within the opposition (Cavatorta 2009), competing versions of political Islam 
(McFaul and Wittes 2008), overarching disillusionment with the political process (Willis 
2008) and inherent weaknesses of Morocco’s party system (Szmolka 2010).  With 
exception of the latter, relatively scant attention has been given to the rules that governed 
the campaigns, the laws that determined the ballot structure and the formulas that 




 This chapter thus explores the effects of Morocco’s electoral rules on the cohesion 
of the Islamist opposition from the lack of electoral coalitions between parties and 
coordination among voters.  I develop an explanation in that the combination of a 
proportional system with low district magnitudes produced incentives for smaller parties 
to establish themselves as relevant players in the system and reinforced campaign 
strategies based on parochial interests and patronage.  As a result, voters did not defect en 
masse to the PJD and competing parties siphoned off support.  The absence of decisive 
victories across electoral districts prevented the PJD from racking up a plurality of total 
seats from a plurality of total votes.100 
 My central claim is that moves towards greater proportionality in Morocco’s 
electoral system served to inhibit coordination among politicians and voters in the past 
two parliamentary elections, most notably in 2007.101  Using Cox’s (1997) “SF-ratio” (the 
ratio of the vote won by the “second loser” to that of the “first loser”), I examine the 
extent of strategic defections of voters from less competitive to more competitive options 
in local district-level contests.  In addition, I also use a corollary of Rae’s (1967) index of 
“electoral fractionalization” (the dispersion of vote shares) to assess the degree to which 
the electoral landscape is fragmented with votes scattered among competing parties.  
 I recognize that a strict quantitative analysis that attempts to model political 
behavior based on institutional arrangements only captures part of the story and is 
susceptible to an excessive functionalism.  I deal with this potential criticism by 
addressing qualitatively the following question: Are Islamists’ recent electoral setbacks 
                                                
100 Table 3.2 shows that the PJD received slightly more votes than the other parties but won fewer seats.  
 
101 This claim tracks closely with the arguments of Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2001) that electoral rules 




purely a function of exogenous electoral rules or might other factors be at play?  The 
empirical analysis thereby considers alternative explanations that attribute electoral 
setbacks of Islamist parties to forms of self-restraint, palace intervention or preexisting 
patron-client networks.  But rather than trying prove or disprove various hypotheses, my 
purpose in this study is to evaluate the explanatory weight of electoral rules.  
 This chapter is organized into four main sections. The first section provides a 
framework for the key theories and concepts.  The second section presents a background 
of the PJD, the electoral systems in which it competes and the symbolic power of the 
palace.  In the third section, I apply the framework to test various hypotheses based on 
official district-level data from Morocco’s 2007 parliamentary elections. The fourth 
section discusses the implications of the recent elections and political disaffection for the 
stability of the kingdom.    
 
 
1. Theoretical/Conceptual Framework 
 
  
The lackluster performance of the PJD in Morocco 2007 elections spurs at least two 
puzzles.  First, why didn’t other opposition parties join forces with the PJD in order to 
realize potential payoffs?  Second, why didn’t voters abandon weaker parties based on 
personalities and coalesce around the PJD?  In order to address these questions, this 
section begins with a select review of various theoretical perspectives about electoral 
coalitions and coordination, highlighting key concepts along the way.  From there, I 
theorize about how electoral rules that lower electoral thresholds reduce incentives and 




Opposition Coalitions and Coordination 
 Scholars have debated extensively whether prospects for democratic transitions are 
enhanced by certain structural preconditions or the contingent choices of actors under a 
variety of conditions.102  With regards to the latter, an emergent scholarship within the 
democratization literature has begun to investigate the relationship between opposition 
cohesion and democratic transitions.  The problem is that recent studies tend to be located 
on either end of a spectrum in which opposition cohesion is extremely consequential or 
relatively inconsequential.  Howard and Roessler (2006), for example, probably go too 
far in claiming that opposition coalitions are the essential ingredient in explaining 
liberalizing electoral outcomes.  On the other hand, Gandhi and Reuter (2008) argue that 
the prospects for democratic transitions actually cause opposition coalitions to form.  Left 
unanswered is what actually happening that portends democratic transition.  
 Van de Walle (2006: 84) sheds some light on the causal mechanisms by offering a 
conceptualization of political transitions as “tipping games” during the course of which a 
majority of political forces moves from one coalition to another. The key dimension of a 
tipping game is a “problem of coordination” (ibid. 85).  Regimes thus depend on the 
support of a select group of actors who bond together knowing that the costs of defection 
are severe.  
 At this point, some conceptual clarity is needed for the terms coordination and 
electoral coalition. How do we know an electoral coalition when we see one and how is 
coordination different from other forms of opposition cohesion?  What kinds of 
assumptions can we make about the behavior of political actors and under what 
                                                




conditions do opposition coalitions form?  
 Pre-electoral coalitions entail an agreement among party leaders both on a joint 
electoral strategy and distribution of office benefits (Golder 2006: 5).  While this 
definition helps to identify objective and observable criteria (12), I find this standard too 
rigid for non-democratic contexts for three reasons.  First, party systems in countries 
undergoing political transitions are often very fluid and defy any sort of programmatic 
categorization. Second, pre-electoral coalitions do not need to be hashed out formally 
among party leaders or publicly stated because of the inherent risks under repressive 
political systems.  Third, and perhaps most applicable to cases in the Arab world, 
electoral campaigns are often accompanied by explicit and implicit agreements between 
the government and opposition over the boundaries of participation and contestation. 
 For the reasons briefly explained above, I prefer the term coordination to 
distinguish political actors that join together for strategic purposes from those alliances 
based upon ideological affinities or organizational bonds (Howard and Roessler 2006). 
Coordination among opposition parties can take a variety of forms, ranging from the 
issuing of joint statements to the creation of joint electoral lists or even uniting behind a 
single presidential candidate.  Coordination at the mass level typically involves strategic 
voting in which citizens cast their ballots for front-runners.  
 
Electoral Rules and Coordination Behavior 




of political actors, which, in turn, affects voter choices.103  To recap, this study identifies 
three critical components of electoral rules: ballot structure, district magnitude and the 
electoral formula.  This chapter theorizes that variations in these institutional variables 
shape the opportunities for political actors to garner votes and hence, the parameters in 
which coordination can occur.  It assumes incumbent autocrats and ruling parties seek 
electoral rules that dampen mass mobilization and/or foster intra-party competition so 
that opposition parties remain weak and internally divided, thus inhibiting the formation 
of coalitions and coordination among voters.  Regimes also opt for electoral 
arrangements that reinforce traditional forms of clientelism in order to maintain 
established patronage networks and to discourage political actors from coalescing around 
an opposition party or candidate.  
 With these objectives in mind, I adopt Norris’ (2004: 11) hypotheses regarding 
two ideal typical electoral systems. Below I summarize the incentives these electoral 
systems produce with electoral thresholds shaping strategic coordination behavior. 
 
1.  Majoritarian systems encourage political actors to seek a broad base of votes and 
support (i.e. ‘bridging strategy’) because electoral thresholds are higher in each 
district. 
2.  Proportional systems encourage political actors to target their campaign appeals to 
a narrow base of homogenous votes (i.e. ‘bonding strategy’) because electoral 
thresholds are lower in each district. 
 
 
 In sum, majoritarian systems generally encourage coordination because they require 
political actors to achieve a majority/plurality of votes from an electorate that tends to 
                                                
103 This claim originates from Downs (1954) and was examined systematically by Norris (2004). I adopt 
this theoretical orientation in order to generate testable hypotheses. I do not wish to diminish the 




coalesce around the strongest candidates or parties on the ballot competing for one seat or 
a small number of seats.  In contrast, proportional systems generally discourage 
coordination because they reduce entry costs for political actors and allow citizens to 
distribute their votes among different candidates or parties on the ballot competing for a 
large number of seats.  
 
Strategic Voting and Electoral Fractionalization 
 Many scholars have sought to explain and evaluate the effects of electoral rules 
on voting behavior.  In one pioneering work, Duverger (1954) describes the mechanical 
and psychological effects of electoral rules.  He showed that mechanical effects flow 
directly from electoral rules because they tend to give a bonus of seats to larger parties 
and penalize smaller ones.  Although Duverger did not provide a formal definition of 
psychological effects, some contemporary theorists (Blais and Carty 1991: 80) claim to 
have inferred a clear distinction: the psychological factor affects the vote, the mechanical 
factor affects the seats (given the vote), but both of these factors are mutually reinforcing. 
In other words, the manner in which votes are translated into seats can have a powerful 
psychological effect on the voter calculations of choice and utility.  If citizens feel their 
vote will be “wasted” on a losing candidate or party, their choice could be altered or they 
could abstain from voting altogether.104  This incentive structure produces the 
phenomenon known as "strategic voting,” which is also commonly referred to as 
“sophisticated” or “tactical” voting.  In contrast, “sincere voting” occurs when voters 
                                                
104 Blais and Carty (ibid.) add that political elites and party leaders also anticipate the mechanical and 




stick to their preferences without regard to the expected outcome or shifting political 
winds.   
 Although studies about strategic voting have flourished in recent decades, our 
understanding of its causal mechanisms still suffers from two main deficiencies. For one, 
many assume that strategic voting can only occur in established democracies. The 
common assumption is that citizens unfamiliar with the norms and practices of 
democratic processes lack the political sophistication to vote strategically. Although 
Duch and Palmer (2002: 64) challenge the notion that new democracies have fewer 
strategic voters than mature democracies, the critical question is whether a given voter, 
even under definitively non-democratic conditions, can be sincere and strategic at the 
same time.  Under this logic, voters in authoritarian elections can be strategic by 
recognizing situations in which their vote would be wasted on a losing party and sincere 
by casting their ballots only for those who can deliver material benefits.  
 The second deficiency relates to what Cox (1997: 12) describes as “the gap 
between our electoral theories (mostly district-level) and data (mostly national-level).” 
Indeed, one of the most powerful critiques of Duverger’s famous causal proposition 
about the relationship between the electoral system and party system is the former 
operates at the district level while the latter is often measured at the national level. 
Evaluating the psychological effect must focus on how electoral rules affect individuals 
in distinct electoral environments.  As Taagepera and Shugart argue (1989: 214), “the 
Duverger psychological effect is a district-level phenomenon, and this is the only level at 




 Although this study is animated by the lackluster performance of Islamists in 
recent parliamentary elections, one of the essential questions relates to why votes were 
scattered among competing parties across Morocco’s electoral districts.  The first task 
could be to define the parameters of the party system by its number of “relevant” parties 
(Sartori 1976).  A simple indication of registered parties, however, does not indicate the 
relative strength of each party in the electoral arena.  As Rae (1967: 53) asks poignantly, 
how extensively is competitive strength dispersed among contestants?  For this reason, 
Rae introduces the concept of fractionalization, which measures the dispersion of vote 
shares and signals the relative degree of competition among effective parties.  For the 
purposes of this study, I use the effective number of parties (ENP) instead of Rae’s 
fractionalization index (1967) because the ENP is an integer that is easier to visualize.105 
As I later describe in the section about my main variables, the ENP provides an index for 
the degree to which the electoral landscape is fragmented and allows me to infer the 
degree of electoral coordination among political parties across districts.  
 
Cox’s M+1 Rule and SF-Ratio 
 A number of scholars (Sartori 1976; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994) 
also point out the significance of district magnitude as the key to Duverger’s findings as 
opposed to an exclusive emphasis on the electoral formula.  In recognition of Duverger’s 
shortcoming, Cox (1997) develops a general model that stipulates for all electoral 
systems, the number of viable candidates (or lists) in any district is equal to the district 
magnitude plus one, or the “M+1 rule.”  Cox purports that his model extends to multi-
                                                




member districts but points out that as district magnitude increases, voters encounter 
informational obstacles in assessing the relative strength of front-runners and runners-up. 
Nevertheless, he claims that the model seems to be accurate at least up to district 
magnitudes of five seats based on empirical analysis of select cases (100).  Cox first tests 
his M+1 rule in Japan’s multi-member districts.  He finds that the strategic desertion of 
trailing candidates does indeed occur (i.e. a Duvergerian equilibrium), most likely in 
districts with fewer candidates.  The M+1 rule is also applicable to other electoral 
systems, including those with proportional representation, as long as the ballot allows for 
choice between candidates or between alternate party lists.   
 These conclusions have led others to extend Cox’s theory to other cases and build 
upon his model to predict other outcomes of strategic voting.  Moser and Scheinner 
(2005, 2009), for example, examine strategic voting as a source of ticket splitting by 
using the SF-ratio developed by Cox (1997), which is the ratio of the vote won by the 
second loser to that of the first loser. In addition to measuring the strategic defection of 
voters from less competitive to more competitive electoral options, the SF-ratio is also a 
useful indicator of the degree to which strategic coordination occurred across electoral 
districts.  The SF-ratio for a district will tend toward zero under conditions in which 
citizens voted strategically whereas if they voted sincerely, the SF-ratio will be closer to 
one. In the empirical analysis, I calculate SF-ratios in Morocco’s electoral districts to 
determine if Cox’s theory holds and to explain the causal mechanisms underlying them. 










This section first provides a brief overview of Morocco’s electoral system since 2002.  
From there, it provides a background of the Islamist movement and the 2007 elections, 
including the results and several explanations for the poor showing by the PJD.  Finally, I 
highlight the role of the palace and its impact on party mobilization and voting behavior.  
 
Morocco’s Electoral System 
 In August 2002, Morocco’s government overhauled the electoral system in 
advance of parliamentary elections the following month.106 In short, the country was 
divided into 91 multi-member districts and List PR was introduced.  Reynolds et al. 
(2005: 60) summarize this system succinctly: 
 
In its most simple form, List PR involves each party presenting a list of 
candidates to the electorate in each multi-member electoral district.  Voters vote 
for a party, and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote 
in the electoral district.  Winning candidates are taken from the lists in order of 
their position on the lists.  
 
 
 More importantly, they go on to note that additional details “have a small but 
sometimes critical effect on the outcomes of elections under PR (ibid.).”  In the case of 
Morocco, the regime adopted an electoral formula that allocates seats in electoral districts 
based on an “electoral average” that is calculated by the number of voters divided by the 
number of seats, plus one.  But since the number of seats in Morocco’s electoral districts 
only ranges from two to five and the total vote is fractured among many competing 
                                                
106 Although it was the prime minister (and leader of the leftist coalition of parties) who initiated the 




parties, the electoral average is difficult to achieve.  Consequently, the party with a 
plurality of votes receives the first seat and the party and the second highest number of 
votes receives the next seat.  This process continues until all the seats are filled.  
 If the electoral average is reached, the “largest remainder” formula is used, which 
makes the process even more complicated.  The parties that receive the electoral average 
will automatically win seats but electoral average is subtracted from their vote total.  The 
remainders are compared with the total number of votes of the non-winning parties. 
Winning parties can only obtain a second seat if their remainders are higher than the 
original number of votes of the other parties.  Table 3.1 (see below) shows how the 
electoral average and largest remainder formula worked in practice with actual results 











 In short, Morocco’s electoral formula makes it very difficult for parties to win more 
than one seat in any given electoral district.  The empirical analysis will provide evidence 
Table 3.1:  Analysis of Rabat’s electoral district (partial results from 2002) 
 
Number of votes: 83831 
Number of seats: 4 
Electoral average: 16766 
 
Round 1 (votes per party)   Round 2 (remainder votes) 
USFP: 22691     USFP: 5925 
PJD: 16618     PJD: 16618 
Istiqlal: 8422     Istiqlal: 8422 
RNI: 6336     RNI: 6336 
Democratic Union: 4514   Democratic Union: 4514 
Popular Movement: 3528   Popular Movement: 3528 
 
In Round 1, the USFP was automatically awarded one seat because its vote count (22691) 
exceeded the electoral average (16766).  The PJD missed the threshold by 148 votes. In Round 
2, the other three seats were awarded to the PJD, Istiqlal and RNI.  The USFP would have won 




about how this played out in the 2007 elections and will argue that this peculiar version 
of PR has inhibited electoral coordination, thereby affecting the electoral fortunes of the 
PJD.  I now turn to evolution of the PJD from Morocco’s Islamist movement. 
 
Morocco’s Islamist Movement 
 In recent years, Morocco’s Islamist movement has posed the most serious challenge 
to the king’s monopoly on power.  Among the reasons why the Islamist opposition has 
become a more potent force than the secular parties include their superior organization, 
base of popular support and resistance of palace co-optation.  The following paragraphs 
touch on each of these reasons but first it is important to explain the differences between 
the Islamist groups.  
 The two main branches107 of Morocco’s Islamist movement are At-Tawhid wa-Islah 
(Unity and Reform) and Al-Adl wa Ihsan (Justice and Charity). Whereas the former 
became a legitimate participant in Moroccan politics, Ihsan has maintained an 
antagonistic relationship with the regime ever since its spiritual leader—Abdessalam 
Yassine—openly challenged the monarchy’s legitimacy in 1974. Although Yasinne has 
lived intermittently under house arrest and the group has been banned since 1990, it is 
regarded to have one of the largest memberships among Moroccan social movements.  
 In contrast, Islah recognizes the legitimacy of the monarchy and has struggled to 
become a legal association. During the 1980s, the movement explored various strategies 
for political participation even though many of its members had radical roots from the 
                                                
107 Munson (1993: 153-162) describes two other prominent movements—the Sunni movement led by Al-




previous decade. The monarchy and newly formed Islah finally reached an 
accommodation in 1996 and its candidates competed openly in the 1997 parliamentary 
elections under the banner of a moribund party. Although Willis (2002: 7) argues that the 
palace only allowed Islah’s participation to draw support away from the more powerful 
Ihsan movement, its relationship with Islah should be viewed as part of an evolving 
strategy to contain the broader Islamist opposition.  
 After the 1997 parliamentary elections, Islah split with the PJD emerging as the 
political wing. Since them, the PJD’s electoral influence has grown rapidly. Between 
successive elections, the party increased both its vote and seat share from around 250,000 
(nine seats out of 325) in 1997 to around half a million votes (42 seats out of 325) in 
2002 (see Table 1 below). In fact, the PJD gained the third-highest number of seats in 
parliament after the 2002 elections, despite fielding candidates in only 55 of the 91 
constituencies and a call to boycott the elections from other Islamist groups. This 
deliberate restraint resulted from Islamists’ fears that winning too many seats might 
provoke a confrontation with the regime, as had previously occurred in Algeria.108 The 
PJD also decided not to join the new governing coalition, instead becoming the largest 
opposition party. 
 In sum, the PJD has become a major player in Moroccan politics because of its 
longstanding willingness to participate despite significant policy differences with the 
government and opposition to various laws. Ironically, the principal divide within the 
Islamist movement also relates to the extent to which it should participate in the political 
                                                
108 A senior figure within the PJD acknowledged before the 2002 elections that “the Algerian scenario is 




system. Islah and Ihsan represent both a source of support and a challenge to the PJD for 
this very reason. In contrast with secular parties, cohesion within the Islamist opposition 
therefore depends less on the actions of the palace and more with the prospects of internal 
reconciliation. Nonetheless, an electoral system that encourages factionalism and 
continually limits the electoral influence of the PJD weakens its appeal to other Islamist 
groups for participating within the parameters set by the regime. 
 
Background to 2007 Elections 
 Many expected the PJD to build on its strong performance in the 2002 elections 
with higher public support and more seats in parliament. In 2006, several reports and 
analyses appeared to portend a more convincing victory for the PJD in the upcoming 
elections.109 Perhaps the most dramatic evidence came in the form of two public opinion 
polls inadvertently released by an American democracy assistance organization in 
Morocco that showed the PJD attracting a near majority of the popular vote.110 Even 
though the electoral system would have prevented a “winner-take-all” scenario for the 
PJD, a party capturing so many votes and presumably seats would have sent shockwaves 
through the kingdom and provided momentum for a reconfiguration of political power. 
The king’s last minute decisions to invite international observers seemed to rule out that 
possibility that the results could be manipulated by the regime. The stage was set for an 
election with significant ramifications.  
                                                
109 Some within the U.S. academic and policy community became infatuated with the PJD and prospects of 
an Islamist-led government (see Wegner 2006 and Sharp 2006). Two French journalists even published a 
book entitled “When Morocco Will Be Islamist.”    
 
110 The polling was commissioned by the International Republican Institute (IRI). See Spiegel (2007) for a 




 The outcome proved once again, however, that the monarchy was several steps 
ahead of the electoral game.  As the partial results in Table 3.2 show, there was no 
groundswell of support for the Islamist opposition.  Instead, the PJD experienced an 
electoral setback in 2007 as it only gained four seats in the new parliament despite 
making a concerted effort to mobilize supporters across the country, field candidates in 
diverse constituencies and even develop a detailed policy platform based on its record of 
parliamentary activism.111  The result stands in stark comparison to many predictions, 
most notably the PJD party leadership itself, which had expressed optimism before the 
election that it could win upwards of seventy seats and become the largest block in the 
next parliament (Dahbi 2009). Moreover, political observers were already speculating 
about the PJD’s role in forming the next government and whether they could resist being 
manipulated by the palace, as the representatives of other secular parties have been before 
them (Ottaway 2006). What were some of the reasons for the PJD’s lackluster 
performance?  
 
Table 3.2: Partial Results of 2007 Elections (Aggregated from Local Constituencies) 
 
Major Parties112  Votes (%) Seats Seats (%) 
Istiqlal Party (PI) 10.7 52 15.6 
Justice and Development Party (PJD) 10.9 47 13.6 
Popular Movement (MP)  9.3 43 12.2 
National Rally of Independents (RNI) 9.7 38 11.5 
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) 8.9 36 11.2 
Constitutional Union (UC) 7.3 27 9.2 
Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) 5.4 17 4.8 
15 Other Parties ~36 65 total ~33 
 Source: Carnegie (2008), “Arab Political Systems-Morocco” with author’s modifications. 
                                                
111 See Hamzawy (2008) for details of the PJD’s record in parliament and electoral platform. 
 





 The aftermath of the 2007 elections featured the usual finger pointing among 
political parties but, for the first time, the PJD was the principal protagonist.  PJD party 
leaders criticized the conduct of the elections and alleged massive vote buying from 
competing parties had diminished its chances to register a more convincing electoral 
victory. While many of their grievances had merit, the general consensus across the 
political spectrum was that the actual process of voting and counting had been generally 
transparent and fair according to the post-election report published by the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI 2007a), a U.S. democracy assistance organization that led the 
observer mission. 
 Another view of the PJD’s performance is more introspective, arguing that the 
party had become too assimilated or isolated in the political system. Some suggest, for 
example, that the PJD had become too moderate in the eyes of many Moroccans and had 
lost its traditional support base after compromising on important reform issues.113 Others, 
including senior PJD officials, argued that the party had not done enough to establish 
links with the other political parties and coordinate with local “notables” during the 
campaign period.114  
 A third explanation and the one that appears to have the most currency relates to the 
general malaise that accompanied the elections themselves. The fact that voter turnout 
                                                
 
113 Ottaway (2006: 16) notes, for example, that “the PJD received enthusiastic support when it organized a 
demonstration against the new, supposedly un-Islamic family code, but found it more challenging later to 
explain to its supporters [in Islah] why it ultimately decided to accept the reform.” Also see Tozy (2008). 
 
114 Willis (2008: 11) provides evidence for this argument based on interviews with party officials. He 
attributes some of the Istiqlal party’s success, for example, to the recruitment of local candidates that could 




plunged to a historic low of thirty-seven percent with many ballots spoiled by disaffected 
citizens has been well documented. Many of these reports place the PJD’s dismal 
performance within the context of this disillusionment since the party did not receive an 
expected surge of so-called “protest votes” on election day. In fact, abstention was 
particularly high among younger, well educated, middle class and urban Moroccans 
despite considerable voter education and awareness initiatives targeted towards them.115 
Willis (2008: 18) points out that this seriously damaged the party’s election prospects 
since they comprise the core constituency of PJD supporters.116  Having summarized the 
main explanations for the PJD’s poor showing in 2007, I now turn to testing related 




In this section, I summarize the available data, describe the model, specify the variables 
and list the working hypotheses.  Using a regression analysis, I then test the explanatory 
power of variables that features cross-national variation in institutional characteristics, 
levels of partisan competition and patronage.  I conclude that higher SF-ratios and ENPs 
across electoral districts are attributable to a number of coordination dilemmas which 
                                                
115 NDI’s pre-election statement details the role of various civil society groups in promoting voter 
education. One of the more remarkable groups was 2007 Daba, which specifically targeted young voters in 
an imaginative pre-election publicity campaign across the country. See Otmani (2007) for a summary of 
pre-election voter education efforts. 
 
116 Pellicer (2008) examines the “PJD support profile” question based on the same data used in this study. 
His conclusion that the PJD could be evolving into an opposition that relies less on a “grievance” profile 
calls into question conventional assumptions about Islamists only winning “protest votes” (Wittes 2008) 
and other arguments that Islamist electoral support is driven by distrust of the coercive state and a demand 




include informational obstacles due to the sheer number of competing parties; 
disaffection with the electoral process as evidenced by percentages of turnout and invalid 
ballots; material incentives for the poor and uneducated to vote sincerely; and a 
competitive marketplace for votes due to lower electoral averages.  While these factors 
alone do not explain entirely electoral behavior among opposition parties and voters, they 
are useful to portraying coordination failures across electoral districts.  I supplement 
these findings with qualitative evidence based on interviews and secondary resources.  
 
Available Data  
 My method for explaining the relationship between electoral rules and coordination 
behavior combines quantitative data and qualitative research. The former is based on 
three types of data: electoral, census and individual-level surveys.  The first two are from 
primary sources.  Electoral data cover the elections of 2007 and of 2002 and include the 
votes received by all parties as well as the turnout and the amount of invalid ballots at the 
district level. The data show significant variation across districts, thus producing a 
diverse array of inputs and outputs for a multivariate regression analysis. The 2007 
election results are official and were posted online by the Moroccan Ministry of the 
Interior.117 For 2002, the data used was compiled by the parliamentary block of the USFP 
and obtained through a U.S. democracy organization in Morocco.  Inspection of this data 
has revealed some obvious omissions and mistakes and, for that reason, conclusions are 
drawn primarily from the 2007 data.  
                                                
117 Unfortunately, the official 2007 data are no longer available online. Adam Carr’s election archive does 




 The census data are from the Kingdom of Morocco’s Haut-Commissariat au Plan 
(HCP), which includes socio-economic data for the year 2004.  Ideally, I would have 
matched the HCP data with each individual electoral district (circonscription electorale) 
from both elections. However, the boundaries of electoral districts changed from 2002 to 
2007 and the HCP data are reported at the level of region, province and commune, which 
only allowed me to merge some provincial data with electoral districts.  For this and other 
reasons, the demographic data can only provide modest inferences.118  
 The third type of data originates from individual-level surveys presented in a recent 
academic dissertation (Benstead 2008) about the casework practices of parliamentarians 
in Morocco and Algeria. Although this secondary data is aggregated at the national level 
and cannot be organized by district, the results provide the basis for this one of this 
study’s explanatory variables.  
 As for the qualitative data, the primary source of information is in-country 
fieldwork during the months of August and September 2007. During this time, I 
conducted personal interviews with academics, political party officials, candidates and 
ordinary citizens.  Serving as an international observer for the parliamentary elections on 
September 7 also enabled me to obtain important primary documents, attend pre-election 
briefings and observe the elections firsthand.   
 In sum, there is a wealth of available data for comparing the extent of strategic 
coordination among voters and political parties across electoral districts. I now describe 
the two proxies that serve as dependent variables for electoral coordination.  
                                                
118 For example, I fully intended to incorporate unemployment levels into a composite variable to highlight 
areas in which patrons could purchase votes more easily. Surprisingly, however, the HCP database did not 




Variables and Hypotheses 
 The first dependent variable is the second-to-first (SF) loser’s vote total ratio as 
proposed by Cox (1997).  The SF-ratio is simply the vote percentage of the second loser 
divided by the vote percentage of the first loser (2L%/1L%). The SF-ratio serves as a 
proxy of electoral coordination because it is a useful indicator of strategic defection of 
voters from less competitive to more competitive electoral options.  The SF-ratio for a 
district will tend toward zero under conditions in which citizens voted strategically 
because they knew the race was competitive and did not want to waste their vote on an 
obvious winner or loser.  In contrast, SF-ratios will be closer to 1 in districts where voters 
stuck with their sincere preferences regardless of the expected outcome. SF-ratios could 
not be calculated in all districts from the 2002 elections but they range from .2 to .99 in 
the 2007 elections.  
 The second dependent variable is the effective number of parties (ENP), which 
measures the dispersion of vote shares and relative degree of competition. The ENP is 
calculated by taking the inverse of the sum of each party’s vote percentage squared (1/∑ 
p2). ENP serves as a proxy for electoral coordination because it provides an index for the 
degree to which the electoral landscape is fragmented.  Higher ENPs in districts indicate 
that strategic coordination among parties and/or candidates failed because votes were 
more widely dispersed.  In contrast, lower ENPs suggest that some coordination occurred 
among political actors in the form of electoral alliances or side payments to bow out of 
district-level contests.  ENP values are also limited from the 2002 elections but they 
range from 2 to 19 in the 2007 elections. 




 Because of the relatively small number of observations from district-level contests, 
95 in 2007 and 91 in 2002, it is necessary to limit the number of explanatory variables in 
order to arrive at a model that is useful in understanding the parameters of electoral 
behavior.  Therefore, seven variables are tested relating to district magnitude, political 
competition and socio-economic characteristics.  In the paragraphs below, I define these 
variables and hypothesize how they might affect electoral coordination.  
 
1. District Magnitude (M): refers to the number of seats assigned to any given 
electoral district. In Morocco’s past two parliamentary elections, M has ranged 
from two to five. The median and mode was three, thus allowing a binary 
categorization of larger (M=4) and smaller (M=2) districts. Smaller districts 
should exert a mechanical effect that reduces competition among political parties 
by reducing the ENP, thus conforming to Cox’s “M+1 rule.” In turn, fewer parties 
competing for fewer seats also should exert a psychological effect on voter 
behavior. Some may vote strategically because there is less “noise” from 
insignificant parties and clearer choices emerge among the significant ones as 
evidenced by lower SF-ratios.  
 
    H3.1: Small districts encouraged coordination more than large districts. 
  
2. Electoral Average (AVG): refers to the minimum threshold of votes required to 
win a seat in a particular electoral district. A lower AVG reduces the entry costs 
for competing parties, thus diluting the electoral strength of opposition parties.  
The AVG also inhibits opposition mobilization because the party list has to garner 
a minimum number of votes to win a seat.  Electoral campaigns focus on 
mobilizing a narrow base through patronage rather than seeking broad-based 
support through programmatic appeals. The AVG is closely associated with 
institutional characteristics such as district magnitude because it is calculated by 
dividing the number of voters (v) by the number of seats (M), plus one. Thus, the 
formula for AVG is: v/M+1.  
 
        H3.2: As electoral averages increase across electoral districts, electoral                                 
 coordination decreases. 
 
3. Islamist Performance (PJD): refers to the performance of the PJD in each electoral 
district. Since the PJD represents the principal opposition and the party’s 
campaigns are primarily built around programmatic appeals, its vote share 
provides a strong indication of the degree of coordination that occurred in the 




the ENP and SF-ratios should be lower.  Districts are coded with a “+” if the PJD 
won a seat or finished as a first or second runner-up. 
   
  H3.3: Districts in which the PJD won a seat or finished as a first or second  
  runner-up featured higher levels of electoral coordination 
 
4.   Turnout/Invalid (TO/INV): refers to the percentage of registered voters who 
turned out on election day and/or cast invalid ballots.  Since opposition parties 
rely on capturing so-called “protest votes” during elections, the logic follows that 
political disaffection is conducive to electoral coordination.  In the case of 
Morocco, however, survey data shows that negative attitudes among citizens 
toward political parties, the parliament and the electoral process are widespread.  
Coordination among political actors is thus inhibited by inconsistent levels of 
turnout across districts and voters who purposely spoil their ballots in protest of 
the overall electoral process.    
 
  H3.4: Districts which featured lower levels of turnout and/or a higher number 
  of invalid ballots suggest that electoral coordination was difficult. 
 
5.  Winners’ Margin (W): means the difference in percentage between the top vote-
getter (w1) and the party that wins the last seat (w0) in any particular electoral 
district.  Since Morocco uses a largest remainder formula, it is difficult for a party 
to win more than one seat per district.  Other parties and candidates, realizing the 
futility of winning a seat, may have reached formal and informal understandings 
to run joint lists, bow out of particular districts or engage in some other form of 
coordination.  Larger margins of victories indicate that voters coalesced around 
the stronger parties or defected from trailing parties, thus resulting in a lower ENP 
and SF-ratio.  The formula for W is: w1-w0  
  
 H3.5: District-level results with large margins of victory reflect a significant  
 degree of electoral coordination.  
        
6.   Uneducated Youth (DEM) refers to the demographics in each electoral district 
between the age of 20 and 34 whose level of education   is “nothing” (neánt).119  
Based on theoretical expectations, elections register not the attitudes and choices 
of voters, but the reality of socio-economic conditions. Uneducated youth should 
be more responsive to particularistic appeals and susceptible to vote buying in the 
electoral marketplace. In contrast, higher levels of education and life experience 
enable individuals to reduce the costs of obtaining information and to translate 
grievances, interests and needs into forms of political action. Higher SF-ratios and 
ENPs are thus correlated with greater percentages of uneducated youth. 
                                                
119 Based on available data, I construct a composite variable of “uneducated youth.” First, I aggregated data 
from two voting age categories (20-24 and 25-34) to define a “youth” cohort. I then chose a single category 
of education to define a cohort of “uneducated” voters. Although those who only receive a primary level 




  H3.6: Electoral coordination is less significant in districts with more   
  uneducated youth.   
 
7.   Casework (CWK): refers to requests from citizens that members of parliament 
receive relative to housing, employment, education or some other personal matter 
needing assistance. In many developing countries, casework is one of the only 
forms available to parliamentarians to generate popular support since their 
lawmaking capacity is circumscribed. In Morocco, this form of constituency 
service serves as a major vehicle for building and reinforcing patronage networks. 
Therefore, we should expect a negative relationship between incumbent casework 
and opposition coordination because it discourages strategic voting.  
 
  H3.7: Increased levels of casework discourage coordination.   
 
 
 Table 3.3: Variables and Hypothesized Effects on Electoral Coordination120 
Explanations/Hypotheses ENP SF-ratio 
 2002 2007 2002 2007 
Institutional     
   District Magnitude (M) + + + + 
   Electoral Average (AVG) n/a - n/a - 
Actor-Centric     
   PJD Performance (PJD) n/a - n/a - 
   Turnout/Invalid (TO/INV)  -  - 
   Winners’ Margin (W) n/a + n/a + 
Sociological     
  “Uneducated Youth” (DEM) n/a - n/a - 




 Figure 1 shows the distribution of SF-ratios and ENPs in the 2007 election.  The 
first feature of the figure to notice is the relatively high values of ENP and the SF-ratio 
along the Y and X axes respectively. It is clear that the 2007 elections featured a high 
degree of fractionalization and sincere voting based on this observation.  The scatter plot 
                                                
120 Table 3.3 shows the variables and corresponding hypotheses grouped according to various theoretical 
paradigms. The table also summarizes their hypothesized effects, positive or negative, on the dependent 




also displays a linear relationship between the two dependent variables until the ENP 
reaches about 9 or approximately .8 for the SF-ratio, which are the mean values.  At that 
point, values along the Y-axis vary wildly and do not correlate at all with higher SF-
ratios.  This suggests that the dispersion of votes was highly unpredictable when the 
number of competing parties exceeded nine or, vice versa, when the difference in votes 
between the top two runners-up was minor.  
   Based on this nexus (see dotted lines in the figure), one can distinguish roughly 
three groups of districts with different degrees of electoral fractionalization and strategic 
voting: a first group where ENPs and SF-ratios are both high; a second group where the 
ENP is relatively low but the SF-ratio is high; and finally a smaller third group where the 
data points are close to the trend line.  What factors cause this variation in electoral 
coordination across districts?  
 This study evaluates three explanations and corresponding hypotheses related to 
district magnitude, partisan competition and demographics.  I now address the role of 
institutional constraints on opposition coordination, specifically in the apportionment of 


















Figure 3.1: Scatter plot of ENP and SF-ratios from Morocco’s district-level results 
 
 
Explanation #1: District Magnitude 
 Many studies of electoral rules have shown district magnitude to be a “decisive 
factor” (Taagepera and Shugart 1989) in shaping strategic behavior among political 
actors.  When the district magnitude is low, voters may refrain from voting or parties 
running in their districts with little chance of winning a seat, which discourages small 
parties from competing.  I seek to determine whether the case of Morocco’s 2007 
elections was consistent with these theoretical expectations.  I begin with a simple 
descriptive analysis, which indicates a positive relationship between district magnitude 
and both SF-ratios and ENPs.  In other words, the higher the number of seats available in 
a district, the higher is the effective number of parties competing in a district and greater 




 The histogram below (see Figure 3.2) illustrates the distribution of SF-ratios by 
district magnitude.  The first column shows that in 11 districts with two seats, the SF-
ratio was relatively low (below .7), compared with the third column in which a total of 19 
districts had SF-ratios above .8 and 1.  But this does not provide conclusive evidence that 
district magnitude determines levels of strategic voting.  Indeed, the second column 
shows clearly that most districts had high SF-ratios as the average value was nearly .8 
across all 95 electoral districts.  Although Morocco’s 2007 elections appear to be a case 
in which voters en masse did not abandon their sincere preferences for leading or trailing 
parties, there are still questions about the factors that explain the lack of strategic 
coordination.  What are the underlying causal mechanisms that link district magnitude 
and party competition?  Were there other institutional factors that had psychological 
effects on parties and voters?  
 




 Answering these questions is critical for developing a theory about the role of 
electoral rules in inhibiting opposition coordination, but at the same time is challenging 
because it requires fine-grained information not available in large-N analyses or even 
within-case studies that use national-level data to explain individual behavior. 
Fortunately, some additional evidence does lend some plausibility to my core argument 
that electoral rules shaped the political behavior of political actors in Morocco’s recent 
elections.  
 To begin, the drawing of electoral districts and apportionment of seats has always 
been under the purview of the Ministry of Interior, which serves as a virtual appendage of 
the palace.121  When the new electoral map was promulgated in February 2007, it 
featured 18 constituencies with two seats, 49 with three seats, 27 with four seats and one 
constituency with five seats.  Little is known about the delimitation of electoral districts 
in Morocco but this process is generally opaque elsewhere, even in established 
democracies.  What is interesting for the purposes of this study are the observable 
changes that occurred between parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2007.  In the 
following paragraphs, I explore whether variation in district magnitude may have affected 
the fortunes of the PJD.  
 Gerrymandering has been a traditional practice in Moroccan elections but to what 
extent was it utilized recently?  Shortly after the 2007 electoral map was released, the 
PJD accused the government of gerrymandering (Boudarham 2007).  This claim was also 
reiterated just days prior to the 2007 elections when a representative from the PJD 
                                                
121 Driss Basri, a former Interior Minister, was a close ally of King Hassan and widely regarded to be the 




complained about malapportionment, naming the district of Tangier as one particularly 
egregious example.122  His argument does have considerable merit as Tangier has nearly 
twice the population as the rural Chichaua district but both were apportioned four seats 
(see Table 3.4).  Although there are significant imbalances in population across many 
other electoral districts,123 they did not lead to a major shift in seat distributions between 
elections.  In other words, the PJD also performed well under malapportionment in 2002. 
Why was 2007 different? 
 
Table 3.4: Minimum/Maximum Population According to District Magnitude (2007) 
 
District Magnitude 
(# of Total Districts) 
Minimum Population 
(Name of District) 
Maximum Population 
(Name of District) 
2 (18) 10,240 (Aousserd) 142,866 (Ben Msik) 
3 (49) 43,128 (Figuig) 234,601 (Ain Sebaa) 
4 (27) 84,945 (Chichaua) 189,873 (Tangier) 
5 (1) 99,963 (Ouarzazate) 
Source: Adapted from Szmolka (2009: 21) 
 
  
 Instead, more conclusive evidence is found by examining changes in district 
magnitudes to PJD strongholds, most notably the five seat-constituencies that were 
removed prior to the 2007 elections.  Szmolka (2009: 20) notes that the aim of the new 
distribution of seats was to limit the potential representation of the PJD.  Table 3.5 
compares the results from these districts and shows the net gain or loss (+/-) in seats 
between elections. It shows that the regime deliberately reduced the size of these 
predominantly urban districts so as to prevent the PJD from picking up more than one 
                                                
122 NDI organized a panel of five political party representatives to brief the international observer mission 
on September 5, 2007. During this forum, I posed a specific question about the Ministry of Interior’s role in 
the delimitation of district boundaries. The responses were revealing. Four out of the five representatives 
stated that their party had been consulted about this process. The PJD was the only party that did not. 
123 Discrepancies in demographic and electoral data from various sources prevented a more comprehensive 




seat in traditional strongholds like Casablanca.  Although the elimination or reduction in 
these five-seat constituencies only cost the PJD a total of four seats, this scenario 
undoubtedly played out in other districts in which the PJD had hoped to capture seats.  
 
Table 3.5: Changes in District Magnitude Between Elections (5 seats only) 
 2002 2007 
District Seats PJD Seats Seats PJD Seats +/- Seats 
Chefchoeun 5 0 4 1 +1 
Anfa 5 2 4 0 -2 
Hay Mohammadi124 5 2 n/a n/a -2 
Hay Hassani 5 1 2 1 -1 
Tetuoan 5 1 4 1 0 
Source: Devised by author based on Moroccan Ministry of Interior Data. 
 
 
 While changes in district magnitude did not produce telltale mechanical effects in 
the past two elections, there is evidence that it did exert psychological effects.  Party 
strategists were clearly knowledgeable about the composition of particular districts and 
how they would affect their national electoral fortunes.  Indeed, personal interviews with 
political elites, candidates and party leaders strongly suggest that the electoral system 
affected their campaign strategies on a macro and micro level. 
 For one, the number of seats clearly influenced parties’ calculus of mobilization in 
district-level contests.  A campaign manager for one of the major parties told me 
privately after the elections that the electoral system did cause parties to seek a lower 
number of votes.125  On the eve of the 2007 elections, two leading candidates from the 
electoral district of Midelt revealed that their main campaign strategy involved targeting 
                                                
124 This Casablanca-based district was eliminated before the 2007 elections. 
 




local leaders or tribal chiefs to secure votes.126  The PJD candidate, in particular, confided 
that he expected to receive about 25% of the vote in the district’s biggest town but that it 
would be enough because the rest of the votes would be split among other parties.  His 
comment suggests that coordination with other local candidates was unnecessary because 
he was relying on a narrow base of support to win one of the district’s three seats.  
 In the end, the PJD’s list finished in fifth place with nearly five thousand votes, or 
7.2 percent of the total.  The outcome could be attributed to the political clout of the 
traditional parties in the region127 but an alternative explanation for the setback could be 
attributed to the number of minor parties that siphoned votes away from the PJD list. 
Indeed, 57 percent of the total votes were cast for losing parties and nearly one-quarter 
for marginal parties classified as “others” (according to Carr’s tally).  If the PJD list had 
netted just a few thousand of these votes, it would have won the third seat.  It is unclear 
to the extent that this scenario played out in other districts but, based on my calculations, 
there were twelve other districts in which the PJD narrowly missed winning a seat by 
finishing as one the top two runners-up.  The PJD and other opposition parties could have 
benefited enormously from strategic defections. 
 Finally, two recent studies by Benstead (2008) and Szmolka (2009) show strikingly 
different conclusions about the impact of district magnitude on electoral behavior in 
                                                
126 I traveled with a small team of international observers and local field coordinator to the town of Midelt 
on September 5, 2007 to conduct an on-the-ground assessment of the political climate before the election. 
A full day spent in this area afforded me the opportunity to speak with key actors (with the aid of an 
interpreter) about the elections. The two interviews on 6 September were conducted in and around Midelt.  
 
127 I witnessed a rally in Midelt’s town center for several parties on the day before the election. The 
sentiments of the crowd were clearly disposed toward the Istiqlal and personal observation of the counting 
process in one polling center on election night underscored the electoral dominance of its top candidate. 
According to the local field coordinator, candidates from big parties have special strategies to deal with 




Morocco.  Benstead argues that district magnitude did not have any bearing on the 
incentives of the Islamist opposition to cultivate a personal vote (266). Although her 
finding is significant as a measure of caseload levels of Moroccan deputies, it does not 
capture the psychological effects of district magnitude among political actors during 
electoral campaigns within districts.  On the other hand, Szmolka argues that seat 
allocation by constituencies is the main factor of the electoral system that contributed 
most to party fragmentation (20).  But her findings largely neglect the impact of 
clientelism on political behavior by claiming, for example, that low district magnitudes 
gives rise to party switching and encourage vote buying.  The following explanations and 
subsequent typological theory attempt to compensate for these analytical shortcomings.    
 In sum, I do not wish to suggest that institutional characteristics are the primary 
factor in shaping political behavior but I can claim that my hypotheses about district 
magnitude (H3.1) and electoral averages (H3.2) do have some plausibility.  Political 
actors on both the national and local levels knew that the key to winning a seat in any 
given electoral district was to place among the top several contenders. Smaller parties 
likely concentrated their resources in districts in which they had a popular candidate or 
party list in hopes that it garnered enough votes for a seat.  Conversely, larger parties 
likely conserved their resources by seeking to obtain the electoral average in districts in 
which they had fielded lists since the “largest remainder” formula usually only resulted in 
a payoff of one seat.  
 
Explanation #2: Partisan Competition 




strategic behavior.  According to this logic, coordination is contingent upon situations 
and choices of the actors themselves.  There are no intrinsic factors or structural 
conditions that inhibit or facilitate coordination.  Instead, political oppositions cohere and 
voters coalesce around them when actors want to be on the “winning side.”  Electoral 
outcomes are contingent upon shifting power equilibriums among political coalitions.  
 I therefore evaluate van de Walle’s (2006) conceptualization of “tipping games” as 
it applies to electoral coordination in Morocco’s recent elections.  I first test the impact of 
factors related to participation and competition within district-level contests.  The results 
allow me to make some preliminary conclusions about arguments that attribute 
coordination dilemmas to self-restraint by the PJD and disaffection among voters.  
 Tables 3.6 and 3.7 shows the results from simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions of ENP and SF-ratios respectively on different sets of explanatory variables. 
The first column shows the regression on dummy variables for the performance of the 
PJD in various districts.  The results disprove my hypothesis that districts in which the 
PJD won a seat or finished as a first or second runner-up featured higher levels of 
electoral coordination (H3.3).  In fact, there was only one co-efficient that displayed a 
marginal level of significance (p-value=.10) for strategic voting when the PJD finished as 
one of the top two runners-up (PJD 1/2).  
 
Table 3.6: OLS Regression of ENP in 2007 
 
 PJD Performance Institutional Participation Competition 
Intercept 9.217 4.406 18.682 -2.387 
PJD (Win) -0.633 - -.443 .391 
PJD (1/2) -0.234 - -.058 -.038 
M - .074 - 2.115*** 




TO% - - -.112** >.005 
Invalid% - - -.267** -.070* 
W% - - - -.054 
L% - - - .173 
R2 0.007 .525 .121 .861 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<..001 
 
 
Table 3.7: OLS Regression of SF-Ratio in 2007 
 
 PJD Performance Institutional Participation Competition 
Intercept 0.824 .349 1.272 1.05 
PJD (Win) -0.037 .162 -.091* -.07 
PJD (1/2) -0.097 - -.118 -.115* 
M - .066* - .088 
AVG - >.001 - - 
TO% - - -.007*** -.003 
Invalid% - - -.006 >-.001 
W% - - - -.006 
L% - - - >-.001 
R2 0.02 .173 .155 .416 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<..001 
 
 The second column isolates two institutional variables: district magnitude (M) and 
electoral averages (AVG).  M has a modest effect on SF-ratios but whereas AVG has a 
miniscule effect on ENP.  Little can be inferred from such a limited model. 
 The third column adds variables related to participation: turnout (TO%) and invalid 
ballots (Invalid%).  Both have a modest effect on ENP but only had a modest effect. 
Turnout had a very marginal effect on SF-ratios, thereby lending little support to my 
hypothesis about this relationship (H3.4).  These results could imply that coordination 
dilemmas in part arise from inconsistent levels of turnout across districts and political 
disaffection in general.  The negative attitudes among Moroccan citizens toward political 
parties, the parliament and the electoral process are well known but have not been 




highlighted the price that the traditional opposition has paid for participation in the 
gouvernement d’alternance.  Popular perceptions that political parties such as the USFP 
have “sold out” are widespread and are evidenced by declining vote shares and 
representation in parliament.  But instead of voters coalescing around other opposition 
alternatives, they have punished them by not voting or purposely spoiling their ballots as 
a form of protest.128  With record levels of absentia and spoiled ballots, some have 
commented that the real winner of the 2007 elections was the “protest vote.”  This 
phenomenon appears to have played out with the PJD in the recent elections. 
 The fourth column investigates levels of partisan competition.  Contrary to my 
initial expectations, the hypothesis about winners’ margins of victory (H3.5) did not yield 
any significant results. In other words, the presence of dominant parties across electoral 
districts did not appear to influence voter decisions to defect.  Part of this could be 
attributed to informational shortages, a key factor for strategic voting and coordination. 
Despite the aforementioned voter education initiatives, qualitative evidence from post-
election focus groups revealed significant shortcomings in citizens overall awareness and 
knowledge of the political process (People’s Mirror 2008).  Many could not distinguish 
substantive differences among the myriad of competing parties.  Otmani (2007) argues 
that many potential voters were also skeptical of short-term voter awareness efforts, thus 
making a logical extension between their general suspicion of politics and the election.  
 Based on this evidence, I attribute the PJD’s lackluster performance in 2007 less to 
self-restraint and more due to a severe erosion of public support. The background section 
                                                
128 I personally witnessed examples of spoiled ballots during the counting process at one polling center on 
the night of the election. Several ballots featured derogatory remarks toward particular individuals or 




briefly touched upon some of the events that may have damaged the party’s image such 
as the 2003 terrorist bombings in Casablanca and the passage of the family code 
legislation.  
 The district-analysis by Pellicer (2008) also presents telling evidence of how the 
party has failed to make inroads within key constituencies in Morocco and its support 
base has become narrower, like other parties.  While PJD leaders have legitimate 
grievances about the electoral system and can point fingers at other parties for vote 
buying, the PJD’s inability to capture so-called “protest votes” is a major reason why it 
failed to win more seats in the recent elections.  Contrary to what the PJD might have 
hoped, voters did not defect en masse from other parties and an opposition coalition 
between the secular parties and the PJD was out of the question because their relationship 
had deteriorated severely.129. 
 
Explanation #3- Patronage 
 The third explanation attributes the breadth and depth of patron-client relationships 
in Morocco to the strategies political actors pursue and their propensity to coordinate.  
This explanation argues that the access and distribution of patronage condition political 
behavior, not some arcane set of electoral rules or capricious choices made by 
individuals.  As Denoeux (2007: 134) states plainly, “Moroccan society can be thought of 
as a gigantic patronage machine.”  Although sources of patronage may be abundant 
within society, the wellspring begins with the monarchy itself.  
                                                
129 Hamzawy (2008: 14) notes that some secular parties had even spearheaded an anti-PJD media campaign 




 As previously explained in Chapter 2, the makhzen exerts a tremendous influence 
on the political system through a variety of informal institutions.  Indeed, a plethora of 
religious and cultural symbols associated with the king have effectively elevated his 
image so that he is considered above the political fray.130  Successive monarchs have 
skillfully employed this role of supreme arbiter among competing political forces and 
have doled out rewards and punishments as they see fit.  As Anderson (1987: 221) duly 
observes about cases like Morocco, “Opposition has little place in a system where the 
ruler is accountable only to God and where it is the ruler’s responsibility to guarantee the 
continued and harmonious integration of each individual and group into the community.” 
What evidence exists then with regards to the role of the makhzen on coordination 
behavior in recent elections? 
 To begin, cross-national comparison of electoral results from 2007 only yields a 
few cases in which coordination did occur but one is particularly telling about the 
influence of the palace.  In the Rehamna district outside of the city of Marrakesh, a 
conspicuous party called the Movement for All Democrats (MAD) defied the intrinsic 
bias of the “largest remainder formula” and swept all three seats with a commanding 
margin of votes.131  The previously unknown party won a staggering 72 percent of the 
vote and the ENP in this district was less than two (1.9).  This outcome is a direct result 
of Fuad Al-Himma, who headed the party’s electoral list and was well known for being a 
                                                
130 Many cultural or sociological analyses of Morocco point out that the king enjoys wide discretion based 
on his symbolic legitimacy as Amir al-Mu’manin or “Commander of the Faithful.” This is the main theme 
of classic works by Waterbury and more contemporary studies by Mednicoff (2007) and Daadaoui (2008). 
 




close confidante of the king.132  During his brief campaign, El-Himma successfully used 
this privileged access to cultivate a charismatic aura and since his election has secured 
considerable patronage for the district and amongst supporters of his newfound party and 
parliamentary coalition.133  While the PJD and other opposition parties were obviously no 
match for the “king’s man” in Rehamna, what explains their failure to coordinate across 
other districts? 
 This question is complex because actual patron-client relationships cannot be 
analyzed at a distance from their micro-level context.  Testing for these relationships 
within the confines of an empirical analysis is a challenge to say the least.  Fortunately, 
the HCP data does allow me to infer some cross-national patterns of clientelist voting 
based on particular demographic characteristics. A simple bivariate regression shows that 
both age and education did have a modest independent effect on ENP in the 2007 
elections (see Table 3.3).  The scatter plot below show that as the average age decreased 
across districts the effective number of parties increased slightly. The relationship is less 
linear with regards to the “no education” variable but the data points suggest that the 
prevalence of uneducated voters is correlated with a greater dispersion of votes. These 
results provide modest support to my hypothesis that a higher percentage of “uneducated 
youth” discourages electoral coordination (H3.7).  Whether patronage is the causal 
mechanism is still left to speculation, however. 
  
                                                
132 Al-Himma resigned as Deputy Minister of the Interior to run independently in the 2007 elections. He 
was a former classmate of the King and it was well known that he had very close ties with the palace.  
 
133 See Liddell (2008; forthcoming) and Boussaid (2009) for more fascinating details about Al-Himma and 




Figure 3.3: Scatter plots of ‘Youth’ (left) and ‘No Education’ (right) variables 
  
 
 On the other hand, qualitative evidence from area experts suggests that the 
demographic profile of “uneducated youth” is actually indicative of electoral 
coordination.  In an in-depth analysis of which party won votes where during the 2007 
elections, Bennani and Boukhari (2007) point out that in the areas where the [Istiqlal] 
party had its strongest showing (the southern provinces—winning 12 seats from the 
Souss mountains down to the border with Mauritania), it relied on the co-optation of 
tribal leaders.  They go on to explain that people from these regions are largely illiterate 
and have little use for the game of politics.  Voting was based on the influence of tribal 
leaders, whose co-optation or endorsement of Istiqlal candidates proved crucial. 
According to this logic, voters face acute coordination dilemmas because of the 
incentives and constraints of clientelism. Many suffer sanctions or punishment from 
patrons if they defect regardless whether their preferred party wins or loses.  For certain 
parts of the public dependent on particularlistic goods and material benefits, it is better to 
stick with their sincere preferences or those of their patron.  
 Patronage also exerts powerful effects on electoral coordination among parties and 




parties and candidates seek elected office based on vote-maximization strategies, 
incumbent elites and opposition actors in Morocco have had tacit understandings about 
the boundaries of political competition and acceptable electoral outcomes.  Many 
Moroccan parties understand that elections are not ideological contests over competing 
policy platforms but rather represent a socio-political exercise for the sake of maintaining 
the legitimacy of the system.134  Other political groupings approach elections as a vehicle 
for supplying their own patronage networks.  Even Islamists view elections as an 
opportunity to mobilizing their constituencies by emphasizing the value of religion in 
public life yet, as in the case of the PJD, are careful not to challenge the monarchy in fear 
of triggering a political backlash (Wegner 2006).     
 As in past elections, district results from 2007 continue to mirror demographic 
patterns and clientelist bases among various parties. Despite its organization prowess and 
ideological appeal in urban centers, the PJD could not make inroads in rural areas where 
certain politicians have long cultivated electoral fiefdoms (Tozy 2008: 40).  Other parties 
with regional bases of support, like the Popular Movement (MP), had a vested interest in 
winning a requisite number of seats in Berber areas.  Moreover, parties such as the 
National Rally of Independents (RNI) and the Constitutional Union (UC), for example, 
continued to consolidate their base in young urban-based professional constituencies to 
counterbalance the influence of the left within the urban middle class (including public 
                                                
134 After the 2007 elections, the king appointed Abbas Al-Fassi, the longtime leader from Istiqlal, as the 
new prime minister since his party technically won the most number of seats. Despite hailing from the 




sector employees, service sector workers, intellectuals, and labor union members).135  As 
these examples show, the make-up of the political party and geography were often 
incompatible with electoral coordination. 
 Although the fundamental asymmetry in power between the makhzen and 
opposition movements most directly hinders electoral coordination, the monarchy also 
relies on a series of clientelist linkage structures to perform the actual duties of 
governance and regime maintenance. These structures are enshrined in administrative 
apparatuses and embedded in formal institutions.  Members of Morocco’s parliament, for 
example, most commonly serve as intermediaries between the regime and citizens and 
become clients themselves for powerful brokers within the regime.  Recent research by 
Zerhouni (2008) and Benstead (2008) shows how patronage permeates the institution. 
Their survey data reports that most parliamentarians are motivated by their will to defend 
the interests of their districts and constituents have similar expectations as evidenced by 
casework practices. While their methods are rigorous and include significant findings, 
they do not provide cross-national comparison for the role of patronage on coordination 




 In attempting to show how institutional variables may have affected electoral 
behavior across districts, I recognize three methodological dilemmas.  First is the 
                                                
 
135 The RNI consolidated its base in the Rif region to the North as did the MP over its well-established 




problem of ecological inference about unobserved individual level behavior on the basis 
of available aggregate district-level data.  In order to analyze the data, other studies (e.g. 
Blaydes 2008) have used Gary King’s estimation strategy, which allows quantities of 
interest (i.e. the proportion of citizens who vote) to vary over districts while at the same 
time incorporating the legal bounds for these values (1997).  My analysis largely relies on 
descriptive statistics that do not require this procedure.136   
 Second, this analysis only addressed the last two elections under the List PR 
system.  Franklin (2004) clearly argues that the logical way to ascertain the impact of a 
variable on electoral behavior over time is to examine increases or decreases when that 
variable changes.  Since reliable district-level results are not available from past elections 
conducted under a majoritarian system, this model begins with the 2002 elections.  Bear 
in mind, however, that I seek to explain the persistence of authoritarian regimes, not 
transitions to something else. A study that takes a “snapshot” of opposition failure is 
therefore sufficient for this purpose.   
 Finally, this study would be remiss if it did not mention potential problems 
regarding the suitability of the proxies as dependent variables.  Moser and Scheiner 
(2009: 55), for one, mention that there is no finely grained way of differentiating between 
different SF-ratio distributions, especially ones that are very similar. Cox himself also 
notes that SF-ratio values can be ambiguous.  The fact that I use ENP as a second 
dependent variable helps to mitigate these shortcomings. 
 
 
                                                





 The reasons why Morocco’s opposition parties have failed to coordinate have 
varied over time and have involved a multiplicity of factors.  Originally, palace 
interference played a prominent role in electoral outcomes through manipulation and 
other thinly veiled strategies based on coercion.  But then the monarchy recognized that 
some degree of pluralism was necessary to maintain the façade of regime-led 
liberalization.  The design of quasi-democratic institutions thereby became an 
increasingly important tool for managing the political opposition.  As Korany notes 
(1999: 171), “multipartyism has been (ab)used to fragment, satellize and finally, paralyze 
opposition forces.”  As such, I argue that electoral rules represent one of the most 
effective institutional constraints on the opposition by inhibiting coordination.  They 
encourage the proliferation of political actors, facilitate rampant party switching and 
divide the electoral landscape.        
 Although the PJD has leveled direct criticism at the electoral system for its recent 
failure, it should not receive exclusive blame.  Meyer-Resende (2008), for one, argues 
that Morocco’s electoral system is not as bad as generally believed:  “To those who 
allege that the electoral system allows the regime to manipulate the results, the regime 
could not foresee outcomes in every constituency” Although he is correct in saying that 
“everything depends on local voting patterns,” I have argued elsewhere (Barwig 2008) 
that the monarchy cared less about manipulating the results than ensuring that no single 
party could win a substantial number of seats and therefore present itself as an alternative 





 At the same time, a number of recent analyses of Morocco’s recent elections stress 
the primacy of clientelism and personalism over ideology and institutions in Moroccan 
politics (Liddell 2010). These arguments underscore the importance of informal 
institutions associated with the makhzen and present a foil for my central argument about 
the importance of formal institutions.  For these reasons, I conclude that factors relating 
to political patronage play the central role in inhibiting opposition coordination.  
Nonetheless, electoral rules continue to shape the incentives and constraints of political 
actors within this context.  In Chapter 5, I explore this interaction and attempt to develop 
a typological theory about the conditions under which elections reinforce competitive 
authoritarian regimes.  For now, I turn to the case of Jordan’s 2007 elections to evaluate 


































JORDAN’S 2007 ELECTIONS:  
WHY THE “NEW CAPITALISTS” WON 
 
 
 In November 2007, Jordan held parliamentary elections within the context of 
widespread political discontent and powerful Islamist opposition groups.  Yet, as in the 
case of Morocco several months before, traditional forces reasserted control and the main 
Islamist party did not perform well.  While some analyses have focused on the “electoral 
disaster” suffered by Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF),137 the 2007 elections also 
displayed the usual success of independent candidates with strong pro-regime 
orientations.  These results were particularly noteworthy because they featured 
unexpected victories for more than a dozen young economic entrepreneurs known as the 
“new capitalists.”   
 The emergence and participation of this nouveau riche in Jordanian politics has 
become increasingly significant for the regime’s stability.  After the 2007 elections, 
several newly elected “new capitalists” formed a relatively small but influential 
parliamentary block called Al-Ikha that attracted over 20 reform-minded deputies.  The 
activism of Al-Ikha’s membership quickly raised the ire of traditional powerbrokers in the 
parliament and other conservative forces.  Yet support from prominent deputies within 
                                                
137 The IAF suffered its worst electoral performance ever in 2007. See the article in The Economist from 




the block for the king’s economic liberalization agenda has also proven instrumental.  
 What explains the electoral success of elites who neither had tribal weight nor any 
kind of previous political base?  And does the emergence of Al-Ikha represent a vanguard 
for political reform or the continuation of politics as usual?  Explanations and answers to 
these questions have so far proven inadequate.  The defeat of popular Islamists in key 
electoral districts elicited immediate allegations of vote fraud, making it convenient to 
point to registration and turnout irregularities where a few “new capitalists” scored 
surprising victories (Abu Rumman 2007).  Others have suggested these candidates simply 
bought their own election in order to further their own socio-economic interests (Hroub 
2007).138  Few analyses, however, have examined the “new capitalist” victories in 2007 
from the perspective of the regime and institutional survival strategies.  Although the 
electoral pendulum did not swing dramatically as it did between consecutive elections in 
1989 and 1993, Jordan’s electoral rules continue to exert a considerable influence on 
political actors, including the “new capitalists.”  To what extent did Jordan’s “one vote” 
system enable their candidacies, facilitate their victories and constrain their activities in 
parliament.  The main purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the role of 
institutional mechanisms in maintaining traditional patterns of elite recruitment and the 
circulation of elites in parliament.  According classical elite theorists, both of these 
processes are essential ingredients for stable and effective rule. 
 Using district and candidate-level data from Jordan’s parliamentary elections, I 
assess how electoral rules that reduced the number of votes required to win a seat have 
                                                
138 A post-election analysis by Hroub (2007) is an example of stereotyping the election of the “new 
capitalists” and their implications for the parliament. In particular, he questions the ability of these 




shaped political behavior among candidates, voters and deputies themselves.  The results 
suggest that districts with lower electoral thresholds encouraged personalistic campaigns, 
reinforced clientelist structures and even have inhibited parliamentary capacity.  In order 
to advance this argument, I also present qualitative evidence from personal interviews 
with more than a dozen Jordanian MPs that provides some insights about how the recent 
elections were successful in recruiting a new breed of “up and comer” elites and fostering 
new loyalties and allegiances to the monarchy.  King Abdallah’s decision to dissolve 
parliament in November 2009 and institute a new system of electoral sub-districts sheds 
new light on this argument  
 This chapter proceeds in four parts. The first part discusses classical and “second 
generation” conceptions of elite recruitment and circulation and then highlights 
contemporary scholarship that frames my main arguments.  The second part provides an 
overview of Jordan’s electoral system, the current parliament and a background of the Al-
Ikha block.  The third part applies the framework to test various hypotheses with three 
stylized profiles of newly elected deputies.  The fourth part discusses the new electoral 
law for upcoming elections in November 2010 and its implications for my core argument 
about electoral rules providing a “window” into the regime.  
 
1. Theoretical/Conceptual Framework 
 
To this mixing, in the particular case in which only two groups, the élite and non-élite, are 
envisaged, the term “circulation of élites” has been applied. We must pay special attention…in 
the case of various groups, to the ways in which transitions from one group to the other occur, 
and to the intensity of that movement—that is to say, to the velocity of the circulation. 






The democratic tendency—the tendency to replenish ruling classes from below—is constantly 
at work with greater or lesser intensity in all human societies…When the democratic tendency 
does not exert too great an influence…it represents a conservative force. It enables ruling 
classes to be continually replenished through the admission of new elements. 
-  Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, Paper XV §5 
 
Classical and “Second Generation” Elite Theory  
 Pareto and Mosca are widely considered as the founding fathers of elite theory in 
general and a “classical” school of thought in particular.139  Although their voluminous 
works are instructive in many respects and the quotations above are illuminating, their 
theories about how the incorporation of new elites affects political stability are relatively 
embryonic within a comparative framework.  Since the nature and organization of elites 
are not constant fixtures across societies, under what conditions do elites remain loyal or 
defect?  This question, which has been posed by scholars in various forms, is essential to 
understanding the impact of traditional patterns of elite recruitment and circulation on 
political stability in Jordan.  Before addressing it, I elucidate the term “elite” in broad 
terms, leaving aside specific characteristics for the empirical analysis that follows. 
 As contemporaries in the early 20th century, Pareto and Mosca shared many views 
about the prevalence of inequalities in human society. However, in contrast with Marx 
and his disciples, they sought to unmask non-economic dimensions of those inequalities 
by examining a single cohesive elite which dominates the affairs of society (Parry 1969: 
30). Exactly what constitutes this “elite” has been the subject of ongoing debate among 
scholars.  Instead of providing an exhaustive review of definitions and elitist theories, I 
focus on a commonality in differentiating the elite from the general public by the extent 
                                                
139 Others such as Weber, Michels, Burnham and Mills are highly influential in their own regard but are 





of their power and influence based on various overlapping resources, which include 
control of organizations and public support (Etzioni-Havely 1997: xxv).  
 How then do we understand what power and influence entail?  Among the many 
who offer helpful conceptualizations, Putnam (1976: 6) describes power and influence as 
means to achieve desired outcomes and hence, “the probability of influencing the policies 
and activities of the state.”  Subsequent scholarship (Burton and Higley 2001: 91) 
concurs that political elites are “persons who are able…to affect national political 
outcomes regularly and substantially.” In order to shed some light on these processes, I 
now return to the theories advanced by Pareto and Mosca.  
 Pareto’s thesis was that as long as a group governing elite can absorb into its ranks 
the most talented from the non-governing elite—while shedding the more degenerate of 
its own members—a “circulation of élites” would keep society in a state of equilibrium 
and gradual change (Etzioni-Halevy 1997: 44).  As for Mosca, he argued that recruitment 
of the ruling class would display either an aristocratic or democratic tendency.  The 
tendency is aristocratic when new members of the ruling class are recruited from the 
descendants of the existing ruling class.  The democratic tendency is displayed where the 
ruling class is renewed from the lower class of those ruled (Parry 1969: 39).  According 
to these authors, the key is assessing the “velocity” of circulation and “intensity” in 
which the ruling class is replenished. 
 In The Ruling Class, Mosca (1939: 154) also states famously: “When we say that 
the voters ‘choose’ their representatives, we are using language that is very inexact. The 
truth is that the representative has himself elected by the voters [or]… his friends have 




directly and indirectly responsible for recruiting new elites and determining the pace of 
elite circulation.  According to Best and Cotta (2000: 7), the selectorate are the “party 
organizations, the personal cliques, the groups of dignitaries... involved in the selection of 
candidates and in their presentation to constituencies.  Some have developed elaborate 
theories about the relationship between selectorates and regime stability but it will suffice 
here to describe how selectorates vary according to regime and types of society.140  
 In a democracy, the selectorate is presumably the general electorate. In an 
autocracy, on the other hand, accountability of leaders and policy-makers is not, by 
definition, to the electorate.  Rather, it is to a selectorate, which is some narrow subset of 
the population.  Under authoritarian regimes, the selectorate is often dominated by the 
governing and non-governing elite, which includes military officers, merchants, 
administrators or some other set of interests usually centered around the state. 
Selectorates in traditional societies commonly featured informal caucuses of dignitaries 
or state officials whereas in modern societies they are more institutionalized. Traditional 
societies also tend to choose leaders based on ascriptive criteria such as lineage, ethnicity 
and religion.  Modern societies, in contrast, place more value on achievement criteria.  
Although both Jordan and Morocco feature monarchs who embody the ultimate source of 
power and authority within the polity, clientelist networks and patronage are essential 
instruments of elite maintenance (Tripp 2001: 220). 
 A “second generation” of studies on Middle East elites (e.g. Zartman 1980) draws 
from the work of classic elite theorists and also provides a framework for defining types 
                                                
140 For example, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) develop a theory of political survival that describes 
incentives on rulers using two key characteristics of a polity's institutions: the sizes of the selectorate (S) 




of elites and their roles.  Many of these works conceptualize elites as mediators that serve 
more the interests of regime.  Binder’s study on Egypt (1978), for example, focuses on 
middle-level elites, or a “second stratum” in Mosca’s terms, through whom central 
authorities rule.  Weinnbaum defines a brokerage function whereby legislative elites act 
as intermediaries between the government and their constituents.   
 At this point, it is important to note two conceptual disclaimers regarding political 
elites under authoritarianism.  For one, due to the informal institutions of personalist rule 
and patron-client relationships, I recognize that parliamentary membership does not 
automatically guarantee privileged access to the inner circle of the political elite.141  On 
the other hand, elections do confer a certain degree of “elite” status and that political 
participation is an “instrumental value” for most elites (Huntington and Nelson 1976: 29).  
Secondly, I admit the role of economic elites is vitally important to the study of regime 
stability, particularly in the Middle East.  A number of works have focused on the 
relationship between particular Arab states and business elites.142  While their theories are 
certainly relevant to the “new capitalists” in Jordan, this chapter is concerned with the 
recruitment and circulation of political elites through institutional venues and electoral 
mechanisms.  
 
                                                
141 Bank and Schlumberger (2004) identify three concentric circles of influence among politically relevant 
elite in Jordan.  They put the large majority of parliamentarians in the outer circle because they have 
limited influence and whose main duty is to “rubber stamp” decisions made by the king.  I dispute the 
relegation of parliamentarians as seemingly insignificant in light of the “new capitalist” phenomenon in 
2007.  Why would they seek election to such a marginal role?    
 
142 The following works have addressed the role of business elites in Arab politics: Crystal (1990) and 
Chaudhry (1997) on merchants in the Arabian peninsula; Vitalis (1997) on capitalists in interwar Egypt, 




Contemporary Scholarship on Elites and Authoritarian Elections 
 A new generation of contemporary scholarship has reinvigorated the study of elites. 
In an oft-cited work, Higley and Burton (1989), for example, examine the relationship 
between types of national elites and political stability. They develop a tripartite typology 
of elite configurations: ideologically unified, consensually unified and disunified, which 
they claim is the most common type throughout history.  According to their theory, the 
transformation from elite disunity to consensual unity is an essential precondition for 
political stability and that one of the routes for this transformation is when a consensually 
oriented bloc gains a stable majority of electoral support (27-29).  
 Since then, critics have argued that this so-called “new elite paradigm” fails to 
make important conceptual distinctions among elites and that the characterization of 
elites states are unsatisfactory.143  Their basic message is that studying the micro-politics 
of elite cohesion under authoritarianism must elaborate on a simple unity/disunity 
dichotomy and move beyond standard assumptions about elites and regime stability. 
Contrary to some empirical evidence from post-communist transitions,144 this study 
advances the argument that elite defection is not a telltale sign of cracks in the 
authoritarian edifice nor does elite consensus automatically shore them up.  In the case of 
Yemen, powerful elites may choose to defect in order to reposition themselves within 
preexisting patronage networks (Longley 2008).  Neopatrimonial regimes in the Middle 
East also create new institutions that are staffed on the basis of clientelist linkages, as 
                                                
143 See Cammack (1990) for a critique of the “elite paradigm” developed by Higley and Burton. 
 
144 Easter (1997), for one, argues that post communist elites that enter political transitions relatively intact 
successfully retained their monopoly on power whereas those who were fragmented were forced to 




Bank and Schlumberger (2004) describe in the case of Jordan’s Economic Consultative 
Council.  
 Likewise, much of the emerging scholarship on authoritarian elections (Levistky 
and Way 2003, Howard and Roessler 2006, Magaloni 2006, Schedler 2006, Blaydes 
2008) focuses on the electoral “game” between incumbents and the opposition with 
minimal attention given to explaining how electoral rules influence newly elected elites 
and their capacity as parliamentarians.  Recent studies about authoritarian institutions 
(e.g. Gandhi and Przeworski 2007) tend to dwell on why dictators and other rulers create 
legislatures without addressing how electoral rules bind parliamentarians to the role of 
regime intermediaries. This chapter attempts to bridge these analytical gaps by examining 
how Jordan’s electoral system has facilitated the incorporation of so-called “new elites” 
into parliament.  More specifically, it assesses the degree to which the Single Non-
Transferable Vote (SNTV) system shaped the campaigns of “new capitalist” candidates 
and their activities in parliament as members of Al-Ikha.  
 For architects of electoral systems, SNTV attracts scant attention because and has 
been utilized sparingly with mixed effects on political development.145  According to 
Reynolds et al. (2005: 113), the main advantage of SNTV is that it is better able to 
facilitate the representation of minority parties and independents, specifically mentioning 
Jordan as a case in which the system has enabled a number of popular non-party pro-
monarchist candidates to be elected.  SNTV also has some appeal because it offers a 
relatively simple ballot and menu of choices for unfamiliar voters.  The list of 
                                                
145 Today, SNTV is used in Afghanistan and Vanuatu in addition for an allotment of legislative seats in 
Indonesia, Thailand and Taiwan. Its best-known application was for Japanese lower-house elections from 




disadvantages provided by Reynolds et al. (114), in contrast, have more profound 
implications but have not been explored systematically in the general literature outside of 
a regional study of SNTV in East Asia (Groffman et. al 1999).  
 Many analyses of elections in Jordan have singled out SNTV for being unfair and 
unrepresentative.  Some have focused on the apportionment of seats and the bias towards 
rural districts.146 Others scrutinized its effect on political parties, especially the Islamic 
Action Front (IAF), and their ability to nominate candidates and mobilize voters.147 
Surprisingly few analyses have recognized the broader impacts of the system on electoral 
competition as a whole with the notable exception of Lucas (2005) and Lust-Okar (2006).  
The former argues that Jordan’s electoral law helps explain a strong regime coalition and 
the success of overall regime survival strategies.  The latter claims Jordan’s electoral 
system enables an electoral arena in which competition for votes is based on patronage 
and which candidates are best able to deliver on campaign promises.  In a later work 
(2008: 92), she adds that “elites, seeking a successful bid for elections and aware of the 
constraints, are more likely to run if they have good relations with the state.”  Voters, in 
turn, recognize elites that can offer wasta (mediation) for state services and benefits.148 
                                                
146 Sawalha (2001) notes that in Amman’s second district, the ration was one deputy every 172,000 
inhabitants, whereas in the southern district of Tafileh, the ratio was one deputy per each 18,000 citizens. 
 
147 Mufti (1999: 120) claims nomination and vote-equalization errors cost the IAF 11 chamber seats (out of 
80) in 1993. Bachelani (1999) shows that changes in the electoral rules adversely affected the opportunities 
for ideological based parties to mobilize voters between consecutive elections. Abu Rumman (2007) 
concludes that the system’s continued use also played a role in the IAF’s dismal performance in 2007.  
 
148 According to Kilani and Sakiijha (2002: 21), wasta is a “social tool with deep historical precedence in 
which loyalty to family, tribe, religion and sect is used to achieve a mutually beneficial exchange of 
interests.” In contemporary usage, however, Benstead (2008: 71) notes that wasta generally refers to the 
use of an individual’s position within a state bureaucracy and the resources of the state’s power to gain 
power and influence to solve a problem or gain preferential treatment. Wasta thus has a dual meaning as 




  As such, this study departs from the optimistic assessment in Baaklini et al. (1999: 
6) that Arab parliamentarians are “genuinely interested in building their institution into a 
major force for democracy.”  Instead, I show how Jordan’s electoral system reinforces 
clientelism and largely limits the role of legislators as “service deputies.”  Drawing upon 
the study by Barkan and Okumu (1978) about “the Kenyan experience,” I argue a 
primary function of elections in Jordan is to recruit local political entrepreneurs into a 
national system of clientelist networks and contain their activities so they pose no 
challenge to the regime.  Unlike other authoritarian elections, their main purpose is not to 
promote from within the ruling elite or to accommodate power-sharing with rival groups. 
Rather, Jordan’s electoral processes formalize clientelistic structures and then link them 
with the center of power through an inept parliament. The rules that govern parliamentary 
elections therefore serve as a vital institutional mechanism for regime stability. 
 In sum, the central thrust of this chapter is to emphasize the importance of elections 
as a tool for elite recruitment and circulation in parliament.  It builds on the foundational 
theories developed by Mosca and Pareto about elite recruitment and circulation 
respectively.  It then applies them to the case of Jordan’s elections and parliament within 
the framework developed by Higley and Burton (1989) as well as Lust-Okar (2006). 
Drawing upon “The Kenyan Experience” study by Barkan and Okumu (1978), it 
advances the argument that the primary function of elections in Jordan is to recruit local 
political entrepreneurs into a national system of clientelist networks so as to limit their 
influence and prevent their defection.  Unlike other authoritarian elections, the main 
purpose is not to promote from within the ruling elite or to accommodate power sharing 




between the candidate and selectorate and then link them with the center of power 
through an inept parliament. The rules that govern parliamentary elections therefore serve 
as a new instrument of elite recruitment and circulation. 
 
 
2.  Overview/Background 
 
In this section, I provide a brief overview of Jordan’s electoral system and a profile of the 
15th parliament that was elected in 2007. I also highlight the role of Jordan’s 
parliamentary blocks and, most notably, the emergence of Al-Ikha on the political scene. 
This overview serves as a backdrop to the application that follows. 
 
Overview of Jordan’s Parliamentary Electoral System149 
 Although the king is the ultimate authority in Jordan, the political system features a 
bicameral legislature with limited legislative and oversight powers.  The Chamber of 
Deputies consists of 110 elected members while the king appoints 55 members to the 
smaller and more exclusive Assembly of Senators.  Draft legislation is referred to the 
Chamber of Deputies by the government, where it can be approved, amended or rejected, 
before being passed on to the upper house.  If the Senate approves the draft law, it is sent 
to the king for his endorsement.  In theory, the parliament can override a law that the king 
has vetoed, but this scenario is nearly inconceivable given the monarch’s role in 
appointing senators and ability to dissolve parliament. 
                                                




 As Chapter 2 explained, for most of Jordan’s post-independence history, direct 
elections have allocated parliamentary seats according to plurality rules in multi-member 
districts with multiple votes.  Since 1993, however, the monarchy has maintained a 
controversial electoral system that only allows citizens to cast one vote in each district no 
matter the number of competing candidates or seats contested.  In previous elections, 
each voter had been able to vote for as many candidates as there were seats in the 
electoral district, which typically ranged from two to nine.  
 
Profile of the 15th Parliament 
 The Lower House of Parliament between 2007 and 2009 forms the fifteenth 
parliamentary council in Jordan.  The vast majority of its members are independent 
deputies who are not affiliated with or supported by any political parties.  In fact, most 
political parties did not even bother to field lists of candidates in 2007, with the exception 
of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), which won just six seats.  As a result, tribal candidates 
and other loyalists control a commanding 98 seats in the House, not even counting the 
king’s allies in the Senate.  
 Despite a super-majority of pro-regime deputies, the parliament has not served as a 
“rubber stamp” for the palace’s agenda.  A significant number of MPs have rejected and 
criticized several draft laws presented by them.  Others have submitted questions to the 
government about issues related to the economy or summoned ministers for questioning 
regarding cases of corruption.  The 15th parliament displayed an unexpected 




new deputies.150  Indeed, almost two-thirds of the current deputies are newly elected with 
only 29 incumbents from the previous parliament. 
 There are a number of explanations for the behavior of the new MPs. The one I 
wish to highlight emphasizes the mutual interests of the regime and individual deputies. 
According to this perspective, the king probably recognized that the political process 
needed to regain some legitimacy after mismanaging municipal and parliamentary 
elections.  For this reason, the palace has allowed some degree of government criticism 
and deputies have picked up on subtle cues not to shy away from doing so.  This assertive 
behavior on the part of newly elected members early in their tenure serves dual purposes 
of catering to domestic consumption with local constituencies and being in step with the 
general antipathy toward parliament.  
 
Parliamentary Blocks and Al-Ikha 
 Since 1993, Jordan’s parliament has featured a series of blocks in lieu of formal 
political parties. Deputies usually join blocks based on personal relationships and 
political marriages of conveniences. They use their affiliation as a means to extract 
patronage and are quick to defect if the other side has more to offer. These blocks 
obviously provide a weak substitute for political parties because they lack most 
semblances of internal cohesion and discipline. At the same time, the blocks do help to 
overcome the individualistic character of Jordan’s parliament. 
 In the past, a handful of parliamentary blocks typically had been formed among 
centrists and chaired by leading deputies.  In the aftermath of the 2007 elections, this 
                                                




trend appeared to hold true as over fifty pro-government deputies flocked to the National 
Trend Block under the leadership of Abdul Hadi Al-Majali, a high-ranking former 
official and party leader.  Shortly thereafter, however, another block emerged known as 
the National Brotherhood, or Al-Ikha.  While the new block initially consisted of young 
MPs from the business sector, it attracted a diverse membership of 20 deputies, including 
one female elected under the quota system.  Most deputies were drawn to the “mentality” 
of block early on because they were newcomers and felt parliament needed an injection 
of “new blood.” Some also took stock of various options and decided that a smaller 
middle-of-the-road block better suited them.  A few also defected from another block 
after becoming dissatisfied with its leadership and internal procedures.  
 Members of Al-Ikha have assumed an active oversight role in relation to other 
blocks.  At the same time, the block has also drawn the ire of their colleagues in the 
Lower House. Some incumbents have criticized its members as being inexperienced and 
overly “aggressive.”151  Many others have called members of Al-Ikha political 
opportunists for abusing their position in the majority coalition to secure coveted 
positions including chairmanships of influential committees such as Finance, Agriculture 
and Public Services.152  As a result, some independent deputies with significant 
legislative and policy experience were shut out of committee memberships altogether.  
This configuration of elites has been characterized as an unprecedented (JPM 2009).  
                                                
151 This particular criticism came after several members of Al-Ikha proposed changes to the 1976 
Citizenship Law in order to allow Jordanian mothers to grant citizenship to their children, an extremely 
sensitive topic given the sizeable number of Palestinians in Jordan. 
152 Upon the inauguration of the Lower House in 2007, the National Trend and Brotherhoo blocks forged a 
parliamentary coalition and largely divided up committee assignments amongst themselves. Even though a 
major split occurred at the beginning of the second session in early 2009, these two blocks still hold a 




 To recap, this section has provided an overview of the electoral system as well as a 
brief background of the 2007 elections, the 15th parliament and the Al-Ikha parliamentary 
block.  The key points are: 
•   SNTV was instituted in 1993 and only allows citizens to cast one vote in each 
district no matter the number of competing candidates or seats contested, thereby 
encouraging voting along family or tribal lines. 
•   The 15th Parliament has not served as a “rubber stamp” for the regime; but rather, 
many of its newly elected members have shown considerable assertiveness (with 
tacit acquiescence from the monarchy). 
•   Al-Ikha has emerged as a relatively small but influential parliamentary block that 
represents a potential counterweight to the dominant pro-government block but 




In this section, I first examine biographical data of Jordanian deputies in the Lower 
House and describe the attributes of those who comprise the Al-Ikha parliamentary block. 
Second, I present various explanations and corresponding hypotheses for their success 
and specify the analytical framework.  Third, I assess the explanatory weight of each 
factor in an attempt to develop some contingent generalizations for the conclusion. 
Before setting out with the empirical analysis, I summarize the data and methods used in 





Data and Methods 
 This analysis utilizes a mixed-method approach that draws from both qualitative 
and quantitative data.  As for qualitative data, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
in Amman, Jordan during the month of July 2009 with a non-random stratified sample. 
The primary subjects were ministers of parliament (MPs) that fit the profile of “new 
capitalists” but also included other newly elected MPs, including committee chairmen 
and those who won surprising electoral victories.  Of the twenty-one members of Al-Ikha, 
I interviewed approximately half of them.153  The interviews consisted of standard 
questions that solicited factual and opinion-oriented responses about the campaign 
period, election process and parliamentary activity.154  
 My method for explaining the relationship between electoral rules and electoral 
outcomes is based on district-level data compiled by Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center 
and published in Who’s Who in the Jordanian Parliament series. Unfortunately, the data 
are mostly limited to those who were elected so this analysis essentially compares 
electoral outcomes for winners.  Therefore, I use candidates’ percentage of the total of 
vote and margin of victory as proxies for my dependent variable.  I specify this and my 
explanatory variables later in this section but, for now, I describe the subjects of interest 
to this study. 
 
                                                
153 Attempts were made by phone to contact all the members for interviews.  Some did not respond. 
 
154 The procedures for the interviews were designed with careful thought and attention to political 
sensitivities.  Interviews were conducted in the MP’s office or a place of his choosing. The question format 
afforded significant flexibility and depth for responses with a “trigger” question that introduced the topic 
followed by a “probe” to elicit more revealing information.  The questions generally covered the campaign 
period, election day and the current parliamentary session.  The subjects were granted anonymity under the 




Choice of Subjects 
 This study concerns itself with Al-Ikha for three main reasons.  First, the 
individuals from this parliamentary block embody many of the concepts and theories 
elucidated in the previous section about elites. Some Al-Ikha members personify the so-
called “new capitalists” of Jordan that essentially “had themselves elected” through 
lavish campaigns or their campaigns reflect cases in which their “friends had them 
elected” (per Mosca’s observation).  Their socio-economic status also raises the question 
whether they represent an aristocratic or democratic tendency (also explained by Mosca) 
of replenishing the ruling class.  Second, Al-Ikha provides a focal point for examining 
electoral mechanisms for elite recruitment and circulation under authoritarianism.  Many 
of its members represent the “new elite” in Jordan that is usurping power from traditional 
forces and tribal structures.  Third, the emergence of a new political elite in Jordan allows 
me to draw some limited comparisons with the case of Morocco.  During Morocco’s 
2007 parliamentary elections, Fuad Al-Himma—a former Interior Ministry official and 
confidante of the king—emerged in the political scene and has since formed an 
influential parliamentary block. 
 While there is no official list of the “new capitalists” nor has much been written 
about them, they were certainly a “visible phenomenon” during the 2007 election 
campaign according to one resident observer.155  Different answers have been given to 
the question of who they are and why they were successful.  These answers, however, are 
generally facile and do not cover a potential range of explanations.  For the purpose of 
this chapter, it is useful to present some basic biographical information in order to derive 
                                                




a series of stylized profiles of Al-Ikha members that can help guide the empirical 
analysis.  What follows, therefore, is not a comprehensive survey, but rather a 
preliminary examination of demographic and professional attributes.  
 
Member Attributes 
 In terms of demographics, the membership of Al-Ikha is fairly representative of the 
country.  A third of the membership is from the capital city of Amman.  Two or three 
members each are from the governorates of Balqa in the south, Ma’an in the center and 
Irbid in the north. Several members also represent smaller towns or rural areas.  The 
block has two Christians, one woman and a Circassian, all of who were elected under the 
quota system for minorities in Jordan.  Finally, most of the Al-Ikha MPs are between 45 
and 50 years old, with the youngest member being 30 and the oldest 52 at the time of the 
2007 elections. Table 4.1 illustrates that Al-Ikha’s members are slightly younger than 













Table 4.1: Demographic Profile of 15th Lower House 
 
Source: Hourani (2009: 136) 
  
 The level of education and professional backgrounds of the members are perhaps 
their most impressive collective attributes.  All of Al-Ikha’s deputies are college 
graduates with ten holding advanced degrees including two members with doctorates. 
Half of them are businessmen or come from the private sector.  Four are educators and 
the rest are engineers, lawyers, former military officers and a doctor.  Most of their 
careers are characterized by rapid advancement that has been facilitated by connections 
with important families, tribes or government officials.  
 In short, the membership of Al-Ikha is fairly diverse, relatively young, highly 




the block from the local media and general public simply do not hold up against this 
evidence.  But the group’s diversity is also reflected in some distinct political 
personalities among its members.  The following paragraphs present a series of stylized 
profiles that attempt to capture some of the main differences. 
 
Stylized Profiles 
 While MPs in Jordan’s individualistic parliament have never fit neatly into various 
political and ideological boxes, several distinct profiles emerge from interviews with a 
dozen of Al-Ikha’s members.  The following three categories will guide subsequent 
empirical analysis and allow me to test various hypotheses: 
 
1)   “Up and Comer”: The first profile is personified by a handful of MPs who were 
primarily elected from Amman’s affluent urban districts.  They largely owe their 
election to family pedigrees and wealth won during Jordan’s recent boom in real 
estate and construction sectors.  Many of these so-called “new capitalists” spent 
lavish sums of money during their campaigns and made unlimited promises to 
help people in need.  Their vote shares were suspect in the face of allegations that 
massive vote buying and vote transfers had boosted their final tallies.  Because 
they have limited knowledge of public policy and an unformed political ideology, 
these MPs tend to fall back on populist causes while backing the government’s 
legislative priorities.  The distinguishing feature is their combination of personal 
ambition with strong backing from various state apparatuses. 
 
2)   “One and Done”: Between five to ten members comprise the second category. 
These are relatively older MPs who represent more of the traditional elite from 
Amman and political class from other parts of the country.  Their campaigns were 
also built on patronage but they came to parliament with a stronger desire to 
influence public policy, particularly on domestic welfare issues.  As a result of 
their knowledge and connections, many secured coveted committee assignments 
or ascended to chairmanships during the second ordinary session.  On the other 
hand, these members are burdened by systemic constraints and have become 
disillusioned with the excessive duties of being “service” representatives.  For 
these reasons, these MPs appear likely to return to their roles in the non-governing 
elite after serving out the remainder of their term.  Based on their limited tenure in 




3)   “Insiders”: The third category has only a few members and they tend to share 
some of the characteristics of their “up and comer” and “one and done” 
colleagues. They have a mixture of both political clout and practical experience 
that they have been able to parlay effectively in their parliamentary duties.  As a 
result, this select group has achieved a genuine “insider” status, both within the 
Speaker’s leadership circle and as “go-to-guys” on important legislative issues.  In 
contrast to their “one and done” colleagues, however, these “insiders” are likely to 
seek reelection after consulting with their family, tribe or local association. 
 
 These profiles derived from personal interviews are important, but because of the 
small sample size and range, they should be interpreted with care.  For one, the fact that 
many of the subjects are highly ambitious politicians should be considered in evaluating 
the internal validity of their responses.156  Nonetheless, I believe the categorization above 
is helpful for the purposes of framing select explanations and developing testable 
hypotheses, the task to which I now turn.  
 
Explanations and Hypotheses 
 To recap, the empirical puzzle animating this study involves the surprising success 
of “new capitalist” candidates in Jordan’s 2007 parliamentary elections.  However, this 
chapter’s objective is to examine the extent to which electoral rules have structured the 
political behavior among political actors as it relates to participation and competition both 
in the electoral and parliamentary arenas.  As such, this section seeks to demonstrate 
empirically that the continued use of SNTV, or the “one vote” system, has established a 
new pattern of elite recruitment through elections and maintained the traditional pattern 
of circulation of elites in parliament.  
                                                
156 In my view, the “up and comer” deputies have inflated values of self-importance in the broader political 
system. During the course of our interviews, they tended to exaggerate the extent of their popular support 




 Since limited data and sample size preclude detailed narratives and more extensive 
forms of process-tracing, I develop three parsimonious analytic explanations for the 
success of pro-regime candidates in Jordan’s 2007 parliamentary elections.157  In turn, 
these explanations spawn nine testable hypotheses about the “new capitalists,” which I 
use to refer to the three stylized profiles collectively.  They are: 
 
1.  The state played a prominent role in supporting certain “up and comer” candidates 
that would incorporate the country’s nouveau riche and contribute to the 
circulation of elites in parliament.  As such, authorities turned a blind eye to vote 
buying and even engaged in the transfer of votes as part of a strategy to recruit 
businessmen that would presumably support the king’s economic liberalization. 
 
  H4.1: The difference in means from the percentage of vote totals between “up   
 and comers” and other “new capitalists” was significant.  
 
  H4.2: Districts adjacent or in close proximity to the districts in which “up  
  and comers” were victorious had noticeable discrepancies in voter turnout  
  from 2003 to 2007.  
  
  H4.3: The percentage of businessmen elected as MPs has increased in  
  successive parliaments beginning in 1997. 
 
2.  The electoral rules continue to favor those candidates who could draw on patron-
client relationships to mobilize voters in districts that required a lower threshold 
of votes.  Variation in district magnitudes shaped the incentives and constraints of 
political actors so that pro-regime candidates were well positioned to win and the 
selectorate exerted greater influence.  At the same time, this system has inhibited 
reform-minded deputies in parliament and influenced their re-election prospects. 
 
 H4.4: Candidates who competed in districts with fewer seats were more likely 
 to have a greater margin of victory and//or percentage of total votes. 
 
  H4.5: Lower electoral thresholds benefited local elites with strong personal  
  or tribal connections with the district's voters. 
 
  H4.6: Differences in the number of questions submitted by “new capitalist”  
  MPs are significant according to their political affiliation and profile.        
                                                




3.  The role of money played an inordinate role in the success of the “new capitalist” 
candidates because they could promise material benefits above and beyond 
whatever the incumbent was able to deliver while in office.  Voters also perceived 
that wealthy businessmen would be better able to deliver once in office.  
 
   H4.7: The campaigns of “new capitalists” were successful because they  
   showcased their wealth to people in need of material benefits. 
 
   H4.8: The “new capitalist” candidates either displaced incumbents or  
  gained higher vote totals than them in district-level contests.  
 
   H4.9: Businessmen candidates received higher percentages of votes and  
  their margins of victory were greater. 
   
 
Results 
 Before discussing the findings, I summarize the overall results in Table 4.2 (see 
below).  The “expected” columns indicate that all nine hypotheses have a positive effect 
on the electoral fortunes of the various “new capitalist” profiles.  I report the results of 
the tests in the “actual” columns as weak, moderate or strong as a subjective assessment 
of their explanatory weight.  Although some of the tests were inconclusive (Incon.) or 
only provided weak evidence, the results of the hypotheses related to formal electoral 
rules were the most consistent across the board.  The “up and comer” profile exhibit the 
most definitive attributes of the hypotheses. 
 
Table 4.2: Summary of Results 
 
Explanation/Hypothesis “Up and Comer” “One and Done” “Insider” 
 Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual 
#1 State Interference       
  H4.1: %Total Vote + Moderate + Weak + Weak 
  H4.2: “Vote Transfer” + Strong + Incon. + Incon. 
  H4.3: Recruitment + Moderate + Moderate + Moderate 
#2 Electoral Rules       
  H4.4: District Magnitude + Weak + Weak + Weak 
  H4.5: Lower Thresholds + Moderate + Moderate + Moderate 




#3 Political Money       
  H4.7: Banquets + Strong + Moderate + Weak 
  H4.8: Businessmen + Weak + Weak + Weak 
  H4.9: Anti-Incumbent + Incon. + Incon. + Incon. 
 
 
 Of course, the most likely explanation is that all the aforementioned explanations 
interacted with each other, and each played a role in the surprising performance of the 
“new capitalists” in the 2007 elections.  However, this study also aims to assess the 
importance of institutional factors and the explanatory weight of electoral rules.  This 
kind of analysis is made more difficult because limited district-level data and vote tallies 
do not provide definitive answers.  Nevertheless, they can provide some insight when 
trying to develop a deeper and more objective analysis of each factor.  I therefore discuss 
the results of each explanation in more detail. 
 
Explanation #1: State Interference 
 The palace and various state apparatuses have a long history of interfering with 
elections and making their preferences known for certain candidates.  Both municipal and 
parliamentary elections in 2007 were clearly no exception.  The challenge for this 
empirical analysis is to present of evidence of fraud and malfeasance to corroborate the 
many official and unofficial sources.  I approached this challenge by examining the 
electoral data in search of particular irregularities and anomalies that would signal some 
sort of quasi-official complicity in favoring “new capitalist” candidates. 
 I first sought to determine whether there were significant discrepancies in the 
percentages of total votes among different categories of “new capitalists” and how they 




received an average of six more percentage points than other candidates but little should 
be inferred from this small sample.  What is significant is the total number of votes that 
several “up and comer” candidates received, most notably in Amman’s 1st and 3rd 
districts.  In these relatively affluent areas of the capital, the top two and three respective 
vote-getters in each electoral district amassed over ten thousand votes (see Table 4.3 
below), a staggering sum considering there were over twenty other registered candidates 
that drew on their own preexisting vote banks.  Several of these newly elected deputies 
had close ties to the regime’s pillars of power and undoubtedly benefited from them.158  
In sum, there is some suggestive data with regards to this cohort but not the others. 
 
Table 4.3: Vote Totals in Amman Districts (1st and 3rd) 
First District MPs   
No. Name  Vote Total % of Total 
1 Khalil Hussein Khalil Atieh 14275 23% 
2 Ja'far Marwan Salem Al Abdallat 12141 19% 
3 Hassan Mahmoud Khalid Safi 8118 13% 
4 Azzam Jameel Fares Al Hneidi 4779 6% 
Third District MPs   
No. Name Vote Total % of Total 
1 Mamdouh Saleh Hamad Al Abbadi 11604 14% 
2 Ahmad Mohammad Ali Al Safadi 10666 13% 
3 Abdul Rahim Fathi Al Beqa'ai 10061 12% 
4 Yousef Ahmad Ali Al Bustangi 8623 11% 
5 Tareq Sami Hanna Khoury 6945 9% 
Source: Hourani (2009) 
 
 As for vote transfers, there were numerous reports in the press and among 
candidates themselves that the government had arranged buses for voters to participate en 
                                                
158 For example, Mamdouh Al-Abbadi and Jaafar Abdellat were younger members of particularly powerful 




masse in districts where the outcome was less certain.  Abu Ramman (2007) claims this 
phenomenon had a direct, negative influence on electoral outcome for Islamists, 
especially in the Amman districts.  He cites the case of one Palestinian refugee camp in 
which the Islamist incumbent won reelection despite receiving 5,000 votes less than he 
did in the previous election.  More importantly, he singles out the third district of Amman 
because the five winning candidates split almost 50,000 votes.  Although voter 
registration data fails to substantiate claims that the district does not have enough voters, 
respected tracking and exit poll data suggest the outcome could have been engineered.159 
Several of the candidates from this district fit the “up and comer” profile and it is likely 
that at least one of them benefited from vote transfers.160  I conclude, therefore, that the 
“vote transfer” hypothesis (H4.2) has strong plausibility with a select few “up and 
comers” but there is a lack of conclusive data concerning the other cohorts.  
 Finally, I examined the make-up of several parliaments to discern whether there is a 
growing number of businessmen that are being elected (H4.3).  Table 4.4 presents a 
longitudinal comparison of professional backgrounds among Jordanian MPs.  One of the 
few definitive trends is the steady increase in the percentage of businessmen over the past 
three parliaments (9%, 14% and 21%).161  Although the percentage of businessmen 
presently represented in Jordan’s parliament is significant, personal interviews did not 
reveal that any of the “new capitalists” were recruited by the regime specifically because 
                                                
159 These polls were conducted by the Jordan Center for Social Research with the support of the 
International Republican Institute (IR). The data is available from the author upon request.  
 
160 The particular candidate in question is Ahmed Al-Safadi. I specifically asked him about vote transfer 
allegations and he dismissed them as people being “jealous of his influence.” 
 
161 Momani (2004) concludes that only marginal changes occurred between the 13th and 14th parliaments 




they came from backgrounds in business.  I conclude this hypothesis has moderate 
plausibility since each profile consists roughly of the same proportion of businessmen. 
 
Table 4.4: Professional Backgrounds of MPs in Successive Parliamentary Sessions   
 
Professional Background 1997-2003(13th) 2003-2007 (14th) 2007-2011 (15th) 
Businessman 7 (9%) 15 (14%) 23 (21%) 
Physician/Pharmacist 14 21 19 
Military 15 14 17 
University Professor 2 7 8 
Government Employee  13 4 6 
Lawyer 4 7 7 
Engineer 10 4 7 
Writer – Journalist 3 1 0 
Police 3 8 0 
Private Sector Employee 4 1 4 
Teacher 0 14 5 
Administrative/Manager 0 14 6 
Farmer 5 0 0 
Other n/a n/a 8 
Total 80 110 110 




Explanation #2: Electoral Rules 
 Electoral rules provide relatively straightforward variables that can be used to 
assess the effect on competition and contestation with some degree of confidence.  As 
previously mentioned, this analysis uses candidates’ percentage of total votes and margin 
of victory as proxies for my dependent variable because available electoral data does not 
specify vote tallies for losers.  I calculate the margin of victory by taking an average of 




competing.162  I then subtract this number from the winning candidate’s vote total to 
arrive at an approximation of their margin of victory.  This is admittedly an imperfect 
measure for the distribution of vote shares but does allow a rough comparison between 
winning candidates and losing candidates. 
 To begin, the dataset presented some unique challenges because quotas for minority 
and female candidates might skew district level returns.   Comparative analysis was also 
difficult because the size and composition of the districts are so varied and unequal.  With 
this in mind, I organized the data by district magnitude and calculated averages of vote 
shares under each category.  The results in Table 4.5 indicate that candidates won a 
higher percentage of the total vote (Vote%) in districts with fewer seats, most notably in 
single-member districts, but this is not surprising.  Additionally, larger margins of victory 
did not correlate with lower district magnitudes.  Thus, my hypothesis that candidates 
who competed in districts with fewer seats winning by a greater percentage and/or 
margin of total votes (H4.4) has weak plausibility for all three categories.163 
 
Table 4.5: Average Percentage of Votes and Margin of Victory by District Mag.  
 
District Mag. # Districts Vote% Win% Votes Margin 
1 18 31.0% n/a 3930 2252 
2 7 22.0% n/a 4817 2954 
3 12 13.0% 33.0% 5544 3676 
4 6 11.0% 25.0% 6336 4179 
5 1 11.6% 20.0% 9580 7410 
6 0 - - - - 
7 1 5.5% 14.3% 3962 2032 
Source: Author’s own calculations from data compiled by Hourani (2009) 
                                                
162 Annexes 1,3 and 13 in Hourani (2009) allowed me to construct my own variable to measure the margin 
of victory. I subtracted the number of candidates who received less than 500 votes and the number of 
winning candidates to determine the number of viable challengers in each district.   
 




 On the other hand, the fact that 82% of Jordan’s 45 electoral districts range between 
one and three seats makes the use of SNTV that more peculiar because it essentially 
operates as a simple plurality formula in those 18 single-member districts.  Much can be 
learned by the geographic distribution of district magnitudes, in particular the 
apportionment of seats and bias towards rural districts.164  Malapportionment provides 
some of the clearest evidence of electoral manipulation.  
 The principal effect of SNTV that has been understudied in the literature is that it 
significantly lowers electoral thresholds for victory since voters are only allowed to cast 
one ballot.  This has profound implications for the participation and behavior of various 
political actors.  In the case of Jordan, the change from multiple-candidate ballots to 
single-candidate ballots greatly enhanced the role of the selectorate because the value of 
each constituent’s vote was considerably higher.  In 1993, for example, candidates 
needed approximately half the number of votes (2808) to win in districts than the 
previous election (5375).  In terms of percentages, a winning candidate averaged about 
twenty-one percent of the total vote in 1989 when voters could cast as many votes as 
seats but only about nine percent in 1993 when they could only vote once.  Table 4.6 
depicts the change in the threshold of votes (T) across electoral districts between the two 







                                                




Table 4.6: Threshold of Votes in 1989 and 1993 Elections by District 
 
District 1989 T 1993 T #Voters '89 #Voters '93 Win% '89 Win% '93 
Amman 4 4260 6310 19262 40957 22.1 15.4 
Amman 2 5082 5527 33170 42670 15.3 13 
N. Badia 3569 5039 14622 21616 24.4 23.3 
Ramtha 5483 4297 26724 38458 20.5 11.2 
Aghwar 6163 3811 27419 36787 22.5 10.4 
Amman 1 9708 3469 27610 36733 35.2 9.4 
Mafraq 2533 2644 14715 22928 17.2 11.5 
S. Badia 4303 2453 12191 16981 35.3 14.4 
Ma'an 4482 2436 19427 26534 23.1 9.2 
Amman 5 4845 2302 28000 45507 17.3 5.1 
Irbid 11178 2227 64000 93896 17.5 2.4 
C. Badia 2814 2200 12243 14993 23 14.7 
Balqa 8721 2038 53143 72886 16.4 2.8 
Amman 6 3088 1969 22158 28713 13.9 6.9 
Tafileh 3526 1931 15364 19787 22.9 9.8 
Amman 3 6211 1582 27590 47191 22.5 3.4 
Zarqa 6513 1235 58153 90949 11.2 1.4 
Kerak 9378 1024 35722 58594 26.3 1.7 
Aljoun 2855 850 23417 29257 12.2 2.9 
Jerash 2787 n/a 20467 27480 13.6 n/a 
Average 5375 2808 27770 40646 20.6 8.9 
Source: Bachelani  (1999: 217). Author’s own calculation of averages. 
  
 Data from subsequent elections is inconclusive but still shows the effect of the 
continued use of SNTV on the size of the selectorate.165  Despite an increase in the 
number of voters by 250%, electoral thresholds remained relatively low in the 2003 and 
2007 elections. In fact, a couple thousand votes would still win a seat in many districts.166 
The average number of winning votes also decreased between 2003 and 2007 but, 
strangely, each candidate averaged almost three additional percentage points.167 
                                                
165 The 1997 elections were not considered because the general boycott skewed the data.  
166 According to a 2007 report by Democracy Reporting International (DRI), there is also a huge disparity 
between the number of votes needed by an elected deputy to win a seat. In Amman’s first district, the 
winning candidate secured 19,256 votes (27 per cent of votes cast in the district) but in Tafileh’s second 
district the highest scoring candidate won a seat with only 997 votes (14 per cent of votes cast). 




  I conclude that the “one vote” system continues to be instrumental for local elites 
with strong personal or tribal connections to a significant number of the district's voters 
(H4.5).  Personal interviews with a number of “up and comers” with minimal political 
experience revealed that their extended family was the backbone of their electoral 
campaign.  Public opinion data from recent elections also confirm that many Jordanians 
continued to vote for candidates based on family or close personal ties.168  Anecdotal 
evidence gleaned from other interviews strongly suggests that candidates were very 
aware of the minimum number of votes needed to win and tailored their campaign 
strategies accordingly. 
 This empirical analysis has so far yet to examine the activities of newly elected 
deputies in the 15th parliament and whether electoral rules shape their legislative 
behavior.  Unfortunately, votes in the Lower House are sparsely recorded and it would be 
exceedingly difficult to develop a litmus test for evaluating legislative initiatives 
submitted by the government and the response of individual deputies.  I deal with this 
shortcoming by examining public questions raised by members. According to a report 
compiled by the “Jordanian Parliament Monitor,” Al-Ikha deputies addressed 22 
questions to the government in the last session, of which nine were related on issues 
related to the economy.  Seventeen of the questions, however, were from three members 
who fit the “one and done” and “insider” profiles, thus demonstrating a relative passivity 
among the block as a whole.  None of the “up and comer” deputies have raised any 
questions, suggesting a hesitancy to upset their relationship with patrons within the 
                                                
168 The public opinion data can be accessed from the websites of Center for Strategic Studies (www.css-




government and palace.  These results do lend some credence to my hypotheses about 
deputies being bound with the institutional domain of parliament (H4.6). The electoral 
system certainly contributes to the degree to which deputies are beholden to their 
constituencies, which is reflected in their legislative behavior. 
 
Explanation #3: Role of Money 
 Without a doubt, all three categories of deputies had successful campaigns based on 
their socio-economic status and visibility during the campaign.  The question of interest 
is the extent to which money played in their election.  The qualitative interviews included 
questions about the campaign period that provide some insight.  The “up and comer” 
candidates held particularly large banquets that featured free food and direct access to the 
candidate or prominent supporters to attract large numbers of potential voters.169  These 
events were instrumental to their boosting their image and giving their campaign an aura 
of electoral clout.  Anecdotal information about one particularly flamboyant “up and 
comer” obtained through a reliable source revealed that he bought tribal support for his 
candidacy through the sale of lucrative land around Jordan’s main international airport 
outside Amman.170 
 In contrast, other candidates comprised of the more traditional business elite tended 
to rely on longstanding connections with associations and organized events based on 
                                                
169 One “up and comer” MP remarked to me that he had hosted a banquet dinner for 3,500 people several 
months before the election that convinced him that he would be elected. Many candidates from all parts of 
the country also held lavish campaign banquets under large tents. Many political observers commented how 
this election was unprecedented in the amount of money spent by particular candidates, with some likely 
exceeding one million dollars.  
 




direct voter contact.  Almost all candidates admitted to doling out money and favors 
during the course of the campaign.  Some indicated this behavior was normal and simply 
part of the game.  Thus, the hypothesis (H4.7) about the type of campaign has 
considerable validity with regards to the “up and comers” but only moderate plausibility 
with the “one and done” and “insider” groups.  
 How did the role of money impact the actual electoral returns?  This question is 
obviously extremely sensitive and could not be measured objectively.171  However, some 
public information allows some modest inferences.  For example, a compilation of 
electoral data shows businessmen received approximately twenty percent of the total vote 
in their respective districts, almost five percent higher than those elected from other 
professions. This does not confirm my hypothesis (H4.8) about voter preferences for 
business acumen, however. In fact, a miniscule number of voters (less than 1 percent) 
indicated that they voted for a certain candidate because he was a businessman in one 
post-election poll (Al-Quds 2009).  Rather, nearly half of the respondents indicated their 
reasons were because of a family or tribal tie.  Other tracking surveys and exit polls 
confirmed that tribal and familial affiliations are still the most important considerations 
driving voter’ decisions.172  
 As for the success rate of “new capitalists” vis-à-vis incumbents (H4.9), the results 
are inconclusive.  According to a list of 17 deputies I classified as “new capitalists,” only 
three were successful in either displacing incumbents or receiving higher vote totals.  It 
                                                
171 No public data exists on campaign expenditures and I did not broach this topic in personal interviews in 
order to prevent the appearance of a normative agenda to my study. 
 
172 See reports from the Al-Quds Center, the Jordan Center for Social Research as well as additional polling 




should be noted that many districts that featured “new capitalists” also included powerful 
incumbents and there was likely some ”gentlemen’s agreement” between them about the 
electoral competition.  Therefore, it is too difficult to assess this hypothesis on a cross-
national aggregate level.  It can be stated with a relative degree of confidence, however, 
that the palace has an interest in high rates of turnover in Jordan’s parliament so there is a 
continual incorporation of new members for three reasons.  
 First, the capacity of the parliament to enact laws and oversee the government 
remains weak because members lack the institutional knowledge and experience in such 
processes as bill drafting, budgetary analysis and so forth.173  Second, the parliament 
becomes an effective forum for channeling elite interests and containing potential 
dissent.174  New members are bound by the rules of parliamentary procedure and many 
are indebted to the government for their election and status in the legislature.  Third, 
many deputies face significant challenges in balancing the particularistic needs of 
constituents while trying to affect some sort of “change” on policies or the political 
system as a whole.175  In sum, Jordan’s parliament has become an effective political 
institution for maintaining the circulation of elites in Jordan. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has attempted to make some sense of the surprising success of “new 
capitalist” candidates in Jordan’s 2007 parliamentary elections in hopes of providing 
                                                
173 This is the main thrust of the assessment by Baaklini et al. (1999). 
 
174 Blaydes (2008) and Zerhouni (2008) make similar conclusions about the parliaments in Egypt and 
Morocco. 
 




insight into the broader question about why competitive elections strengthen authoritarian 
regimes.  The empirical analysis showed that three leading explanations each have their 
own limitations based upon personal interviews with members of Al-Ikha, biographical 
data on newly elected deputies and statistical analysis of district-level returns.  Although 
this study gravitates towards the role of formal electoral rules and, indeed, those 
hypotheses displayed the most consistent results, it would be a mistake to neglect the 
other explanations and shortchange subterranean forces associated with tribal politics.  
The three explanations presented in this analysis should be viewed as complementary, not 
competing. 
 State intervention, electoral rules and political money were therefore all factors that 
explain the victories of “new capitalist” candidates in 2007.  A select number of “up and 
comers” benefited directly from vote transfers facilitated and even organized by the 
government.  They also took advantage of their spectacular wealth to promote their 
candidacies and leapfrog more senior members of their tribe by essentially buying out 
support from under then.  Of course, all this was enabled by an electoral system that 
places a premium on personal reputation.  The change to a “one vote” system in 1993 
lowered electoral thresholds to the point where prominent elites could rely on their own 
tribe and corresponding patronage networks to win localized races.  Candidates had 
strong incentives to pursue bonding strategies that targeted narrow homogenous segments 
of the population.  Ideological parties and candidates from the IAF were at a 
disadvantage because they could not garner votes based on platforms or programmatic 
appeals.  In turn, voters recognize which candidates are best able to “deliver” on 




members to supply jobs, money and other forms of support to those who are less 
fortunate. 
 As the case of Jordan demonstrates, the relationship between elections, elites and 
regime stability involves a complex interaction between formal and informal institutions.  
The historical analysis of Jordanian elections in Chapter 2 helped illuminate how the 
regime periodically reshuffled ruling elites within the cabinet in order to prevent them 
from building patronage networks that could rival the palace.  In recent years, the regime 
has become more adept at ensuring a never-ending circulation elites through various 
ministries, the royal court and other political institutions.  This chapter has examined a 
small sample of elites from recent parliamentary elections to show how an old 
mechanism for the recruitment and circulation of elites has been maintained.  Electoral 
rules that lower entry costs, reinforce personalism and discourage strategic voting have 
become a modus operandi for the Jordanian regime.  Thus, a formal institution 
(parliament) is populated by informal means (clientelism), a phenomenon others have 
called “formalized informality.”176  The following chapter attempts to model this 
interaction in developing a tentative theory of electoral rules under authoritarianism.  
Before doing so, recent developments in Jordan involving a new electoral law and 




                                                
176 See Bank and Schlumberger (2004) for a discussion of this strategy in relation to King Abdallah’s 






Even though Jordan’s parliamentary elections in 2007 were accompanied by a fleeting 
interest in the West, they carried important implications for competing political forces 
within the kingdom.  Besides the compartmentalized competition among elites within 
individual districts, the 2007 elections represented a battleground between broader forces 
within Jordanian society.  
 For one, the election shed light on the dynamics of internal cohesion within the 
ruling elite as typified by the struggle between elements of a “new guard” and “old 
guard.”  Although the outcome revealed a definitive trend toward a sustainable majority 
of pro-government deputies that are elected to parliament, their dominance did not 
translate into a consensually unified elite according to the classification by Higley and 
Burton.  Instead, the emergence of the Al-Ikha parliamentary block showed that Jordan’s 
national elite has become more diversified and that a new generation of economic elites is 
challenging the “old guard” within Jordan’s traditional political hierarchy.  The question 
is whether the brief ascendance of Al-Ikha foreshadowed broader political reform or the 
continuation of politics as usual.  I present two arguments for the latter.   
 First of all, Al-Ikha is not sustainable.  Even though its membership is fairly 
diverse, relatively young, highly educated and upwardly mobile—all characteristics of an 
effective group of reformers—it is doubtful that Al-Ikha will achieve more influence 
within parliament and a bigger following among the general public.  While Jordanian 
elections do periodically inject “new blood” into parliament, they also serve to reinforce 




empirical analysis was that some of Al-Ikha’s members were disillusioned with the 
realities of being a “service representative.” For this reason, the block’s influence most 
likely will wane after the next parliamentary elections when it loses a significant number 
of its members and a new group of pro-regime deputies are empowered. 
 Second, the “new capitalists” will also face a renewed struggle from tribal influence 
in Amman and elsewhere.  The older generation of tribal members will seek to reassert 
control over the younger members that usurped power before the latest elections.  The 
tribes are also keen mobilize against the encroachment of Palestinian elites into 
traditional domains of Hashemite rule.  There is a pervasive belief that King Abdullah 
likes Palestinian technocrats in government and the tribes are losing a traditional 
important political position in the country.  In 2007, some tribes made a significant push 
to capture seats from the Palestinians in Amman and they will continue to do so for the 
upcoming elections.177  The outcome of local races in several electoral districts will have 
significant implications for the balance of power among competing forces in Jordan. 
 With possible tectonic shifts in Jordan’s power structure over the coming years, a 
series of recent events in the kingdom has been met with anxious speculation.  In 
November 2009, King Abdallah decided to dissolve parliament in November and call for 
new elections.  He then instructed the government to ensure that future elections were a 
“model of transparency and justice” based on a new electoral law.  The hopes of 
reformers for an inclusive process that addressed fundamental issues of fairness involving 
the “one vote” system were dashed once again.  The new deputy prime minister tasked 
with implementing reform was Rajai Muasher, a vocal opponent of the liberalization and 
                                                




reform process.  Adballah also appointed Samir Rifai as prime minister based on his 
conservative credentials and powerful family pedigree.  This sequence of events was 
reminiscent of the call for electoral reform after the 1997 electoral boycott at which time 
the king handpicked a commission to fashion a "consensus" on a new system that only 
made cosmetic changes to administrative procedures of the electoral law.   
 The outcome mirrored the preceding experience for a number of reasons.  For one, 
many traditional elites still quietly support the “one vote” system.  According to Mustafa 
Hamarneh, a Jordanian journalist who was interviewed about the likelihood the 
controversial provision will remain intact, “there are conservatives who believe that this 
is the best way to maintain stability.”178  Second, there was resistance to fundamental 
reform within the parliament itself.   Most of the newly elected deputies I interviewed 
believed that the “one vote” system needed to be changed but only gradually.  Finally, the 
advocates for change lacked leverage during negotiations over the new law.  In the spring 
of 2010, a broad coalition of Jordanian organizations called for fundamental electoral 
reform but the participants could not exert any significant influence on the process. 
 The new law received harsh criticism from reformers and the IAF when it was 
unveiled in May 2010.  Even though the new law addressed some of the opposition’s 
longstanding demands for greater representation in urban centers, it maintained the “one 
vote” system and did nothing to curb tribalism or encourage the development of political 
parties.  Electoral reforms with macro-political effects have typically been introduced in 
the form of subtle changes.  In this most recent case, the law divides current electoral 
                                                
178 Quoted in Slackman’s article entitled, “Jordan’s King Remakes His Government,” from The New York 




districts into electoral "zones” that are composed of multiple sub-districts.  According to 
one resident expert, the redrawing of sub-districts further narrows the scope of support 
bases and forces candidates to be more localized.179  The most noticeable impact may be 
on voters, however, as they will be able to “roam” and vote for one candidate in any sub-
district (within their designated electoral zone) that they choose.  Voters may become 
more susceptible to vote buying under the new system.  
 In short, the new law appears as though it was designed to satisfy the main pillars 
of support for the Jordanian regime.  Tribes will continue to have the upper hand over 
parties and gain representation in the parliament.  Conservative elites are undoubtedly 
pleased that the new electoral system did not incorporate the proportional system that 
liberal reformers have demanded.  Many ethnic minorities are relatively secure knowing 
that the new system maintains their quotas for representation in the parliament.  Some 
Palestinian notables are even happy because they stand to gain from the addition of seats 
in heavily populated areas.  And finally, the “new capitalists” must feel that the electoral 
playing field is even more favorable as they can wield their financial resources with a 
smaller electorate. 
 Time will tell whether the new electoral law enhances the stability of the regime or 
exposes the fissures within the ruling coalition that gradually undermines it.  It is 
probably safe to say that recent reforms show the palace is firmly in control of the reform 
process and will not relinquish any semblance of power.  The IAF announced on August 
1 that it would boycott the 2010 parliamentary elections, concluding that it stood to gain 
little under the new law from its disastrous performance in 2007.  The “new guard” may 
                                                




be content with the continuation of economic liberalization but most likely will have to 




















































A TYPOLOGICAL THEORY: 




 The empirical analysis has so far explored two related research questions.  First, 
under what conditions do Arab monarchs seek to change electoral rules (Chapter 2)?  
Second, what is the impact of these rules on managing elites and the opposition (Chapters 
3 and 4)?  As previously stated, this line of inquiry is important to understanding the 
inner workings of authoritarian regimes.  A comparative historical analysis first described 
how the evolution of electoral systems in Morocco and Jordan were linked to shifting 
power dynamics within the opposition and ruling coalition.  I then presented an 
explanatory framework for electoral system design based on the cohesion of these actors 
(see Figure 1.1).  From there, the empirical analysis shifted to the second question with 
regards to the impact of particular electoral rules.  In separate chapters that focused on 
key actors from the 2007 parliamentary elections in both cases, I sought to examine the 
extent to which recent changes to electoral rules were effective tools for inhibiting voter 
coordination and recycling elites in parliament.  This inductive approach has yielded 
mixed results.  
 On one hand, secondary resources and original research conducted in Morocco 
and Jordan give strong indications that electoral rules do shape political behavior 




longitudinal and cross-national electoral data preclude conclusive results about the 
relationship between electoral rules and electoral outcomes.  More sophisticated models 
that incorporate individual-level data are needed to test some of the more specific 
hypotheses.  Although this study admittedly cannot address the impact of elections on 
regime stability across an array of authoritarian regimes, it does provide insight into two 
critical cases that can serve as building blocks for scholars wishing to investigate the 
question in a regional perspective.  The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to extend the 
empirical analysis to a theoretical model for understanding institutional change and 
regime maintenance in the Arab world.   
 In the following section, I introduce a number of secondary cases that will help to 
show how particular electoral arrangements were not effective in dividing the opposition 
and unifying supporters in contrast to the general experiences of Jordan and Morocco.180  
These rare exceptions of elections that did not reinforce authoritarian regimes in the Arab 
world provide some variation on my dependent variable and allow more rigorous analysis 
of causal mechanisms.  Some of them can be explained as simple miscalculations or 
attributable to the absence of information at the local level.  For others, however, I argue 
that they could be construed as strategic blunders in the manipulation of electoral 
institutions.  These deviant cases are thus helpful for tracing processes that produced 
deleterious electoral outcomes.  Besides the regime losing control over the electoral 
reform process, I show how the “winner-takes-all” systems enabled the opposition to 
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capitalize on shifting political winds and temporary alliances.  I now provide a historical 
background of the electoral miscues in the secondary case studies. 
 
1. Historical Background of Secondary Cases 
  
The monarchies and repubics of Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt and Palestine have used a 
variety of strategies to manage opposition movements.  By and large, they have followed 
a familiar pattern where challenges to the regime are initially suppressed, followed by 
efforts to bring some dissident factions into the fold while containing the influence of 
broader and potentially more powerful movements.  Put simply, I posit that the strategies 
generally follow a sequence of coercion, co-optation and containment and are reflected in 
the choice of electoral rules.  Moreover, the logic of institutional choice follows theories 
in which regimes seek to reduce risk and uncertainty.  In order to advance these 
arguments, I construct a typological theory inductively through a cursory examination of 
these secondary cases.  I now provide a summary of these historical periods in order to 
flesh out any differences in electoral arrangements among them.     
 
Bahrain 
 The Kingdom of Bahrain defines itself as a hereditary constitutional monarchy, 
but the powers of the king are too extensive for Bahrain to be considered a constitutional 
monarchy by the Western definition of a monarchy where the king rules but does not 
govern (Carnegie 2008).  Members of the Al-Khalifa ruling family, who belong to 




positions in government.  As such, the king maintains a firm grip over state institutions, 
which has been instrumental for the regime to squash challenges to its authority.    
 The ruling family has also relied on institutional strategies to co-opt potential 
challengers and to contain the opposition.  In a public address marking the country’s first 
National Day celebrations in December 1971, Sheikh Issa proposed the adoption of a 
constitutional form of government, which would include a parliamentary experiment 
(Lawson 1989).  The first elections for the newly formed National Assembly produced 
three broad coalitions: a populist bloc that advocated traditional labor demands; a 
religious bloc that represented rural and suburban Shi’a; and a heterogeneous bloc of 
independents that generally favored economic liberalization (91).  Although the 
parliament was only authorized to advise and consent to laws initiated in the cabinet, it 
soon became outspoken on several sensitive issues.  The presence of antagonistic blocs 
and institutional inability to change government policies produced stalemate, which 
provided the pretext for the regime to suspend parliament in 1975.  The introduction of 
parliamentary politics during the 1970s gave voice to segments of the opposition within 
narrow institutional confines.  At the same time, it exposed its supporters and allowed the 
regime to assess their strength.  As with the case of Jordan and Morocco, Bahrain’s rulers 
were also able to dissolve parliament when it crossed certain red lines while promoting 
the image that the monarchy was above the political fray.  This brief experiment also had 
consequences for the opposition. 
 When Bahrain’s rulers forced the opposition to the sidelines, it allowed them to 
mobilize around issues of exclusion and identity.  Indeed, since the late 1970s, the 




this time, militant clerics succeeded in recruiting poorer members of the Shi’a community 
and organizing demonstrations against the regime.  Also in line with the primary case 
studies, the Bahraini regime responded to initial challenges with coercion and armed 
force.  Militant Islamists were deported, political dissidents were jailed and state security 
forces broke up religious associations and other cells.  The opposition was essentially 
crushed during the first half of the 1980s but political unrest would later resume and 
reach its apogee in what local Shi’a refer to as the “Bahraini intifada” from 1994 to 
1998.181  This period presented new challenges to the regime that would require a more 
deft touch to co-opt and contain opposition elites.  
 At the turn of the new millennium, Bahrain began a gradual process of 
liberalization that coincided with the succession of a new monarch and was based on the 
new ruler’s personal initiative.  As was the case with both Jordan and Morocco, Sheikh 
Hamad Al-Khalifa also came to power in 1999 after the death of his father.  Faced with a 
number of potential rivals within the Al-Khalifa ruling family, he moved quickly to build 
an independent power base within society.  Like Morocco’s King Mohamed, Hamad 
quickly enacted a number of symbolic gestures of goodwill such as releasing political 
prisoners and allowing certain opposition figures to return from exile.  He also promised 
broad reforms to the public and made conciliatory efforts toward opposition.  For 
example, Hamad called for the introduction of a bicameral parliament with a popularly 
elected chamber to enact laws.  These proposals were spelled out the National Action 
Charter, which won widespread public support in a 2001 referendum and even garnered 
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accolades from the United States.  When Hamad officially became Bahrain’s king in 
February 2002, he promulgated a constitution that was very different from the popularly 
endorsed charter, however.182  It included a number of formal mechanisms that spelled 
out the rules of the game by which both incumbent and opposition would play.   
 For one, the king’s constitutional amendments enhanced the role of an appointed 
upper chamber (Consultative Council) in order to check the elected lower chamber 
(Chamber of Deputes).  This arrangement gave the king considerable leverage over the 
composition of the parliament and the ensured that regime allies could apply a procedural 
brake on any opposition-driven legislation.183  The new constitution also sought regulate 
Bahrain’s political societies, which function as de facto political parties, by prohibiting 
“election meetings” at strategic locations such as mosques and universities.  Finally, a 
new electoral law divided the country into forty constituencies, some of which were 
gerrymandered to benefit the minority Sunni population.  A simple majority electoral 
formula virtually guaranteed that these districts would elect Sunni representatives so as to 
manufacture sectarian parity in the elected chamber of parliament.  Other measures 
intentionally designed to limit the power of Shi’a included granting residents from 
predominantly Sunni Gulf states the right to vote and obtain Bahraini citizenship.   
 In protest of the King’s constitution and other extra-legal reforms, four prominent 
political societies boycotted the 2002 legislative elections and roughly half of eligible 
voters abstained from participating.  In the face of a united opposition coalition, known as 
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close allies to the ruling family. 
 
183 According to Article 85 of the 2002 constitution, the chairperson of the Consultative Council (who is 




the Constitutional Alliance, the regime lost a considerable degree of legitimacy even 
though loyalists and Sunni Islamists dominated the newly formed parliament.  In order to 
shore up his ruling coalition in subsequent years, King Hamad ordered two cabinet 
reshuffles and replaced several other ministers, most notably the minister of interior who 
was a member of the royal family in May 2004 (Niethammer 2008: 150).  Following a 
course of action utilized by both new kings in Jordan and Morocco, Hamad also created 
new administrative bodies under the guise of economic liberalization that appropriated 
decision making from the cabinet and outsourced governmental functions to a “new 
guard” more closely controlled by the monarch.  
 Meanwhile, the principal opposition group and largest Shi’a political society—Al-
Wefaq—had become a potent force both through formal political channels and other 
informal venues of participation.184  For example, Al-Wefaq mobilized a petition in 
opposition to the 2002 constitution and also organized popular demonstrations during 
regional crises in Palestine and Iraq.  After some initial leniency, the government 
increasingly began to suppress unlicensed activities, culminating in a violent crackdown 
on Shi’a demonstrations.  While brute coercion clearly had a chilling effect on opposition 
activity, the most effective measure was a controversial Political Associations Law 
initiated by the regime and enacted by the rump parliament during the summer of 2005.  
In addition to restricting the goals and membership of political societies, the new law 
required all existing political societies to re-apply for a license with the Ministry of 
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Justice.  Al-Wefaq thus faced the unpalatable choice of either registering (and abiding by 
legal restrictions) or becoming an illegal organization (Niethammer 2008).   
 After much internal debate and some external persuasion, Al-Wefaq decided to 
register and participate in the next parliamentary elections scheduled in October 2006.185 
Although some thought Al-Wefaq could capture a majority in the lower house, it still 
fared surprisingly well, winning 17 of the lower house’s 40 seats.  Sunni Islamists won 
12 seats despite and other pro-government candidates won a total of ten seats.  
Nonetheless, the dynamics of the elected chamber had changed considerably even though 
the regime had resorted to fraud and appointments in order to manufacture a slim 
majority in the parliament.186  Although the success of Al-Wefaq in 2006 has received 
considerable attention, the elections should be viewed from the broader perspective of 
regime maintenance.  As Ottaway and Dunne conclude (2007: 7), 
 
From the point of view of the regime, Bahrain’s institutional reforms have been 
extremely successful, strengthening its position in several important respects. Although 
the Shi’i opposition remains dissatisfied, civil unrest is much less than it was in the 
1990s, partly because al-Wefaq has decided to play the political game by the 
government’s rule and partly because of undeniable improvements in human rights 
practices and civil liberties.  
 
 What then explains Bahrain’s electoral miscue in 2006?  I argue that the regime’s 
decision to continue to rely on a simple majority formula in single-member districts was a 
strategic miscalculation.  This electoral arrangement may benefit some Sunni loyalists 
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Haq). The National Democratic Institute (NDI), a U.S. democracy promotion organization, helped persuade 
Al-Wefaq to participate in the parliamentary elections. 
 
186 Some pointed to the fact that the king had to appoint a plethora of liberals and pro-regime women to the 




and pro-regime candidates but it also allowed the opposition to capitalize on its strength 
within an anti-incumbent environment.  The popular support of the Shi’a coupled with 
the organizational prowess of Al-Wefaq translated into a sizeable number of district-level 
victories in the “winner-takes-all” electoral system.187  
 On the other hand, Al-Wefaq’s success in 2006 may actually play into the 
regime’s hands in the long term as the opposition movement struggles with governing 
responsibilities.  As Ottaway and Dunne also note,  
 
The opposition has been fragmented due to disagreements over whether or not to 
participate in elections; al-Wefaq now faces competition from a new popular movement, 
al-Haq. Instead of being isolated and facing a united Shi’i opposition, the Bahraini 
regime has managed to position itself in the comfortable political center between the 
Sunni Islamist societies who hold a majority in parliament and a divided Shi’i opposition. 
 
The level of cohesion among opposition elites will likely determine the future pace of 
political reform, including the shape of new electoral institutions.  The kingdom of 




 Like Morocco, Kuwait held its first post-independence elections in 1963 and the 
resulting parliament soon became the principal counterweight to the regime. 
Confrontations between the monarch, referred to locally as the emir, and National 
Assembly have twice led to the suspension of parliament (from 1976 to 1981 and 1986 to 
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1992) without elections for a new one, which is required under the constitution.  During 
each period, the regime changed the electoral system to alter the make-up of the 
legislative body comprised of 50 elected members.  Thus, the size and composition of 
electoral districts has been a focal point of this ongoing power struggle.  In 1981, the emir 
effectively curbed the powers of parliament by replacing the old system of ten districts 
each electing five representatives with a new one in which twenty-five districts each 
elected two representatives.  Each voter could vote for two candidates, with the top two 
vote getters taking seats in the parliament.  This electoral arrangement reinforced 
clientelism because it led to very close races and campaigns that centered upon 
neighborhood issues, pitting families and tribes against each other.  The redistricting also 
diluted the strength of opposition elements in urban (hadhar) areas and powerful tribal 
blocs though not all of the tribes per se (Gavrieldes 1987). 
 The first parliamentary elections after Kuwait was liberated from Iraqi occupation 
garnered widespread international and domestic attention.  Although the 1992 election 
used the same electoral law and district boundaries from the previous two elections, it 
brought out large numbers of candidates representing newly prominent social bases 
(Tétreault 2000: 110).  To counteract the political realities created by gerrymandering, 
“tribal primaries” emerged as an effective way to ensure the election of members of the 
largest tribes to parliament.  Although these internal elections are technically illegal, the 
Kuwaiti government tolerates them because they often result in pro-regime deputies 
being elected to parliament.  As in the case of Jordan, tribal candidates in Kuwait often 
highlight their connections with the state and ability to deliver material benefits to 




center to the periphery.  Tétreault (2000: 115) describes the outlines of this strategy in the 
following account of Kuwait’s electoral politics: 
Favors for favors, measured in votes as well as in direct campaign contributions, are the 
province of the “service candidate” who acts both as ombudsman and benefactor to 
individual constituents in his district.  The government is a silent partner in this patron-
client system, helping to entrench service candidates by channeling favors through 
parliamentarians who prove themselves to be the kind of men the government prefers. 
Constituents who approach service candidates find it easier to obtain scarce and selective 
benefits ranging from permits to import labor to authorizations to seek medical care 
abroad—for which travel as well as medical expenses are paid—than if they were to 
apply through regular bureaucratic channels. 
  
    
 Since Kuwait’s first national elections in 1963 (also the same year as Morocco 
and Bahrain), the parliament has been the central arena for negotiation between the ruling 
family and the opposition.  Consequently, elections that constitute this body were of 
utmost interest and the Kuwaiti opposition viewed electoral reform as the gateway to a 
serious political reform process (Brown 2006: 2).  Yet the broad spectrum of Kuwait’s 
opposition—ranging from liberals to Sunnis and Salafis—seemed inherently divided and 
was constantly outmaneuvered by the ruling family.  Beginning in the mid-1990s, 
however, the parliament became more assertive and these disparate groups found 
common ground albeit with different motives.  In 2003, the parliament initiated a push 
for electoral reform, hoping this would create a more cohesive body oriented toward 
addressing broad issues more than constituent service (Brown 2008a).  Bolstered by the 
parliament’s role in resolving a succession crisis after the emir died in January 2006, a 
pro-reform coalition emerged that consisted of 29 MPs in favor of electoral reform. Faced 
a cohesive and determined opposition within parliament coupled with the sudden 
emergence of student protests in Kuwaiti streets, the newly installed emir dissolved 




reshuffle the parliamentary deck in his favor (Salem 2008: 216).  The regime assumed 
that a new election under the old rules would work to its advantage but it miscalculated 
the popular support for reformist candidates.   
  With a highly charged political climate and boost in turnout, the “coalition of 
change” won a resounding victory in the June 2006 elections, renewing its majority in the 
new parliament.  The emir recognized the electoral mandate and was forced to relent to 
the opposition demands as the cabinet approved a new electoral system in July 2006.  
Under the new law, the number of electoral districts was reduced from twenty-five to five 
in which each district elects ten parliamentarians.  The ballot structure was also adjusted 
in that each voter now selects four candidates, with the top ten vote getters in each district 
being awarded parliamentary seats.  Reformers hoped that larger districts and hence 
larger electoral thresholds would eliminate vote buying.  They also hoped that the new 
electoral law would encourage more issue-based campaigns rather than personalistic 
campaigns based on family and neighborhood loyalties.  Since an opposition-led 
coalition, which included the Islamist Constitutional Movement (also known by its 
Arabic acronym HADAS), had spearheaded the electoral reform, many believed the next 
round of parliamentary elections would be the “real test” of the system; the ruling family 
would be forced either to reduce its role in day-to-day government or to suspend the 
constitution and parliament (Salem 2008: 228).  
 This test would come much sooner than expected as relations between the 
parliament and regime lurched towards another crisis and the emir once again called for 
early elections to be held on May 17, 2008.  This time, the new electoral law produced 




the eve of the elections: “Tribes have still been holding primaries, in some ways feeling 
that they now have to work harder to coordinate voting.” Since tribal primaries largely 
decided the fate of various candidates, they also facilitated political patronage and 
electoral clientelism.  Hence, HADAS was unable to overcome these factors as evidenced 
by the high degree of dispersion of votes for candidates across electoral districts.188 
 Like Morocco, the 2008 elections in Kuwait dealt a serious setback to the main 
Islamist party.  But the result is even more puzzling considering that the electoral reform 
enacted in 2006 was supposed to benefit HADAS.  Brown (2008b: 5) asks poignantly in 
his post-election analysis: “With a law seemingly tailor-made for its purposes and two 
years of preparation, why did HADAS see its share of seats cut by half?”  The case of 
Kuwait thus presents a series of puzzles regarding the electoral fortunes of the pro-reform 
movement in 2006 and the Islamist party in 2008 that warrant further study.  Why did the 
opposition perform so well under a disadvantageous system but so poorly under an 
advantageous one? 
 I argue that clientelism continues to thrive under an electoral system in which 
electoral thresholds are higher.  Unlike Morocco, Kuwaiti elections have often featured 
significant amounts of strategic voting by which candidates trade the votes of their die-
hard supporters for the votes of other candidates. The conventional wisdom tells us that 
allowing voters to select more candidates on ballots should facilitate vote-swapping and 
strategic coordination even more.  Yet, contrary to what we might expect from a ballot 
that afforded four votes for candidates in each ten-member district, it is very possible that 
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more Kuwaitis cast their ballots for candidates they expected could provide them wasta 
rather than coalescing around candidates that were more likely to win.  The case of 
Kuwait thus provides a foil to my central argument about Jordan’s switch to the “one 
vote” system and lower electoral thresholds.  It appears in this case that when voters were 
afforded more choice, they still vote along tribal lines rather than distributing their 
remaining votes along ideological grounds. 
 
Egypt 
 Egypt has sought to manage the opposition primarily through the manipulation of 
institutions that regulate political parties, associations and the press.  These strategies are 
meant to reinforce the regime, which is embodied in the office of the president, but 
maintained in practice by a dominant ruling party.  The Arab Socialist Union, for 
example, represented the power base of the Egyptian regime during the 1960s and 1970s.  
After multiparty elections were introduced in 1976, President Sadat created the National 
Democratic Party (NDP) to serve as the institutional reservoir for political elites and, 
more importantly, an instrument for containing conflict amongst them.  The case of the 
NDP differs somewhat from Morocco’s “palace parties” and Jordan’s loyalist deputies in 
that it has become institutionalized to large extent within Egypt’s authoritarian edifice 
and has become a pillar of Mubarak’s rule.  Analysis of the NDP’s electoral fortunes thus 
provides considerable insights into the health of the regime.  
 The traditional opposition in Egypt is made up of the Left and Islamists.  Socialist 
parties vary across the Arab world but most originate from colonial independence 




cases of Jordan and Morocco, Egypt’s Wafd party emerged in the 1940s as the principal 
opposition to the British colonial administration and a potential counterweight to the 
monarchy but was later co-opted and ultimately displaced.  Today, the opposition parties 
that constitute the Left remain structurally weak and are plagued by aging leadership, a 
history of infighting, and petty personal politics.  As for the Islamists, the Muslim 
Brotherhood clearly represents the most significant political opposition in Egypt.  It 
enjoys widespread popular appeal but its electoral influence is sharply limited and its 
political agenda is ambiguous.189  In broad historical terms, the Muslim Brotherhood has 
been tolerated by the state but it does not recognize it as a legal political party or political 
association.  For this reason, Islamist candidates formally run as independents even 
through their affiliation with the Brotherhood is well known.  As such, the boundaries of 
Islamist electoral participation and it the degree of its parliamentary representation has 
been part of a prolonged bargaining process with the Egyptian regime throughout its 
modern history.190     
 Despite its overwhelming influence in virtually every political sphere, the regime 
has changed the electoral system on a number of occasions to redistribute the balance of 
power in the Parliament between the opposition and the NDP.191  The most critical period 
of electoral reform occurred during the 1980s when Egypt moved from a party-list 
                                                
189 See the analysis by Brown (2007) about the commitment of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to core 
principles related to democracy and human rights. 
 
190 As Mitchell (1971: 27) notes, the founder and spiritual guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al-
Banna, made a deal with the Nahhas government to withdraw his candidacy from the 1941 elections in 
exchange for a number of concessions. 
 
191 Posusney (2002) provides more details about electoral engineering under Sadat and Mubarak.  Much of 
her account derives from Kamal Khalid, one of the Egyptian lawyers who filed court cases against the 




proportional system with 48 electoral districts to one in which the 444 seats were 
allocated to the top two majority winners in 222 constituencies.  Even though Egyptian 
courts supposedly forced the regime to make the change,192 the new “winner-take-all” 
system was heavily titled toward the NDP because of its dominance of patron-client 
relationships.  Egypt’s current electoral rules thus place a premium on a candidate’s (or 
party’s) ability to mobilize its core voters and, as a result, the system tends to promote the 
candidacies of local elites with ready-made vote banks (Masoud 2008: 120).   
 Many political analyses define Egypt’s electoral system as a relatively 
straightforward first-past-the-post system.  In doing so, they essentially reduce the 
political impacts of the system to vote distortions that favor the ruling party (e.g. 
Posusney 2002) without illuminating some of the underlying mechanisms that shape 
electoral behavior more profoundly.  In a recent dissertation, Masoud (2008) goes beyond 
facile descriptions to portray several unique features of Egypt’s electoral system such as 
the dual vote, electoral quota and runoffs (121-123).193  He emphasizes that one of the 
implications is that the value of a candidate’s personal reputation increases dramatically.  
To buttress this argument, Masoud points out the article by Carey and Shugart (1995) that 
rank orders electoral systems to the degree which they “affect candidates’ incentives to 
run on personal rather than party reputations.”  According to this scheme, he notes 
Egypt’s system ranks fourth (124), thereby placing it just behind those used in Jordan and 
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193 See pages 121-123 for details about the dual vote, electoral quota and runoffs that he claims allow 




Morocco.  This shows that the major component to electoral system design in the Middle 
East, irrespective of regime type and binary majoritiarian/proportional classifications, 
involves the degree of personalism that it engenders.    
 If the electoral system has benefited the NDP and inhibited the opposition, 
especially the performance of Left vis-à-vis Islamists, what explains the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s unprecedented success in the 2005 parliamentary elections in which it won 
88 seats, more than five times its previous share in parliament?    
 The 2005 elections were a turning point for a number of reasons.  For one, the 
opposition was galvanized by a series of political protests that occurred throughout the 
year, sparked by a new opposition movement known as Kifaya or “Enough” in Egyptian 
Arabic.  The Muslim Brotherhood even participated in demonstrations while its 
leadership exercised restraint in its official discourse so as not to provoke a crackdown 
from the regime.  Moreover, a number of secular parties jumped on the opposition 
bandwagon and put aside longstanding personal differences to unite in a common front. 
In this electoral context, the opposition was poised to make significant gains even though 
the dominance of the NDP would remain unchallenged.  As Brown and Hamzawy 
summarize succinctly in a post-election analysis (2005: 3), “None of Egypt’s political 
actors expected that parliamentary elections would result in anything other than a victory 
for the NDP.  But the extent of that victory, the nature and size of the parliamentary 
opposition, and the ability of the regime to prevent meaningful reform were all open to 
question.”  Thus, the scope of the opposition’s success in 2005 is of critical interest.   
 Although the Muslim Brotherhood only presented candidates in a limited number 




previous parliament.  Contrary to past elections, the Muslim Brotherhood candidates 
captured a significant amount of the protest vote at the expense of the other opposition 
parties (Masoud 2008).  According to Brown and Hamzawy (2003: 5), “Almost 70 
percent of NDP nominees lost such contests. In other words, those voters given a direct 
and unambiguous choice between the NDP and the Brotherhood chose the Brotherhood 
by a wide margin.”  The accountability principle is frequently cited by proponents of 
majorittarian systems and, in the case of Egypt, it clearly worked against unpopular 
incumbents in a combustible electoral climate. 
 Sensing the shock that a widespread victory of Brotherhood candidates would cast 
over the body politic, the regime engineered a number of key victories in subsequent 
rounds of voting by harassing opposition supporters and falsifying electoral results in a 
number of closely contested races.  A number of independents who had defeated NDP 
candidates were abruptly ushered into the party with perks and promises of benefits no 
doubt.  Even though the NDP ended up with 311 seats, the elections can still be construed 
as a blunder because the Egyptian regime had to rely on coercion and blatant electoral 
manipulation much more than the other case studies.  As a result, the aura of ruling party 
dominance was shaken and the opposition has been emboldened to press for additional 
reforms.  Whether the Brotherhood can solidify its position as the principal opposition 
and integrate itself as a legitimate political actor remains to be seen.  
 According to Koehler (2007: 983), Egypt’s struggle over the laws and practices 
regulating the electoral arena since the mid-1980s can be framed in terms of the regime 
yielding to oppositional demands in successive steps, thus leading to a more open arena 




liberalization of electoral administration and judicial supervision.  But it is short-sighted, 
on the other hand, in the sense that the new electoral system instituted in 1990 reinforced 
clientelism and the traditional arenas of control under the ruling party.  The system lost 
its effectiveness, however, when the opposition coalesced prior to the 2005 parliamentary 
elections and voters could make a clear choice between incumbent and opposition 
candidates.  It further spells potential trouble for President Mubarak because he is clearly 
identified with the ruling party and cannot stand above politics the same way as the 
linchpin monarchs in Morocco and Jordan.  In this context, it is interesting that the 
regime moved in 2007 to reintroduce a mixed electoral system not only to blunt any 
rising electoral influence of the Brotherhood but also to insulate it from electoral 
accountability.  These subtle moves coupled with continued regime-sponsored coercion 
shows that Egypt uses all the “tools in the box” to suppress the opposition.   
 
Palestine 
 The history of Palestinian elections and the electoral laws that governed them are 
intimately linked to the broader conflict with Israel.194  In contrast to other cases where 
parliamentary elections were introduced under the auspices of colonial administration and 
became a focal point for bargaining between incumbent elites and the opposition, 
electoral rules were not part of the Palestinian political calculus until secret negotiations 
occurred between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israel in the early 1990s.  
Even then, the 1993 Oslo Agreement only included a provision for an elected Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC) to be established and did not spell out how the body would be 
                                                




elected.  Subsequent negotiations during the Interim Agreement in 1995 hammer out the 
details for the first scheduled elections in January 1996.  At the time, the two principal 
protagonists included Fatah, which had to a large extent controlled the Palestinian 
movement from abroad, and Hamas, which had emerged from a Palestinian branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood during the intifada at the end of the 1980s.  Although both entities 
shared a commitment to the liberation of Palestine and self-determination for their 
people, they have never been able to reconcile fully their competing claims for authority 
and representation of the Palestinian national cause. 
 The dramatic breakthrough in 1993 changed the strategic situation on the ground 
for both parties.  The PLO gained a substantial foothold within Palestinian institutions of 
self-governance (Rubin 1999) as its personnel were handpicked to populate the 
bureaucracy and security services of the nascent Palestinian Authority.  In contrast, the 
primary means of recruitment and mobilization for Hamas were shut down since the 
agreement stipulated an end to the intifada (Mishal 2000: 67).  Although Fatah and 
Hamas reached an understanding the following month regarding conflict over Oslo, the 
asymmetric relationship between the two parties was clearly established.  From this point 
on, maintenance of the Palestinian Authority essentially came to rely upon the 
management of relations among traditional elites within Fatah and control over the 
Islamist opposition through various strategies of coercion, co-optation and containment.  
 As such, the case of Palestine demonstrates the importance of domestic factors as 
the political dynamics among various Palestinian factions at the time played a significant 




system used for the 1996 parliamentary elections195, the choice of a candidate-centered 
“Block Vote” system therefore emerged in response to three pressures: the wish to 
provide a channel for informal candidacies of persons linked to movements which 
formally rejected the process; the desire of a number of prominent figures to stand as 
independents; and the recollection of historic elections.  Ultimately, however, the 
fundamental difference over the peace agreement with Israel led to Hamas boycotting the 
elections with the knowledge that its participation would bestow it with tacit recognition 
and legitimacy for the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority.  Unsurprisingly then, the 
new Legislative Council was dominated by members of the Fatah Party, who won 52 of 
88 seats, and 14 independents affiliated with the party.  While international observers 
deemed the election “largely fair,” many candidates later filed complaints with the 
Central Election Commission that suggest incumbents and Fatah loyalists used resources 
at their disposal to affect the outcome.196  As such, a number of analyses (e.g. Mahler 
1996) rightly conclude that the elections served to formalize the already empowered 
administration of Yassir Arafat and his Fatah Party. 
 After the climactic failure of the Camp David summit in 2000, the relationship 
between Fatah and Hamas was subsumed by the prospects of renewed conflict with 
Israel.  The subsequent outbreak of violence and mass uprising within the Palestinian 
territories, which became known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, dramatically changed the 
balance of power between Fatah and Hamas.  Besides Israel’s military reprisals aimed at 
Palestinian institutions, internal politics also underwent profound changes.  As Brown 
                                                
195 See the summary entitled “Palestine: Political Realities Shape the System” by the ACE Electoral 
Knowledge Network.  Available online http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esy/esy_ps.  
 




notes (2007: 7), a Palestinian reform movement emerged with the aim of transforming the 
authoritarian system into a far more accountable and democratic structure.  By the time of 
Arafat’s death in late 2004, moderates within Fatah had accepted that they would have to 
divest some of the PA’s authority and share power with their rivals, an unthinkable 
proposition until recent times.  In January 2005, newly elected Palestinian President 
Mahmoud Abbas, an Arafat loyalist and longtime Fatah apparatchik, agreed to hold 
parliamentary elections that would determine the face of a new Palestinian Authority.  
Once again, the political realities on the ground would shape electoral reform but this 
time the result was profoundly different for the principal political actors.  
 On June 18, 2005, after months of haggling, the Palestinian Authority reached an 
agreement that detailed procedures for candidate registration and the means by which 
candidates and party lists could qualify to run.  More importantly, the Election Law 
stipulated a mixed (parallel) system in which half of the PLC’s members would be 
chosen through proportional representation (PR) with closed-party lists in one national 
district, while the other half would be chosen from sixteen multi-member local districts. 
Voters would cast one ballot for a national party list and one ordinal ballot for local 
district candidates.  The electoral threshold for the national district seats would be two 
percent.  Six seats would be reserved for Christian candidates. Some of the characteristics 
of the electoral system were negotiated among Palestinian factions, including Hamas, in 
Cairo, Egypt in March 2005.  For Hamas, the Cairo Agreement cemented its participation 
in the scheduled elections.  
 By that time, Hamas had already emerged as the principal electoral opposition to 




Bank and Gaza by delivering social services and taking a hard line against the terms of 
past peace agreements with Israel.  However, the participation of Hamas as a political 
party was problematic because Hamas also retained an armed wing that had engaged in 
acts of terrorism.  This issue opened an intense debate about whether Hamas should be 
allowed to participate at all.  President Mahmoud Abbas’ strategy was to bind Hamas 
politicians by the rules of the Palestinian system once they were elected, not to bar or 
limit their candidacies before elections.  Even though polls indicated Hamas was poised 
to make significant gains at the ballot box, Abbas consistently argued that he would be in 
a stronger position to integrate the party into the Palestinian Authority and disarm 
militant factions after the elections.  The linchpin of Abbas’ plan was based on a limited 
role for Hamas in a Fatah-led government and the legitimacy that open elections would 
confer on his rule (Yaghi 2005). 
 On election day, turnout was over 77 percent of the Palestinian population.  The 
“Change and Reform” Party (Hamas) captured a majority of seats (74) despite only 
winning a plurality (45 percent) of the popular vote.  On the national list ballot, Hamas 
won 29 seats.  The striking results, and the key to the Hamas victory, was in the multi-
member district elections.  In those contests, Hamas won a staggering 45 seats, nearly 
three-fourths of the seats allocated under the majority/plurality formula.  While 
widespread dissatisfaction with Fatah’s decade-long rule of the Palestinian Authority 
certainly played a major role in its dismal performance, three ruling party made a series 





 The major blunder was adopting a mixed system in the summer of 2005.  This 
decision was particularly perplexing given that Abbas and his allies in the Palestinian 
Central Committee knew that using PR in a single national district was the best way to 
limit the number of seats Hamas could gain in the elections.  In the end, Abbas chose to 
accommodate demands for a parallel system and abandoned the strict PR system despite 
the polling and considerable political opposition from within his own party.197   By 
competing on a national level in one district, Hamas would have lost its advantage of 
fielding highly popular candidates in local communities and may have won only a narrow 
plurality of seats instead of an outright majority. 
 The second error was Fatah’s decision to hold a series of primary elections to 
determine its candidates on both the district and national slates.  On one hand, Abbas 
probably sensed the popularity of the younger Fatah activists and hoped the primary 
elections would help him to usher out some of the so-called “old guard” who were 
viewed as corrupt and ineffective.  Of course, Fatah’s “old guard” fought vigorously to 
retain their high positions on national and district party lists despite losing badly in 
Fatah’s primary elections. Many of them appealed to the “Committee of the Wise,” a 
body of high-level party officials who disregarded the primary results and appointed 
candidates at will.  The two devices of selecting candidates, by primaries and party 
assemblies, operated concurrently and in direct conflict with one another.  According to 
one political party building expert, parties that want to build support during this process 
                                                
197 A poll conducted by Bir Zeit University in late April 2005 revealed that if PLC elections were to 
proceed under such a system, Fatah would win 41 percent of the seats while Hamas would win only 23 
percent.  Moreover, in May 2005, the Palestinian cabinet recommended eliminating the mixed system 
based on the consensus opinion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Executive Committee. 




“generally rely on one of these two devices.”198   Consequently, the primary process 
further divided Fatah. 
 The third mistake was establishing a weak electoral threshold for district-level 
candidates.  As the party primaries drew to a close, it was obvious that the internal 
struggle had taken a toll on Fatah’s ratings.  A damaging consequence of Fatah’s party 
list disputes was that it did not allow room for prominent and respected independents to 
join its ranks.  In turn, many independents and deposed members of the “old guard” 
decided to run in the district races, which effectively siphoned votes away from Fatah 
candidates.  In contrast, Hamas never ran more candidates than seats in multi-member 
district races.  While Hamas’ supporters voted largely for Hamas candidates, supporters 
of Fatah and other parties scattered their votes among a large number of candidates.199  
 In sum, the new electoral law promulgated in 2005 offers a powerful, albeit 
partial, explanation for the Hamas “tsunami” in subsequent parliamentary elections.  
Although the dramatic outcome did reflect a confluence of powerful societal forces, a 
number of electoral mechanisms were instrumental in locking the various parties and 
candidates into a set of rules and procedures that exacerbated divisions within Fatah and 
allowed Hamas to capitalize on its organization at the local level.  As in the case of 
Egypt, it interesting to note that the Palestinian Authority has since changed the electoral 
formula by a presidential decree.    
 
 
                                                
198 See the paper published in 2005 for the National Democratic Institute (NDI) by Susan Scarrow entitled, 
“Political Parties and Democracies in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives.” 
199 See the insightful analysis and diagram by Jerret Blanc, “More Votes, Fewer Seats,” published in the 





 The brief comparative historical analysis of recent parliamentary elections in 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt and Palestine supports the argument that the manipulation of 
electoral institutions can backfire for regimes under certain conditions.  The Palestinian 
electoral reforms in 2005 demonstrate this proposition most clearly.  The cases of the two 
Gulf monarchies also reveal that gerrymandering electoral districts enabled opposition 
gains when it fully participated in elections under a crystallized reform message.  A high 
degree of political turbulence also changes the dynamics of accountability under “winner-
take-all” arrangements as the case of Egypt shows.  Not to be forgotten, in all the cases 
the regime lost control over the process of drafting a new electoral law. 
 In sum, this section has highlighted how these regimes made strategic 
miscalculations (and an outright blunder in the case of the Palestinian Authority) with 
their choice of electoral institutions.  Decisions to leave electoral arrangements intact 
despite shifting dynamics within the regime and opposition also produced electoral 
miscues.  My main purpose, however, was to illuminate the extent to which particular 
mechanisms affected the strategic behavior of incumbent and opposition elites, most 
notably in observable degrees of cohesion and coordination.   
 
2. Developing a Typological Theory 
  
This section aims to construct inductively a typological theory by using evidence gleaned 
from within-case analysis of two primary case studies and comparison of four secondary 




explained by George and Bennett (2004: 235-236), it identifies “generalized pathways” 
or “syndromes” associated with an outcome of interest.  Typological theorizing also 
recognizes that the same outcome can arise through different pathways and therefore only 
develops “contingent generalizations” rather than universal theories or causal 
explanations.  
 This project seeks to illuminate how electoral rules have reinforced Arab regimes 
through a series of domestic processes and electoral outcomes.  My theory links the 
consequences of electoral rules to degrees of cohesion among elites and opposition actors 
by identifying nine variables of interest.  They are: 1) costs of entry into the electoral 
arena; 2) incentives to defect to competing groups; 3) corresponding degrees of 
factionalism; 4) type of campaign strategies pursued; 5) type of reputation cultivated; 6) 
levels of party mobilization; 7) incidence of vote buying; 8) prevalence of sincere voting; 
and 9) extent of voter accountability.  Chapter 2 described some of these intermediate 
variables and how electoral rules can determine different value for each one.  Having 
described compared and contrasted the electoral experiences of primary and secondary 
case studies, I now seek to construct a typological theory that explains how lower 
electoral thresholds and candidate-oriented systems produced greater stability across 





 Tables 5.1 and 5.2 places the primary and secondary case studies in the typological 
space with the corresponding values for the intermediate variables.  The primary cases of 




reform for comparison.  The secondary cases of Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt and Palestine 
encompass the period of interest between 2005 and 2006.  The first three rows describe 
the electoral system of each case based on the aforementioned components of district 
magnitude, ballot structure and electoral formula.   
 The intermediate variables are ordered sequentially and grouped according to the 
“generalized pathways” depicted in the previous models.  The first three variables (entry 
costs, defection and factionalism) capture the calculus of political actors regarding 
participation in the electoral process.  The second three (mobilization, campaign and 
reputation) reflect strategic decision making during the actual electoral competition.  The 
last three (sincere voting, reputation and accountability) attempt to measure the saliency 
of clientelism on voting behavior.  Although all of the assigned values in the property 
space are subjective, they were informed from the empirical analysis, a number of post-




























Implications for  
the Argument  
District 
Magnitude Small Small Small Small 
No major changes in either 























Major change in Morocco 
      
1) Entry Costs Medium Low Medium Low Major decrease after reform 
2) Defection Low Low High High No change in either case 
3) Factionalism Low Medium Medium High Minor increase over time 
4) Mobilization Medium Low Medium Low Major decrease after reform 
5) Campaign Bonding Bonding Bonding Bonding No change in either case 
6) Reputation Personal Personal Personal Personal No change in either case 
7) Sincere Voting High High High High No change in either case 
8) Vote Buying Medium High Medium High Minor increase over time 















Implications for  
the Argument  
District 
Magnitude Small Large Small Small 






















Only major changes in 
Palestine 
      
1) Entry Costs Medium Medium Low Low Minor changes in Egypt/Pal 
2) Defection Medium Medium High High No major changes 
3) Factionalism Medium Medium High Medium No major changes 
4) Mobilization Low Low Low High Minor changes in Kuwait 
5) Campaign Bonding Bonding Bonding Bonding No major changes 
6) Reputation Personal Personal Personal Personal No major changes 
7) Sincere Voting Medium Medium Medium Medium No major changes 
8) Vote Buying High High High Medium No major changes 





 The shaded boxes in Table 5.1 indicate changes in values across time in the 
primary case studies and suggest at least five theoretically important variables.  It is 
important to note this does not suggest the other four variables are unimportant.  Rather, 
they simply did not register a significant change after the new electoral system was 
instituted.  For example, personalism and allegiances based on kinship are deeply 
engrained norms and ideas within many Arab societies and may not be affected by 
changes to electoral laws.  While these aspects of electoral behavior may endogenous to 
institutional change, they are still useful for comparison.  With this in mind, I explain the 
change in each variable of interest in turn, with a particular emphasis on the primary case 
studies.  I draw from the secondary case studies in order to buttress certain arguments.  
Shaded boxes in Table 5.2 highlight instances in which secondary cases provide 
disconfirming evidence for my theory.  In some cases, this helps to illuminate the 
different conditions in which electoral rules interact with clientelism.    
 
Variables of Interest 
 The first is entry costs (#1), which decreased dramatically in both Jordan and 
Morocco after regimes enacted more permissive electoral rules in 1993 and 2002 
respectively (see Table 3.4 in the case of Jordan).  Lower entry costs, as indicated in 
these cases by the threshold of votes required to win, initially encouraged participation 
among opposition actors and elites.  As more candidates threw their hat in the ring 
believing they could win, political parties faced difficulty in mobilizing support and 
coordinating votes under their labels.  The chapter on the performance of the PJD in 




among opposition actors and prevented the consolidation of competing forces around 
which voters can coalesce.  On the other hand, large numbers of candidates and low voter 
turnout mean that victory requires relatively small vote shares, which in turn means that a 
party’s ability to mobilize its core voters is paramount—an advantage on which the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas capitalized in recent parliamentary elections in Egypt 
(2005) and Palestine (2006) respectively. 
 The primary case studies demonstrate that low entry costs encourage greater 
numbers of incumbent and opposition elites to participate in elections.  In both, the field 
of candidates and parties expanded greatly after changes to electoral rules.  Most notably, 
the switch to a “one vote” system in Jordan fostered the growth of independent 
candidates over the next decade and a half and eventually enabled “new capitalists” to 
compete effectively in the 2007 elections.  On the other hand, low entry costs have also 
worked against the ruling parties in Egypt and Palestine.  Indeed, Masoud (2008: 23) 
places low entry costs (or barriers to entry) at the center of his explanatory framework on 
electoral environments and stresses how low they became by the time of Egypt’s 
parliamentary elections in 2005 (26).  He argues that low barriers to entry largely explain 
the success of Muslim Brotherhood candidates and divisions within the NDP.  Likewise, 
the self-destruction of Fatah before the 2006 Palestinian elections can be traced to the low 
entry costs that ensued from the open nomination process and concurrence of party 
primaries and assemblies in the latter months of 2005.  In sum, lower entry costs in the 





 The second is factionalism (#3), which has increased in both Morocco and Jordan 
as a result to changes in the ballot structure.  In the case of Jordan, the change in ballot 
structure from multiple votes to a single vote heightened competition within 
multimember districts.  Candidates of similar political orientations were forced to 
distinguish themselves from others with similar ideologies or political orientations by 
drawing on clientelist networks and promises of patronage.  Even though some groups 
have used traditional “tribal primaries” to overcome this dilemma, the “one vote” system 
continues to generate a “medium” degree of factionalism.  The empirical analysis of 
Jordan alluded to the emergence of inter-generational rivalries among tribes in the run-up 
to the 2007 elections, for example.  The degree of factionalism within Jordan’s recent 
parliament, as evidenced by the emergence of the Al-Ikha bloc, is also attributable to an 
electoral system that promotes individualism.  In the case of Morocco, the adoption of 
closed party lists have generated a “high” degree of factionalism within established 
parties and led to rampant amounts of party switching before and after elections.  Despite 
efforts to clamp down on this practice of transhumance, the competition among 
candidates over the rank ordering on party lists continues to engender significant 
factionalism.  An open list or preferential system could alleviate factionalism in 
Moroccan politics.  While some Islamist parties in the various case studies, including the 
PJD in Morocco, have shown the organizational capacity and internal cohesion to elude 
this fate, factionalism has significantly impacted secular opposition parties and the 
institutionalization of the overall party system.  Both incumbent and opposition elites 
across the region are obviously motivated to hang on to their positions of influence within 




 The third is mobilization (#4), which decreased to “low” levels in both Jordan and 
Morocco after new electoral laws reduced incentives for parties and candidates to mass 
mobilize and instead focus their resources on turning out their core supporters.  In Jordan, 
the “one vote” system dramatically reduced the electoral threshold so that candidates 
continue to be elected with only a few thousand votes, thus reinforcing the use of wasta 
and patronage as the primary tools of mobilization.  In addition to Bachelani’s (1999) 
study of party mobilization in Jordanian elections, my own personal interviews with 
newly elected parliamentarians in 2009 provide strong evidence that the electoral system 
inhibits mobilization.  Likewise, in Morocco’s proportional system, the use of a Droop 
quota sets a relatively low bar, or “electoral average” as it is known, for parties to win a 
seat.  Key informant interviews before and after the 2007 elections confirm that 
Moroccan parties and candidates devoted limited resources to mobilization beyond this 
quota in each district because the reward of capturing an additional seat is very difficult 
under the “largest remainder” formula.  Interestingly, electoral reform in Kuwait that 
reduced the number of electoral districts and increased the number of votes was thought 
to encourage party mobilization but has had little discernable effect on subsequent 
elections (see Brown 2010).     
 The fourth is vote buying (#8), the incidence of which has increased to “high” 
under supposedly more “free and fair” electoral arrangements in both cases.  Although 
various forms of electoral clientelism are widespread and routine in both cases, the 
practice of vote buying has become more sophisticated and more salient in recent 
elections.  Some factors are directly related to the consequences of institutional-level 




the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 showed, this change dramatically decreased the 
electoral threshold required for winning a seat and therefore increased the value of each 
vote by two or three-fold.  The most recent parliamentary elections in 2007 witnessed an 
unprecedented amount of political money, which was instrumental to the success of the 
“new capitalist” candidates.  Nearly all of the newly elected deputies I interviewed 
admitted to doling out money during the campaign or promising material benefits after 
their election. Whether this is considered “earning” votes or simply “buying” them is 
deble.  What matters is that political actors are increasingly turning to financial resources, 
not programmatic platforms, to promote their candidacies.  In the case of Morocco, vote 
buying has persisted and also adapted to new technologies.  Despite some reforms to the 
process of electoral administration, the underlying system still encourages party bosses 
and local notables to employ vote buying in elections.  With limited mobilization and low 
turnout, vote buying has become a more salient factor.  Focus groups conducted after the 
2007 elections (see People’s Mirror report) provide strong evidence for this argument.  
Vote buying is also pervasive in the secondary case studies.  Blaydes (2006), for 
example, and details how the practice has become essential to the sustenance of the ruling 
party in Egypt.  
 The fifth is voter accountability (#9), which shows mixed results in the two case 
studies over time.  In Jordan, the switch to a “one vote” system has endowed a 
selectorate, narrowly defined, with greater accountability because their vote carries more 
weight.  Consequently, the numerous requests levied by citizens have given them 
leverage to reward or punish their “service representatives.”  The high rates of turnover 




deliver is further evidence that voters are able to impose accountability, but only within 
the confines of an electoral system that reinforces clientelism.  In Morocco, the switch to 
a proportional system has led to the opposite effect as voters only select a slate of 
candidates of which parties rank order.  The shares of votes and seats parties receive do 
not correspond with their participation and influence in parliament.  In fact, the king often 
designates the prime minister irrespective of the election results.  This system has 
exacerbated the alienation of the public with the electoral process and heightened its 
dissatisfaction with the role of parliament.  In sum, the two cases show markedly 
different outcomes, often with conflicting purposes, with regards to linkages between 
citizens and elected officials as a result of new electoral systems.  Yet the majoritarian 
formulas used in the secondary case studies had significant implications for 
accountability when the opposition crystallized.  In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood 
candidates fared very well in head-to-head match ups with incumbents.  In Bahrain and 
Kuwait, Shi’a and Sunni Islamists were able to capitalize on winning seats in electoral 
districts which they dominated.  And most notably in Palestine, Hamas was able to 
aggregate electoral victories in district-level contests into a parliamentary majority at the 
national level.     
 
Conclusions 
 What can be learned from this exercise in typological theorizing?  To begin, the 
typology and corresponding property space have identified some key intermediate 
variables.  Values on each of the nine variables reflect distinct political phenomena in 




authoritarian regime maintenance strategies through an interaction of formal and informal 
institutions.  Particular electoral rules have reinforced clientelist structures in the two 
cases through a number of mechanisms.  There are two mechanisms, in particular, that 
are worthy of discussion and deserving of further research. 
 The first mechanism is the electoral threshold, which was proposed initially as 
four working hypotheses about electoral system design and consequences.  The empirical 
analysis shows that lower electoral thresholds have been a critical institutional 
mechanism by which authoritarian regimes can dilute the electoral strength of opposition 
forces while, at the same time, structuring electoral competition for elites.  Both cases 
suggest a process by which reduced barriers to entry foster an inclusive, but also a more 
divisive, political environment.  Opposition actors face significant coordination dilemmas 
and elites commonly turn to patronage in the pursuit of votes and “pork” after they are 
elected.  This was clearly the case in Jordan’s switch to a “one vote” system in 1992. 
 In the case of Morocco, however, the key electoral mechanism related to the 
combination of low district magnitudes and proportional representation with a “largest 
remainder” formula.  This arrangement allows some minority parties to capture a seat in 
multi-member districts while reducing Duvergerian incentives to coalesce around 
stronger parties.  At the same time, it prevents opposition parties from aggregating 
district-level victories into a parliamentary majority.  Electoral outcomes are virtually 
guaranteed to produce electoral fractionalization and fragmented parliaments.  
 Moreover, this mechanism is desirable because it triggers a series of causal 
process that reinforce clientelist structures.  Lower thresholds allow local elites to draw 




This process continues in parliament as elected legislators feel added pressure to deliver 
material benefits to their constituencies so that potential challengers cannot poach their 
supporters based on targeted appeals.  
 Finally, the threshold mechanism indirectly links the periphery with the center of 
power by defining roles of various segments of the population under clientelism.  Local 
patrons exercise their power and seek to placate national elites within the upper echelons 
of power.  Political entrepreneurs are incorporated into an institution with closely defined 
rules for participation.  In turn, they serve as brokers between the regime and their 
constituencies.    
 The second mechanism is copartisanship, which is manifested in intra-party 
competition over electoral lists and struggles among candidates to distinguish themselves 
from others competing in the same electoral district.  Intra-party competition also 
undermines the value of party labels to candidates and voters. One reflection of this in the 
case of Morocco’s elections was the rampant party-switching prior to every election. 
Intra-party competition, the weakness of party labels and the relatively small districts also 
encouraged politicians to cultivate and respond to relatively narrow constituencies. 
Rather than moving along an ideological continuum of public policy positions, 
copartisans resort to traditional patronage and sophisticated forms of vote buying to affect 
electoral outcomes.  
 Based on incentive structure described above in the typological theory, I can offer 
the contingent generalization that authoritarian regimes wishing to institute liberalization 
under the guide of political pluralism are increasingly designing electoral institutions that 




briefly discusses the broader implications of this argument and suggests an agenda for 




















































POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR  
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
 
 
 The so-called “Arab Spring” in 2005 revealed that authoritarian regimes, no 
matter how closed their systems may be, are not immune from popular pressures for 
political pluralism and democratic elections.  At the same time, this period also 
demonstrated the ability of Arab autocrats to harness these pressures and channel them 
through competitive elections.  The “Arab Spring” bore no resemblance to its predecessor 
in Eastern Europe where the thaw of civil society overflowed authoritarian dams.  In the 
Middle East, romanticized notions of “people power” met the harsh reality of deeply 
entrenched Arab regimes.  Instead of spring turning into summer, a cold winter returned 
across the region from Casablanca to Cairo and from Beirut to Baghdad. 
 This seasonal metaphor reaffirms the line of thinking among many that we should 
abandon questions about when democracy will occur in the Middle East and instead 
examine how authoritarianism persists under the veneer of political liberalization.  With 
this paradigmatic shift taking hold, scholars have made significant strides in 
understanding the dynamics of “liberalized autocracy” (Brumberg 2006) and 
conceptualizing forms of “authoritarian upgrading” (Heydemann 2008) by which regimes 




increasingly recognize that Arab autocrats only pay lip service to democratic ideals and 
that few, if any, regimes are actually on the “right track” toward democracy.  
 It is surprising then that so few analyses of Arab authoritarianism address electoral 
institutions.  On one hand, those that focus on elections tend to deal with examples of 
blatant fraud and electoral malfeasance without considering the underlying rules of the 
game.  On the other hand, those that focus on institutions use relatively facile categories 
to explicate electoral system design and effects.  These academic debates have limited 
utility for policymakers and practitioners, however, and do not help them to understand 
the actual tools of authoritarian statecraft including electoral manipulation. 
 For this reason, the conclusion to this study attempts to build a bridge between the 
academic and policymaking communities with regards to electoral authoritarianism in the 
Middle East.  It does so by discussing the study’s implications for election observation 
missions and legislative strengthening programs.  Without sufficiently addressing how 
particular electoral rules skew the playing field and reinforce traditional forms of control, 
I suggest that democracy assistance programs actually may be perpetuating 
authoritarianism.  Before elaborating on this bold claim, I first provide a brief recap of 
the study’s main findings.  
 
Summary of Main Findings 
 The central puzzle of this study essentially boils down to why Arab incumbents 
continually dominate competitive multi-party elections?  I have argued that well-worn 
answers to this question—that elections are merely “window dressing” for the regime, or 




us so far.  Instead, I have sought to advance an institutional explanation for authoritarian 
resilience in the Middle East by focusing on the origins and effects of electoral rules in 
Morocco and Jordan. The main argument was that lower electoral thresholds generate 
unique electoral environments in which patronage politics thrive and opposition-based 
politics falter, thus producing a decidedly uneven playing field.  As such, electoral rules 
provide a window into these regimes and help explain their durability.   
 Although this study was motivated by an interest in electoral systems, the 
empirical analysis has shown that formal rules could not be examined in isolation.  
Ignoring informal institutions, cultural frames and symbolic rituals associated with 
monarchical rule would imperil the internal validity of the entire project.  I do not dispute 
the importance of these factors and therefore attempted to incorporate working 
hypotheses that underscored the role of clientelism.  I have shown the rules that govern 
elections and the politics of clientelism that condition them are not incompatible or 
mutually exclusive.  The challenge then is to integrate these approaches. 
 The first part of this project took up this task by devising an explanatory 
framework in which electoral rules serve to manage arenas of competition among ruling 
elites and to maintain political control over opposition elites.  It then put forth a basic 
model that illustrates the causal pathway from electoral rules to elite cohesion (see Figure 
1.3).  My theory stipulated that unified ruling elites and divided opposition elites help 
explain regime stability through electoral dominance whereas elite ruptures and 
opposition coalitions commonly lead to regime instability through electoral miscues.  
Subsequent chapters test this theory through an empirical analysis of elections in 




 Tracing the evolution of electoral systems in the two cases, Chapter 2 showed that 
choices regarding the so-called “rules of the game” reflect perceptions of relative power 
among incumbent and opposition elites.  Cohesion among ruling elites and disunity 
within the opposition have provided these monarchies with leeway to engineer electoral 
outcomes in their favor.  Since the onset of political liberalization in the 1980s, both have 
gradually moved away from “winner-takes-all” electoral strategies based on majoritarian 
rules and shifted toward less risky “divide-and-rule” arrangements that allow the 
distribution of patronage among competing forces.  The conditions that led to such 
fundamental electoral reforms largely relate to external events and economic crises that 
forced key decision makers (namely the king) to make zero-sum choices between 
intervention and accommodation.  Elite ruptures were more often a product rather than a 
cause of these crises.    
 In the following chapters, I also argued that the interaction between particular 
electoral rules and clientelism shaped the strategic behavior of political actors.  Focusing 
on recent parliamentary elections in 2007, Chapter 3 provided some evidence that 
Morocco’s List PR system presented coordination dilemmas for opposition parties and 
voters.  Chapter 4 showed that a combination of factors, including the “one vote” system, 
helps to explain the electoral success and incorporation of a new cadre of elites into 
Jordan’s parliament.  These electoral arrangements largely serve to prevent the 
emergence of alternative power bases with autonomous patronage networks that could 
offset the influence of the palace.   
 Chapter 5 extended the empirical analysis in the Arab world by examining four 




backfired and the opposition registered significant gains in parliamentary elections.  The 
research questions were under what conditions these mishaps occurred and whether we 
could identify any particular electoral mechanisms that produced undesirable outcomes 
for the regime.  I found that opposition mobilization was a key characteristic of these 
elections and that regimes were rendered vulnerable by the use of a majoritarian electoral 
formula in districts with low magnitudes.  This system enabled opposition movements to 
capitalize on widespread discontent, their own superior organization and partisan 
identification in competitive elections. 
 The empirical findings also suggest several notes of caution for democracy 
assistance programs in the Middle East and elsewhere.  While democracy promotion may 
have played an important role in propelling democratic transitions in some post-
authoritarian cases, it may be ineffective or even counterproductive with liberalized 
autocracies for two reasons.  First, election observation missions and ensuing assessments 
may be missing important elements of institutional design that skew the electoral playing 
field.  Secondly, foreign assistance programs aimed at strengthening legislatures or 
political parties may inadvertently be reinforcing patronage networks.  I begin by 
discussing the implications for election monitoring. 
 
Implications for Election Monitoring and Assessment 
 International election monitoring is one of the most recognizable forms of 
democracy assistance and has become a central part of the growing democracy promotion 
industry  (Bjornlund 2004).  Indeed, it is rare nowadays for a developing country to hold 




 Election observers are charged with examining an electoral process and making a 
judgment about its quality.  Studies have shown that the presence of these observers have 
varying effects on the electoral process and outcome.200  It is debatable, however, 
whether election observers are actually able to discern forms of electoral manipulation 
besides blatant fraud and vote tampering.  As Carothers (1997: 19) argues, “the numerous 
teams of inexperienced observers who stay for only a short time around election day are 
unlikely to see beyond the obvious.”  What challenges do election observers face in 
assessing electoral institutions? 
 The emerging literature on electoral authoritarianism provides some insight into 
this question.  Hartlyn and McCoy (2006), for one, describe a series of “observer 
paradoxes” in assessing electoral manipulation and its effect on electoral outcomes.  The 
four paradoxes they identify do capture both “up-stream” and “down-stream” forms of 
manipulation.  They also expand the scope of analysis well beyond election day by 
calling for more thorough assessments of the electoral playing field.  Rather than just 
describing a divided political opposition as a fait accompli, the authors cite a number of 
difficult “judgment calls” for election assessments such as determining whether the 
fragmentation of the opposition is caused primarily by manipulative, undemocratic 
changes to electoral rules (46). 
 This study, particularly the historical analysis of electoral systems in Morocco and 
Jordan, suggests a fifth paradox for observers, what I call the paradox of intentions.  As 
the name implies, this refers to the intentions of those who design particular electoral 
rules.  The paradox is lies in the realm between rhetoric and reality of electoral laws.  On 
                                                




one hand, the process that produces gerrymandered districts and other rules hatched 
behind closed doors is opaque.  On the other hand, the justification for certain electoral 
laws is often couched in the language of democracy.  
 The primary cases of Morocco and Jordan help illustrate this conundrum for recent 
election assessments.   To begin, public proclamations from officials about elections 
cannot be taken at face value because the actual decisions were made by a select few.  
Secondly, throne speeches of both kings in Morocco and Jordan before, during and after 
elections were also carefully scripted for both domestic and international audiences but 
do not belie their true intentions.  Finally, these regimes have invited election observers 
with the knowledge that strategic manipulation will be overlooked.   
 Observing the consequences of electoral systems and assessing the intentions of 
their designers are two distinct mandates and each is fraught with tough questions. How 
do observers determine whether electoral rules are engineered to produce certain 
outcomes?  How can observers secure access and reliable information from those who 
actually made decisions on electoral laws?   How do election assessments establish 
accountability for decision makers, namely the kind, who approve of manipulation? 
 As such, observers must exercise caution in making determinations about the 
intentions of electoral systems.  As Chaudhry (1997) notes in her study of economic 
institutions in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, institutions do not “flow effortlessly from the 
design table of omniscient rulers.” But what distinguishes the cases of Morocco and 
Jordan is that negotiations over electoral laws.  Brown (forthcoming) has characterized 
them as “prolonged and unequal bargaining processes.”  Although I have shown how 




ultimately a product of ruling elites and pro-regime technocrats. 
 Consequently, the design of electoral systems in these two case studies was 
consciously undertaken with certain intentions in mind.  This study has shown how 
institutional design and manipulation has been a consistent feature of regime maintenance 
strategies.  As Hall and Taylor (1996) argue, institutions are designed to preserve the 
power, prestige, privileges and most importantly, the distributional advantage of the 
dominant elite and its allies at the expense of society.  
 The practical dilemmas regarding electoral assessments then come into sharper 
focus.  While pre-election missions may analyze the mechanics of electoral formulas and 
so forth, post-election assessments rarely mention the electoral system. As a result, 
reporting on elections often miss these critical details. For example, Morocco’s pre-
election assessment in 2007 expressed clear disappointment with the “largest remainder” 
system and that revisions to the electoral law “did little to address the problem of parties 
not being able to gain more than one seat in a district” (NDI 2007a).  Later, the post-
election statement (NDI 2007b) merely restated the fact that “the system for allocating 
seats makes it difficult for individual parties to win more than one seat per district and 
increases the likelihood that seats in parliament are distributed relatively evenly among 
major parties.”  This leads me to a discussion of the implications for legislative 
strengthening programs. 
 
Implications for Legislative Strengthening Programs 
 As Brown and Hawthorne (2009: 19) note, many programs in the Middle East have 




tailored to the pre-democracy transition conditions of Arab countries.  U.S. assistance has 
come primarily in the form of funding for non-governmental associations (NGOs) based 
on the romanticized notion of civil society as the “wellspring of democracy.”  Yet many 
Arab regimes have not become more democratic and, in some instances, have even 
benefited from the use of NGOs as a form of social control.201  In comparison, the 
development of political institutions has received less attention and resources. 
 Despite the intrinsic importance of legislatures to democratic ideals, the 
institution itself has been often overlooked in systems that feature a powerful and 
dominant executive.  Although authoritarian legislatures are subsumed under the regime 
and may never become a co-equal branch of government, their development also has the 
potential to play significant mediating roles under liberalization and democratic 
transitions.  Legislative strengthening programs therefore constitute a vital component of 
democracy assistance and are closely linked to electoral systems.  After all, legislatures 
are the arena where the democratic potential of elections is transformed into reality. 
 On the other hand, authoritarian legislatures also embody the faults of electoral 
processes and democratic deficiencies.  For one, they can serve the interests of the regime 
by incorporating potential opposition forces as Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) have 
shown.  More commonly they represent competitions over access to state resources and 
are seldom arenas in which the opposition and incumbents struggle over the rules of the 
game (Lust 2009: 124).  Thus, authoritarian legislatures affect political stability by their 
capacity for the distribution of resources.202   
                                                
201 Langohr (2004) and Wiktorowiscz (2000) make this argument with regards to Egypt and Jordan. 




 The empirical analysis demonstrated that established political actors in both cases 
have been reluctant to challenge controversial aspects of the electoral system because 
they owe their own success to their ability to exploit them.  Simply put, their political 
livelihood is clientelist support networks that various electoral rules enable and facilitate. 
It is worth considering then whether legislative strengthening programs aimed at 
strengthening the linkages between citizens and representatives actually help to reinforce 
clientelist structures under authoritarianism.  This implication presents a choice for 
democracy assistance programs: should the parliament be empowered to make the 
outcomes of elections more meaningful or should the electoral system be reformed to 
make the composition of parliament more meaningful?  
 The current line of thinking within the democracy promotion community tends to 
favor the former approach.  In assessment of Morocco’s electoral framework (DRI 2007: 
1), for example, it was stated that the “limited role of Parliament in the constitutional 
architecture and the political context reduces the importance of elections for 
democratization.” The parliamentary support projects of several democracy assistance 
organizations in Morocco (NCSL, NDI and IRI) reflects this “horse before the cart” 
thinking.  Likewise, the U.S. government has also initiated legislative strengthening 
programs in recent years that are intended to improve the institutional capacity of the 
Moroccan parliament and its public image.  According to USAID (2004: 1), the overall 
objective of these programs is “enhanced parliamentary and legislative oversight 
capacities that will lead to inc reased popular recognition of legislative legitimacy and 





 In the eyes of many democracy practitioners, these efforts are succeeding.  
Denoeux and Desfosses (2007), for example, point to the growing contributions that the 
Moroccan legislature is making within the political system.  But they also highlight 
particular structural deficiencies that will prevent real change.  Ottaway (2006: 10) 
identifies genuine political reform as the missing link to the process of democratic 
transition under King Mohamed, noting that royal power has been used for many 
important initiatives, “but not to open the way to genuine political participation, and even 
less to increase the capability of institutions that could check the imbalances of power.” 
 As for the case of Jordan, USAID had been funding a legislative strengthening 
program since 2005 that focuses on a range of technical assistance projects.203  This work 
is largely overshadowed, however, by the ongoing debate over the controversial “one 
vote” system.  King Abdallah’s recent decision to dissolve parliament was scarcely 
contested and even publicly welcomed by many Jordanians who viewed the institution as 
corrupt and ineffective. By contrast, the accompanying call for a new electoral law to 
govern the next parliamentary elections generated substantial interest as a coalition of 
political forces launched a nationwide campaign for meaningful electoral reform.204  In 
Jordan, the opposition and many activists realize that the path towards true reform begins 
with repealing the controversial “one vote” system.  
 
                                                
203 Since 2005, the State University of New York/Center for International Development (SUNY/CID) has 
been implementing the USAID-funded Legislative Strengthening Program (LSP) in Jordan.  This five-year 
program organizes technical assistance, trainings, advisory services, and procurement for the parliament. 
See http://www.cid.suny.edu/our_work_projects_Legislative_strengthening23.cfm.  
 






 The ingredients to successful democracy assistance programs do not simply 
involve increased funding for legislative strengthening programs and more in-depth 
analysis by election observers.  While this study has shown the importance of the legal 
framework that undergirds elections and how it reinforces clientelism, the problem lies 
more within the democracy promotion industry itself and the political sensitivities that 
surround electoral reform.  
 Many democracy organizations have thrived in a results-driven bureaucratic 
culture and are often compelled to focus on high-profile projects or “feel good” 
organizations in order to secure continued funding.  Many of these assistance programs 
are unlikely to produce significant change and also signal tacit acceptance of regime-led 
“transitions to nowhere.”  Some have criticized the U.S. State Department's multi-million 
dollar "Middle East Partnership Initiative" (MEPI), for example, because it perpetuates a 
long-standing emphasis on the usual piecemeal reforms that avoid tinkering with the 
fundamental ruling institutions (Brumberg 2003, Wittes and Yerkes 2004).  Meanwhile, 
the political and financial costs for many democracy promotion programs are steep and 
the case could be made that such activities now run the risk of becoming unsustainable.205  
What kinds of policy levers are available then?   
 As this study has shown, many Arab regimes have established electoral systems 
that make it nearly impossible for any party to achieve a working majority in parliament.  
They have also increased representation for certain groups and instituted upper houses to 
                                                
205 For a powerful argument that the price tag attached to building democratic institutions is exorbitant and 




check the power of popularly elected chambers.  U.S. public officials need to put these 
practices on the agenda for bilateral discussions and negotiations.  Autocrats and ruling 
elites should no longer expect a “free pass” when visiting Washington and being able to 
hide behind vague promises of reform.  U.S. organizations such as NDI and the Carter 
Center could also refuse invitations to observe elections when the rules of the game are 
manipulated to the extent that elections are patently “un-free and unfair.”  
 Democracy assistance programs should not treat the symptoms to the exclusion of 
underlying causes, however.  I recommend two diametrical approaches for dealing with 
clientelism.  On one hand, policymakers could call for targeted electoral reforms that 
reduce incentives to cultivate a personal vote and the overall saliency of vote buying.  
Arab regimes, particularly U.S. allies such as Jordan and Morocco, are unaccustomed to 
“tough talk” from Washington and may accede to public demands in order to avoid 
further scrutiny.  This appears to have been the case in June 2005 when U.S. Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice called for more rapid democratization in Egypt. The outspoken 
criticism caught President Mubarak off guard and caused him to rethink any plans to 
crack down on the political opposition in advance of the elections. 
 On the other hand, democracy promotion could recognize the reality of 
clientelism in Arab societies and stop treating it as if it were a disease that must be 
eradicated in order for democracy to emerge.  USAID handbooks and policy materials on 
anti-corruption often mention clientelism as a “syndrome” and assume that all types of 
patronage are created equal.  This line of thinking clouds democracy assistance programs 
that deal with institutions such as the parliament that are embedded within preexisting 




there are elites that rely on patronage for their political livelihood but are also pushing for 
political change.  Carefully targeted assistance to these reform-minded figures could help 
them regain traction within the next parliament and broaden their base of support in 
society.   
 In conclusion, policymakers must recognize the linkage between formal electoral 
rules and informal politics of patronage.  The first step involves fundamental electoral 
reform that creates meaningful incentives for political actors to mobilize voters based on 
programmatic rather than personalistic goals and establishes accountability for ruling 
elites.  In turn, competition will be played on a more level playing field and institutions 
will grow.  These challenges will not be overcome overnight.  Understanding how 
electoral rules function under authoritarianism and why autocrats choose them may not 
advance democracy in the Middle East but it can help prevent authoritarianism from 
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